Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 38, Number 3, Summer 1994

Angelo M. Codevilla: Our Conceptual Decadence

Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War—Where It Doesn't
Ross H. Munro

NON-PROLIFERATION

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Clinton Fumbles the World
George Szamuely

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The Central American presidents (*left to right*), José Azcona of Honduras, José Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador, Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua. Courtesy of the *Tico Times*.

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Editor's Column

An editor has been called a man who knows what he wants, but can't say what it is. My initial obscure attempts to solicit articles ("No, what I'm really after is, well . . .") have already taught me the truth of that quip. Indeed, when friends ask what prompted me to take on editorial chores at this point in life, I reply that I think I know, but can't say what it is. So I guess that qualifies me for the job.

Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé knew what he meant *Orbis* to achieve when he launched it thirty-seven years ago. *Orbis* was to provide a scholarly, but provocative, alternative to the "Establishment" discourse on the ends and means of American foreign policy. It was to define and defend American national interests and the values of Atlantic civilization in an era when they were in clear and present danger. It was to remind American leaders of the perils of ignoring or misinterpreting geopolitical realities. And it was to promote the integration of the Western democracies in the hope that someday, after the Soviet challenge was met, the free peoples of the world might escape the tyranny of geopolitics.

We are proud of that legacy. One might even say that my appointment as editor of *Orbis* brings us full circle, inasmuch as I, like Strausz-Hupé in the 1950s, am professor of international relations and director of the international relations program at the University of Pennsylvania. But in the space of four decades, this institute and journal have changed as the world has changed. That is why we can state with confidence that many former, or casual, readers have an image of *Orbis* that is false. We invite you to invest a few hours—and a few dollars—over the next twelve months to look at us again. You may not like all that you see, in which case *mea culpa,* but you will not be bored.

We have many changes in mind for the format and contents of *Orbis*. Two of them are evident in this issue. The first is this Editor's Column, in which I shall report news of the journal, introduce the contents of the number ("In These Pages"), and then meditate on the mysteries of world politics ("Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor"). My daddy used to tell me, "Son, don't ever get into a p—ing contest with someone who owns a printing press." Now, for the first time in my life, I can. The second change is our new book section introduced below by Book Review Editor Adam Garfinkle. More new features will make their appearance in Fall 1994 and Winter 1995, by which time the transition will be complete. Tell us what you think of them. We like to get mail.

The contents of any journal reflect, more or less, the interests and expertise of its editor. Since I was trained by world historian William H. McNeill to be a generalist, not a specialist, my interests are catholic. Nor do I, or the Foreign Policy Research Institute, have any agenda to promote. Accordingly, we encourage submission of articles on all subjects from all points of view so long as they are erudite, lucid, well written, and bear on important current issues of U.S. foreign policy. That said, I do want *Orbis* to be engaged in the debate over what new doctrine(s) ought to replace containment as the centerpiece of American foreign and defense policy—or as George F. Kennan recently

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mused—whether the United States needs a doctrine at all. I want *Orbis* to address the tectonic shifts occurring in the global and regional balances of power, alliances, and alignments, and to offer wise counsel on how the United States ought to adjust to those shifts. I have a bias toward essays that place current crises and trends in their historical context. And I shall continue the journal's inquiry into the nature, dynamics, and dangers of the military revolution being wrought by new technology and the relative rise and decline of great powers. Moving to regions of the world, I intend for *Orbis* to focus (though not exclusively) on East Asia and the Pacific, the post-Soviet world, and Europe. In every case, I want to publish authors who explain the broad implications of their specific analyses and make thoughtful recommendations for U.S. policy.

Where will such authors come from? To put it another way, why would anyone prefer to publish in *Orbis?* I know the rap on us. We are neither a refereed scholarly journal, nor a mass circulation journal of record, nor an opinion journal. So what advantages does *Orbis* offer to the young professor, the veteran statesman, or the well-known pundit? They are these. We offer a rapid decision and rapid publication. We offer a forum that is not befogged by the jargon of the academy or the *politesse* of the policy establishment. We do not insist on some standard length or format. Above all, we positively want to publish the big-think or iconoclastic essay you may have inside you, but never dared to write—or, having written, could not place. "Three-fifths genius, two-fifths fudge" was how James Russell Lowell described the works of Edgar Allen Poe. Imagine a foreign policy journal so confected. I do.

In These Pages

I am pleased to report that my first issue of *Orbis* begins with a scoop. The credit goes to Ross H. Munro, who recognized the importance of the Chinese military volume accidentally exposed on a bookshelf in Beijing, then excerpted a translation of this rare find for the readers of *Orbis*. I leave Ross to introduce this document, of which you will doubtless be hearing more.

By all accounts (even those of its friends) the Clinton administration made a poor start in the foreign arena. But critical essays published so far on Clinton's first year have ignored two sources of our current malaise: the problematical Bush legacy and the Clinton electoral campaign, which, contrary to its own spin, had an emphatic foreign-policy component. In these pages, George Szamuely not only provides the most detailed account yet of the Clinton-era boondoggles, but tells us where the Clinton team's ideas came from, and why they seemed good ideas at the time. Next, Angelo Codevilla, in a veritable *cri de coeur,* argues that American foreign policy began to go off its rails as early as World War I, and that our advanced state of decadence is best described not as a poverty of concepts but as a plethora of bad ones.

Orbis has always entertained new approaches to the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this issue, Gerald M. Steinberg, Jean Krasno, and Brahma Chellaney draw disturbingly different conclusions

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about the efficacy of the American global "supply side" approach based on nuclear and missile export controls, and examine the prospects for a new regional "demand side" approach. Finally, Mary C. FitzGerald summarizes the latest Russian thinking on the revolution in high-tech conventional weaponry, suggesting that Russia—its current embarrassment notwithstanding—still aspires to be second to none in military hardware and doctrine.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

But first—as a regular feature of this column—the following "midnight snack."

Who's Jonathan Clarke, and where does he get off telling us Americans about our "conceptual poverty" in foreign policy (*Atlantic Monthly,* September 1993)? Surely he cannot mean that American statesmen and policy analysts are empty-headed cretins. Not that I'm eager to defend American post–cold war foreign policy, even against smart foreigners. In fact, I've reached that dispiriting age of life when it dawns on you that most people in power are (a) no older than you are, and (b) no brighter than you are. But are they literally devoid of all concepts? Perhaps "conceptual poverty" might describe the condition of the fanatical empiricist who is allergic to theory, predisposition, precept, and prejudice? But no: statesmen must still wield a measuring stick of some sort in order to size up the events of the day and reason their way into a response. Besides, "concepts" usually emerge precisely from experience, so that the avid empiricist *ought* to possess a wealth of concepts. Perhaps "conceptual poverty" describes instead the monomaniac, who is so wedded to *one* concept (domestic political advantage?) that all power of discernment is lost.

Oh, I know what Clarke really meant: that the United States lacks any overarching concept, like containment, by which to weigh the relative importance of issues and relative wisdom of policies after the cold war; or, that the United States has clung to outmoded doctrines after their usefulness has ended. But Kennan preempted this column when he asked whether our nation needs a doctrine at all. Better none, than a stupid one, right? So long as the U.S. government follows good principles, it can probably do without doctrine . . . at least in normal times. The principles of John Quincy Adams, for instance, or those of Adams plus Teddy Roosevelt, would suit our book for the time being. . . .

It's ironic, come to think of Adams, that Alexis de Tocqueville was pronouncing American democracy incapable of wise and sustained diplomacy in the very era of our history when we were doing it. His critique is really more relevant in this century than in the one in which he wrote it. . . .

Which leads one to wonder whether nations really learn from their past? Remember the old saw to the effect that the British voters turned Winston Churchill out and opted for socialism because the working class was "tired" after giving its all in two world wars? It seemed to make sense. But I could never grasp why Britain's youth—male and female—should choose a "politics

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of exhaustion" because their grandfather had fought in the trenches. Is America "tired" after fifty years of engagement against two forms of totalitarianism? If so—if we have no doctrine, don't want a doctrine, don't want any more crusades, and can't afford them anymore—does that mean the United States, not just Japan or Germany, is becoming a "normal nation" again? What do normal nations stand for? What sort of doctrines do they have? Does France have a doctrine? Or does France, too, suffer from "conceptual poverty"? In fact, name me a country that doesn't. I'm beginning to suspect that, except in clear cases of self-defense, "doctrine" is a laundered term for Weltanschauung. . . .

Speaking of French doctrines, the centennial of the Franco-Russian Alliance passed without notice this January. As Kennan had it, that disastrous dance of the tsarist bear and Miss Liberté marked the beginning of the end of the European era. I'm not sure I buy the notion of a straight line from the Franco-Russian Alliance to World War I, but I understand why no one made a fuss over the hundredth anniversary. Photos of François Mitterrand and Boris Yeltsin toasting each other with champagne would not be received with Gemütlichkeit in Bonn. . . .

Students of world politics! Now that the cold war is over, and we can attend to more important things, keep your eyes on: Wrangell Island, frozen in the Arctic Sea on the 180th meridian. Claimed by the United States and Canada, but seized by the Bolsheviks in 1924, that once uninhabited island is now a "Chukchi autonomous zone." Hey, if Vladimir Zhirinovsky can demand retrocession of all Alaska, our State Department lawyers can at least countersue for Wrangell Island. . . .

Now that the cold war is over, keep your eyes on: Sikkim. China and India have made peace, more or less, rendering India's absorption of that Himalayan Shangri-La anachronistic. If Tibet should win independence, look for a Sikkimese National Liberation Front. I say: send the Sidewinders. . . .

Now that the cold war is over, keep your eyes on: Kaliningrad, formerly the medieval Prussian university town of Königsberg. That little wedge of the Baltic coast, annexed by the USSR in 1945, is now physically separated from the rest of the Russian Federation. What's to become of it and its nine hundred thousand *Völker* and *narodny?* I say we ape the League of Nations's regime for Danzig and make Kaliningrad a free port under U.N. auspices. Then we can take a page from the communists' book and rename the town after its most famous and inspirational resident. Call it "Immanuel Kant Stadt."

Walter A. McDougall

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Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War—Where It Doesn't

by Ross H. Munro

A foreign diplomat was browsing in a Beijing bookshop last fall when his eyes fell on a Chinese-language book with an arresting title: *Can China's Armed Forces Win the Next War?*

That is not the sort of question that's publicly asked, let alone candidly answered, in the People's Republic of China (PRC). And, indeed, it turned out that this was a "neibu" book meant only for limited and controlled distribution within China. Apparently, a bookstore employee had mistakenly placed a copy of the book on open shelves. Foreigners have made several such serendipitous discoveries in China in recent decades, though rarely, if ever, has the find been so significant.

The foreign diplomat purchased that book and, sometime later, the Foreign Policy Research Institute succeeded in obtaining a photocopy of the original. Examining the book and talking with experts, we soon satisfied ourselves that the book was authentic—that it came from high levels of the Chinese military establishment and was not a fraud perpetrated by foreign agents or other mischief-makers aiming to put the Chinese military in a bad light.[1]

In fact, *Can China's Armed Forces Win the Next War?* gives us an unprecedented—and at times disturbing—inside look at how important elements in China's armed forces view neighboring Asian countries as well as the United States. The book is *not* an authoritative or official statement of Chinese military and foreign policy. It was almost certainly written by Chinese naval officers or civilian analysts, in part to promote the navy's interests. But, almost all of the points made by the anonymous authors are consistent with Chinese actions, even when the authors deviate substantially from *official and announced* Chinese policy.

[1] On Nov. 16, 1993, *The New York Times* ran a brief article about the book and how it was discovered. The article's assertion that the book was "later banned" is probably in error. We believe it was never publicly available.

Ross H. Munro is director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Asia Program. He worked for many years as a newspaper and magazine correspondent in Asia; for seven of those years, he was posted in Beijing and Hong Kong.

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The book's highlights include:

> •Virtual confirmation of reports by several recent U.S. visitors to Beijing that the Chinese leadership in general and the senior Chinese officers corps in particular view the United States as China's principal adversary now and for decades to come. The book's authors portray China's immediate neighbors as potential enemies, behind whom usually lurks the United States.
>
> •Evidence suggesting that the PRC won't launch an invasion of Taiwan as long as U.S. opposition to such an invasion remains firm and clear.
>
> •A call to the Chinese armed forces to prepare to start a war for total control of the South China Sea before the end of this decade.
>
> •Evidence that recent proposals by China to shelve territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries over islands in the South China Sea are really part of a secret plan designed by Beijing to inveigle those countries into acknowledging that all the islands are sovereign Chinese territory.
>
> •The first written confirmation in memory from members of China's policy elite that bluff, bluster, and deception are important weapons in the PRC's diplomatic and military arsenals.

All of these points appear in a book that is nevertheless remarkably free of ideological cant. Instead, the flavor of this book can best be described as one part Chinese nationalism and one part realpolitik. While the book's Chinese nationalism has an anti-American tone, the authors have great respect for U.S. military power. "For a very long period of time," they warn their Chinese readers, the United States will remain substantially stronger than China. Indeed, the implicit but central subtheme running through the book is *the need to avoid direct military conflict with the United States for as long as possible*. If that's not possible, and a U.S.-China confrontation does loom, then China had better find some new allies, possibly Russia[2] or some Southeast Asian nations. At the same time, China must be prepared for indirect conflict with the United States involving a third country.

[2] On at least three occasions, the book flirts with the idea that China should ally itself with Russia. Such an alliance, the authors hint, could tilt the Asian balance of power decisively in China's favor and drastically reduce the current U.S. military advantage.

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The book's Chinese nationalism also seems deeply rooted in China's past. Imperial China dominated but did not rule neighboring states. Instead, it demanded that those states regularly send material tribute to the Chinese emperor in Beijing as evidence of their acknowledgement of Chinese hegemony. The authors of this book fret over even the slightest sign of assertiveness by China's neighbors. It is as if China's neighbors fall into two categories: potential enemies, or tributary states that acknowledge China's hegemony. Altogether the reader is struck by how strongly instinctive and traditional thinking still affects China's relations with the outside world.

The authors are also steeped in traditional Chinese military thought. They cite the ancients' advice that achieving victory through deception, diplomacy, and bluff is far better than achieving victory through war. Their stance on the pros and cons of Chinese military action is very cautious; most of their war scenarios portray China taking a reactive or defensive position. Even their startling call for conquest of the South China Sea and the Spratly Archipelago, territories China claims but is far from controlling completely, seems conditioned on China's acquisition of at least one aircraft carrier.

Taiwan

Perhaps no "neighbor" will find this book more intriguing than the Republic of China on Taiwan. The book's authors take a remarkably mild and vague position on the Taiwan issue that is significantly out of sync with official and declared Chinese policy. While both the ROC and PRC governments are committed in principle to the idea of "one China," in practice they rule two separate countries. PRC officials have long publicly declared their unwillingness to accept the indefinite prolongation of this situation and have refused to rule out an invasion of Taiwan. These same officials have also said that the PRC would have no choice but to invade Taiwan if the pro-independence opposition party there were to take power and declare Taiwan to be a separate and independent state.

The book's authors, on the other hand, signal their willingness to live indefinitely with the status quo of two separate governments.[3] Only the prospect of a declaration of Taiwan's independence agitates them greatly. But, even if such a declaration were made, their formulation of how the PRC would respond is strikingly at odds with the PRC's official hard line that it would have no choice except to invade. The authors wimp out, saying only that if Taiwan were to declare independence, "China won't exclude using military force."

The authors' rationalization for such a soft line becomes evident as their scenario for invading Taiwan unfolds. What the military men writing this book

[3] This may reflect in part a recent statement, attributed by the Hong Kong media to China's ailing paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, that the best way to achieve reunification of the Mainland and Taiwan is to increase economic ties between the two.

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are gently telling their political masters is that they can't guarantee that an invasion of Taiwan will succeed. The authors claim that in a straight China-Taiwan face off, the PRC can dominate the sea around Taiwan by exploiting Beijing's huge edge in submarines. The book suggests, however, the PRC would have great difficulty establishing air superiority. Because Taiwan is taking delivery of new F-16 and Mirage-2000 warplanes, China would be forced to commit a dangerously large portion of its best warplanes to any attempt to establish air superiority over Taiwan. Former president George Bush can now claim complete vindication for his campaign-year decision to sell the F-16s to Taiwan. Those planes, and the Mirage-2000s, are contributing to a stabilization of the military situation in the Taiwan Strait that could persist for several years.

The book confirms that China's real fear is that the United States will go to Taiwan's aid in the event of a PRC invasion. The authors predict that the U.S. Armed Forces would enter the conflict and fight alongside Taiwan. As a result, the book suggests, the PRC would fail to execute a successful landing on the main island and a dangerous impasse would ensue. The Taiwan chapter concludes: "In a word, solving the problem of Taiwan's return to the motherland, the use of force would be a *really unwise decision* [emphasis added]."

Although it must be stressed that this book is not an official document, this is good news for the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) and for the United States. As long as Taiwan can live with the ambiguity of being part of a divided nation while functioning largely as an independent one, the danger of PRC military action seems slim. And if the United States continues to emphasize that a peaceful resolution of PRC-ROC differences is in the U.S. national interest, such a danger should be close to zero for many years to come. The likelihood of a PRC invasion could reappear only if Taiwan's opposition party came to power and declared Taiwan's independence, an event that could prompt the United States to take an ambiguous stance regarding a PRC military response.

Strangely, the book's authors speculate that the United States will encourage the Taiwanese independence movement in order to gain "a foothold on China's doorstep" and to strengthen its strategic position in East and Southeast Asia. The reader thus gets a taste of the xenophobic quality of some of the anti-Americanism that can be found inside the Chinese officers corps. In fact, to the extent they think about it, U.S. officials dread the implications for instability inherent in a pro-independence party taking power in Taiwan.

South China Sea

Can China's Armed Forces Win the Next War? also applies the title question to the South China Sea. China's claim that the South China Sea is effectively a Chinese lake whose islands are all sovereign Chinese territory has thrown much of Southeast Asia into an anxious tizzy. Here, the tone of the book contrasts sharply with the tone of the Taiwan chapter. The authors say that a war over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is likely soon because

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China's efforts to resolve the issue diplomatically will probably fail. Yet, in the process of making their case, the authors reveal that China's offer to Southeast Asian nations that they put aside their conflicts and proceed with joint development of the disputed islands is really an attempt to force the other countries into a position where they must accept Chinese sovereignty.

Predicting that this attempt will not succeed, the book calls instead for a large, bold, and lightning-fast Chinese military offensive to seize the islands of the South China Sea by force. If successful, such a move by China would change the balance of power in Asia. It would affect not only the Southeast Asian littoral states, who would be hemmed in and humiliated by China, but also Japan and the United States, who consider it vital to their interests that the South China Sea's shipping lanes remain international waters.

The book's war scenario for the South China Sea envisions China moving so rapidly that all key islands are under Chinese control less than forty-eight hours after the first Chinese troops storm ashore. The reason for all this speed is to present the United States and Japan with a fait accompli: "To prevent the prolongation and the escalation of the war, above all to prevent the involvement of Japan and the United States, we must win fast."

The authors present their scenario in an aura of urgency. They argue that China must move by the year 2000. Otherwise, the South China Sea and its Spratly Archipelago may be "internationalized" along the lines of the Antarctica model, which freezes the sovereignty issue and provides for a sharing of natural resources. Then, fret the authors, China's military offensive might be opposed by the entire United Nations.

The authors' references in this chapter to the value of deception underline the prospect of China's launching a South China Sea offensive without warning, perhaps even while diplomatic negotiations are under way. The authors do, however, tell us what to look for: an aircraft carrier! After arguing that China must move quickly in the South China Sea and then making a convincing case that China's navy and air force have the ability to seize the islands, the authors are ready to make their key point: once Chinese forces seize the islands, they will find it difficult to hold them without an aircraft carrier.

That brings us to the book's obvious bias. The Chinese navy's dearest wish is for an aircraft carrier. And the anonymous authors, who all but declare that they are promoting the interests of the Chinese navy, seize every opportunity to argue that China badly needs an aircraft carrier, or two—but not just as a military status symbol. They urge the development of the high-technology systems and the construction of support vessels that together will make an aircraft carrier the heart of a modern naval task force. The lack of these requisite elements, a reader can infer, explains why Chinese military leaders decided two years ago against purchasing an aircraft carrier from Russia.

The navy is at the center of all but one of the book's several war scenarios, while the army is assigned a marginal or nonexistent role. The obvious but unarticulated implication is that the navy can make better use of China's

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defense dollars than the army. The air force is treated with respect. But the perspective is almost always the navy's. Certainly, some students of the Chinese military will read this book primarily for what it reveals about inter-service rivalries in China.

Yet, most of the war scenarios ring true. The navy would indeed play a crucial role in the two military conflicts that Western analysts believe China is most likely to be involved in the foreseeable future—a war in the South China Sea and an attempted invasion of Taiwan. Only when the authors turn their attention to the possibility of a second Korean war does their pro-navy bias get the better of them. They advise against sending the Chinese army across the land border into Korea, as China did with devastating impact on U.S. troops four decades ago. Instead, the authors propose a high-risk naval operation across the Yellow Sea to land troops on the Korean coast.

The following translated excerpts reflect our judgment of what constitute the most important points made in the seventy-six-page book. Three chapters merit special attention. The first chapter is useful because it amounts to a summary of the entire book. We have translated extensive passages from the chapters on Taiwan and the South China Sea because the authors of the book seem to agree with many Western analysts that China is more likely to take military action in these two areas in the foreseeable future than anywhere else.

****

Can China's Armed Forces Win the Next War?

At the beginning of 1993, a meeting of the Central Military Commission was held in Beijing. . . . At the meeting, Jiang Zemin, the chairman of the Central Military Commission, clearly pointed out: "We must win high-tech, small-scale wars under modern conditions."

The meeting decided that military manpower would not be reduced further and the effort to improve military quality would focus on organizational reform and on developing new weapons and equipment. The meeting also called for improving the armed forces' capacity for rapid deployment. . . .

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and particularly since the Gulf war, the Chinese military has treated local and regional wars as a real threat, and thus the primary model for research on future wars. This important adjustment was made after careful consideration by the generals. It signifies that the Chinese military is preparing for future local or regional wars. . . .

An Open Adversary—U.S.A., the No. 1 Military Power in the World

Because China and the United States have longstanding conflicts over their different ideologies, social systems, and foreign policies, it will prove impossible to fundamentally improve Sino-U.S. relations. These relations will

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remain two-sided, that is, the two countries will be wary of each other even while they cooperate and use each other. Although China doesn't pose a real strategic threat to the United States at present, the United States still views China as a potential enemy in its regional defense strategy. . . .

Some American experts believe that . . . East Asia may become the heart of the world economy and the center of science and technology. So, whoever controlled East Asia in the twenty-first century would control the world. Therefore, given U.S. global strategic calculations, the United States cannot tolerate a powerful adversary in East Asia. . . .

We can draw the following basic conclusions regarding the Sino-U.S. military confrontation:

1. The confrontation between China and the United States over economic and political interests in the Asia-Pacific region will persist.

2. For a very long period of time, the United States will remain stronger than China . . . and the difference in their relative strength will remain large.

3. The possibility of the two armed forces coming into direct conflict with each other in a war is small. But there are many issues that could draw the two into indirect conflict. These issues include Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Spratly Islands [South China Sea], and Tibet.

4. The possibility of a large- or medium-scale [Sino-U.S.] land war is small. Indirect conflict may occur on the sea or in the air.

5. Factors that could alter the relative strength of the two sides in a confrontation include:

> a) The stance of the Russian military. This is the most significant factor that affects the situation.
>
> b) Whether ASEAN countries can form a military alliance. The situation would worsen if they were allied against China. If such an alliance couldn't be formed, or if the alliance opposes the United States, it would be to China's advantage. . . .
>
> c) The stance of Japan and Korea. Although both countries are allied with the United States, we cannot rule out the possibility that increasingly tense economic conflicts may alter the situation. . . .

A Powerful Resurgent Adversary—Japan

The Japanese armed forces are sufficient for self-defense but not strong enough to operate overseas independently. . . . For years to come, the Japanese military will . . . have to rely on Japan-U.S. cooperation. . . .

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A local [China-Japan] clash is possible if war breaks out in the South China Sea or the Korean Peninsula. The difficult issue for the Chinese military would be coping with the Japanese air force. . . .

Unpredictable Ace Hitman—Vietnam

Vietnam has increased the number of its naval vessels in the Spratlys, accelerated the improvement of fortifications and the development of permanent bases on the occupied islands. . . . War between China and Vietnam will be inevitable if the Vietnamese authorities don't compromise on the Spratlys issue.

The Potential, Large Threat—India

The Indian military isn't as large as China's, but its quality may be superior. The Indians are obviously superior to the Chinese in naval and air force hardware, blue-water fighting capabilities, and border military fortifications.

A Still Powerful Threatening Force—Russia

Among China's immediate neighbors, Russia is the most powerful country. It occupies more Chinese territory than any other country and is entangled with China in complicated historical disputes. . . . However, in the next ten years, the possibility of Russia's using military force in the Asia-Pacific region is very small. But it needs to be pointed out that, as a huge military power, Russia's existence cannot be ignored by the world. Any move by Russia still carries the weight of a big country.

Rising Temperatures on the Periphery: Hot Spots for Regional Wars

Since the disintegration of the USSR two years ago, the Asia-Pacific region has been calm and prosperous. It seems that the outlook is good only in this part of the troubled world. It seems that there is no challenge, only opportunity, in the region. But what about the future? In particular, what will be the situation of China, the fulcrum of political and military struggle in Asia?

The Central Military Commission's judgment of the outlook for the Asia-Pacific region: the situation is very grim. . . .

Currently, there are eight hot spots that directly threaten China's safety, unity, and territorial integrity and may lead to local military conflict or even a local war.

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Increasingly tense disputes in the South China Sea. [See the translation under "Fundamental Solution to the Problem of the Islands in the South China Sea."]

If South Korea declares war against North Korea. Some believe that the outcome of a peaceful reunification of Korea would be very much like the reunification of Germany: one eats the other. Kim Il Sung, who is accustomed to "family style rule," would never want to see this happen. The declaration of "wartime status for the whole country" demonstrates the rigid and uncompromising stance of the North. The possibility of South Korea's attempting to reunify Korea by military force cannot be ruled out.

If a new Korean war started, it would be very hard for both China and the United States to simply stand by and watch, owing to their vital strategic interests. For China, North Korea provides a buffer for Sino-U.S. confrontation. Once North Korea is lost, the strategic front of the United States would reach the Yalu River directly through the U.S.-Korea military alliance. One can imagine the threat to China. Therefore, once the situation in the Korean Peninsula worsens, a large-scale local war similar to that of the 1950s would be very likely. . . .

The aim of a joint U.S.-Japan force invading Korea would be not only to capture the Korean peninsula but also to seek hegemony. If we did not interfere then, we would be the next to be captured.

Whether or not the U.S. Armed Forces cross the border [into China], the economy of [China's adjoining] Tumen River Valley area would suffer heavily from a flood of millions of Korean refugees. . . .

Chinese military experts believe: in the next Korean war, if there were 400,000 United Nations troops and 600,000 South Korean troops at the China-Korea border, the best approach would be to send our troops across the [Yellow] sea, not the [Yalu] river.

The advantage of the crossing-the-river option is that the expeditionary Chinese army can be supported directly by our rear bases. But, it has an obvious disadvantage: we could not push the strong enemy back. Major formations could not thrust deep into the enemy forces, while small formations—if they managed to do so—could not hold their ground.

With the crossing-the-sea option, we could avoid the enemy's strongest points and instead stick a dagger into its heart. We could cut up the enemy and launch pincer attacks from north and south.

There are two potential landing spots. The first is the area near the 38th Parallel. The advantage there is that we can use existing, well-built fortifications to defend against the enemy from the south, thereby accomplishing the goal of cutting up the enemy. But the landing would be very difficult and support would be too distant. . . .

The second place would be the area from Anju to Changnyon. This area is near the Chinese Mainland and Pingyong. . . .

The confrontation at the roof of the world. [A reference to the China-India border. This section has been partly overtaken by the Sino-Indian agreement in the fall of 1993, providing for a partial demilitarization and stabilization of the existing lines of control.]

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Taiwan. [See the translation under "'Taiwan Independence' May Be the Spark for 'Recovery by Military Force.'"]

Hong Kong. On the surface, the Mainland [PRC] attacks Patten but the purpose of "Patten-bashing" is to warn his masters—the United Kingdom and the United States.[4] As 1997 approaches, Mainland troops will enter Hong Kong. The United Kingdom and the United States will never give up and will persist in creating pretexts for interfering in Chinese domestic affairs [a reference to Hong Kong's being part of China]. So, the possibility of Hong Kong's becoming a spark for regional conflict cannot be ruled out.

Kazakhstan's territorial request to China. In March of this year, Wang Zhen died and China lost an old general who was most influential in the Northwest.[5] For forty years, when Wang Zhen was alive, the separatists in Xinjiang never gained the upper hand. Now the separatists may have the opportunity to gain ground. In addition, after the disintegration of the USSR, independent Kazakhstan lodged a territorial request to the Chinese government, echoing the separatists' position. This is a bad omen for the situation in Xinjiang.

Inner Mongolia. [The authors report that "on three occasions during the past two years, separatists have secretly contacted Mongolian officials three times (to promote a) 'big Mongolian republic.'"]

"Taiwan Independence" May Be the Spark for "Recovery by Military Force"

Peaceful reunification of our motherland is the wish of people on both sides of the Strait. . . . So, why do we still mention recovering Taiwan by military force?

"Taiwan Independence" forces are without doubt a malignant tumor threatening the peaceful reunification of our motherland. "Taiwan Independence" will be the indigenous factor that works against the process of peaceful reunification—not to mention the United States, the key external factor. If the two forces cooperate, it is difficult to predict when they might get the upper hand, thereby making reunification of the motherland very difficult to achieve by peaceful means.

Undoubtedly, the United States dreams of gaining a foothold on China's doorstep. As a large island in the Western Pacific, Taiwan has a very important strategic position. If the U.S. Seventh Fleet could use Taiwan as a transit point, it would be very advantageous for the United States in dominating Southeast

[4] The authors are referring to Hong Kong's British governor, Chris Patten, who has been ferociously attacked by the PRC for his efforts to further democratize Hong Kong's political system before the PRC's 1997 takeover.

[5] Wang Zhen was a Communist military leader and the effective political "boss" of Xinjiang, where he was well known for taking a hard line on Islamic and ethnic militants.

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Asia. Simultaneously, the United States could restrict the freedom of action of both our East China Sea Fleet and our South China Sea Fleet and perhaps directly threaten China's Southeast coast. Therefore, the United States will rack its brains and try everything it can regarding the Taiwan problem. It would openly intervene to establish Taiwan's independence at any cost, once that becomes necessary. If that happens, China will not exclude using military force.

The first battle for recovering Taiwan will start with the island of Quemoy. The next battle for Quemoy may hardly be worth mentioning, but, nevertheless, it will be the first step toward Taiwan. Such a first step would be initiated by a barrage from the coastal artillery. The artillery pieces will be nothing like the conventional ones used more than thirty years ago nor any other "twenty-one-gun-salute" weapons. They will be small homing missiles. Every missile would hit operational headquarters or artillery positions on Quemoy as well as naval vessels. None would miss its target, and every shot would hit a strategic point. These would be vital targets, not just basic fortification. A barrage of a few hours could paralyze the island's nervous system. It would not require much effort by the Marine Corps to finish the battle.

Would the Main Battlefield Be on Taiwan Itself?

War means destruction. From the Mainland's perspective, whether Taiwan is recovered peacefully or by military force, the ultimate goal is to combine the manpower and resources of the Chinese people, to develop the economy of the motherland, and to build up the strength of the nation. . . . Therefore, the main island of Taiwan should not be destroyed by the process of recovering it. We can expect that the main battlefield will not be on the main island itself, but on the sea nearby, possibly on the waters around the Penghu Archipelago.

Of course, to finish the battle, fights over each mountain or city may have to be fought, but neither nuclear nor chemical weapons will be used. As pointed out by an old general, "there should be limits to fights among family members."

On the Taiwanese side, they are even less willing to have the fire of battle burning at home. They would try to destroy the Mainland navy in the Taiwan Strait, with the help of the United States.

An Integrated Battle by Naval and Air Forces in the Taiwan Strait

Overall, Taiwan's air force is weaker than the Mainland's. However, Taiwan's air force will have upgraded by a generation when it is equipped with 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage-2000 planes, as well as with 130 of Taiwan's

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indigenously developed IDF warplanes. By then, the Taiwanese air force will have about 350 third-generation, all-weather warplanes. This will make it more difficult for the Mainland to seize and maintain air superiority over the Strait.

Taiwan's navy currently has about three hundred warships, including patrol craft, destroyers, missile escort vessels, submarines, landing ships, submarine hunters, minesweepers, as well as supporting vessels. Overall, it is stronger than one Mainland fleet, but weaker than two. Significantly, they have fewer submarines and no nuclear submarines.

The foregoing analysis makes clear that Taiwan's armed forces are unable to pursue an offensive strategy against the Mainland. This may be explained by their long-term "defensive strategy" and guiding ideology for defense. But in the war theater of the Taiwan Strait, offensive weapons used by the Taiwanese military for defense against the Mainland are very modern and the density of these weapons extremely high. So, in a limited time, it will be very difficult to defeat Taiwan's military's defenses. Therefore, the contest in the Taiwan Strait will be a modern battle of extremely high intensity.

How Much Military Force Would China Mobilize?

Air force. If Taiwan deploys 80 percent of its warplanes, that is, 280 advanced, third-generation warplanes, the Mainland will need to use 40 percent of its warplanes [out of the total 6,000] in order to strive for air superiority. For the Mainland, qualitatively, the proportion of third-generation warplanes must not be less than 40 percent. Quantitatively, absolute superiority requires a ratio of 10 to 1. . . . The Chinese air force must mobilize at least 1,000 fighters, including at least 400 Jian-8 planes, [and] about 600 bombers. . . . In addition, a certain number of Jian-6 reconnaissance planes, Be-6 amphibious planes, Zhi-5 helicopters, and some transport planes.

Navy. At minimum, the North Sea Fleet, South Sea Fleet, and the independent Submarine Fleet must be mobilized. That would comprise 750 warships, more than 100 landing craft, and 100,000 landing troops. Regarding strategic deployment, we should consider a pincer attack to block the U.S. 7th Fleet from supporting Taiwan.

It is worth noting that the key for winning the battle of the Strait is to make best use of our advantage in submarines. This will always be the most effective way to destroy the Taiwanese navy. The Mainland's surface vessels would primarily be used to carry out diversionary attacks on Taiwan's navy and to support aerial combat and landing operations in order to seize the initiative in the war as quickly as possible.

At present, China's submarine fleet ranks third in size in the world, after the United States and Russia. We have over 100 conventionally propelled submarines, ranking second in the world.

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The Situation Would Be More Favorable If We Had an Aircraft Carrier

People understand that the cost of building an aircraft carrier task force is daunting. By the beginning of the next century, the Chinese navy plans to have two aircraft carrier task forces. . . . The cost for the two aircraft carrier task forces is estimated to be 70 billion yuans [U.S.$8 to $12 billion, depending on the exchange rate used].

There are three key technologies for building aircraft carriers, in all of which China's aviation industry happens to be weak: 1) take-off and landing systems; 2) anti-submarine warfare technology; 3) anti-aircraft radar technology.

Confronting an increasingly serious situation in the Spratly Islands, the Chinese navy has contacted several countries in its search for ways to solve its anti-submarine technology problem.

Would the United States Intervene?

As world policeman and provider of Taiwan's protective nuclear umbrella, the United States will not keep out and watch if Taiwan is threatened by military force, regardless of what circumstances Taiwan finds itself in. The United States will certainly use such an opportunity to demonstrate its concern and support for Taiwan.

Owing to global strategic considerations, the United States cannot tolerate a powerful adversary in East Asia. . . . But to what extent would the United States ultimately intervene? There are two possibilities: one is direct military interference, entailing cooperation with the Taiwan military; the other is indirect military containment through military pressure on the Mainland. The first possibility is more likely. . . .

What Would Be the Outcome of the War?

If the Mainland defeats or destroys Taiwan's navy and air force within a set period of time, the Taiwanese authorities will halt their resistance in order to prevent fires from burning on the main island and to avoid losing all their forces. But if the Mainland fails to destroy the Taiwan military's main defenses and cannot execute a landing, the situation will be extremely grim. There is yet another scenario: the Mainland's offensive achieves only some of its objectives within the set period of time. The Taiwan military's defenses are not utterly routed. The war situation will then become extremely complicated. External factors, such as the United States, will play a significant role.

In a word, in solving the problem of Taiwan's return to the motherland, the use of military force would be a really unwise decision. Peaceful reunification is the best way out.

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The Fundamental Solution to the Problem of the Islands in the South China Sea

If one asks, where are the Chinese armed forces most likely to face a local conflict, certainly the answer, at least for today, is the South China Sea.

For China, resolving the problem of the islands in the South China Sea has become an increasingly urgent "major issue for the country." Since China's "Territorial Sea Law" was announced, Vietnam and ASEAN countries involved in the disputes over the South China Sea have rushed to buy F-16 and Mirage-2000 fighters and rapidly expanded their navies and air forces, accelerated [off-shore] oil exploration, and speeded up military deployment on the occupied islands. They are prepared to confront China indefinitely and their troops are ready to perish in defense of their vested interests.

Recently, Vietnam applied for membership in ASEAN. Vietnamese officials visited ASEAN countries to further strengthen bilateral cooperation, and signalled their willingness to unite with ASEAN against China. As events develop, so does the possibility of Japan and the United States becoming involved in order to protect their important sea lanes and their strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. . . .

Experienced observers have noted that the current stance of the Chinese government amounts to a tactic of sacrificing economic interests for the sake of China's sovereign dignity, territorial integrity, as well as a peaceful periphery.

The implications of the Chinese government's "codevelopment" proposal is that the countries concerned share the resources in the South China Sea under a prior understanding that recognizes the Spratlys as Chinese territory.[6] This represents an obvious compromise.

Leading Chinese figures who know the art of war understand well: "The best tactic is deception, the next is diplomacy, then military deployment. The last is to attack the city. Attacking the city belongs to the category of 'having-no-alternative' tactics. . . . Those who are good at using military force defeat the opponents' armies without fighting the battles, don't waste time in taking the opponents' cities or destroying others' countries."

Does Hope Exist for a Peaceful Solution?

The next century will be the century of scrambling for oceans. Experts have disclosed that the oil and gas deposits in the South China Sea is about thirty-five billion tons, the largest among China's three offshore oil fields. This . . . has enormous attraction to the countries involved in the Spratlys dispute. Therefore, many international observers believe that, given the amount of oil

[6] The "codevelopment" proposal was made by China to Southeast Asian nations that claim all or some of the Spratlys as their sovereign territory.

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deposits, as well as the possibility of war, the South China Sea is very likely to become the second Persian Gulf.

ASEAN countries held the "South China Sea Workshop" in Bandung, Indonesia, with the main theme echoing Malaysia's and the Philippines's proposal for cooperative exploration of the resources in the South China Sea according to the "Antarctic Model," that is, freezing sovereignty and sharing resources. Therefore, the South China Sea runs the risk of becoming an "international high sea". . . .

Problems of the South China Sea Should Not Be Prolonged

How much time is left for the Chinese government? Countries involved in the dispute are speeding up the process of "internationalization" of the Spratlys issue. Once this happens, China won't have sufficient grounds to justify recovery of the islands by military force and may face "multinational forces" under the imprimatur of the U.N. . . . Therefore, the decade of the 1990s is the key period for resolving the Spratlys problem. After that, China may lose its historic opportunity.

There are three major options. The first option is peaceful diplomatic means. . . . At present, this seems hardly possible. The second option is recovery by military force. It looks simple but is actually complicated. Another option is to use diplomatic pressure, backed up by military might, to force our adversaries to give in. The disadvantage of this option is that it may lead to a new "cold war" era in Southeast Asia.

Obstacles to Using Military Force

The Chinese navy will face many thorny problems indeed if it launches a Spratly Islands offensive. One can see that China is in a very disadvantageous position by analyzing the basic factors for winning a war: timing, geography, and support.

Timing. The Chinese navy has not yet completed the process of modernization. Equipment has not reached the desired level. Most important, our first aircraft carrier has not yet been born.

Geography. The Spratly Islands are Chinese territory, but they are far from the Mainland and are surrounded by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. The distance between the Chinese Mainland and the Spratlys is more than one thousand kilometers, while the Philippines or Malaysia is only a little more than one hundred kilometers away. The Chinese navy will face the problems of a long, tiring journey and a long supply line.

Support. China will contest with an emerging "alliance." If the United States and Japan intervene in the Spratlys affair, directly or indirectly, the situation may change to the disadvantage of China.

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SOUTH CHINA SEA



Source: United States Government Map Library, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Comparison of Forces in the South China Sea

No country [that is, no country claiming the Spratlys] can counter China. The navies and air forces of the five countries [with claims in the Spratlys conflicting with China's] combined is even weaker than Taiwan. Judging solely

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by relative military strength, it would be easy to expel the occupiers. A medium-sized task force would be enough. But the most essential question is how to defend the territory after we recover it.

Keys for Victory

Military researchers . . . have concluded that . . . we must abide by the following principles regarding a military offensive in the Spratly Islands.

Suddenness. We should try our best to deliver a deadly blow to our opponents when they least expect it, and make it difficult for them to organize a timely and effective counterattack. We should frighten and confuse our opponents at the beginning of the war. Once this is accomplished, we should prepare for long-term defense.

Focused attack. First . . . we must establish dominance over the Vietnamese air force as much as possible and prevent the Vietnamese from sending reinforcements to the Spratlys. The attack on the sea should focus on Indonesia's submarines and escort vessels. We will seize the winning initiative if we bring the Vietnamese air force and the Indonesian navy effectively under control. If necessary, we could consider "surgical" strikes against the mainland of major [Southeast Asian] countries in order to subdue them by destroying their military bases.

Integrated operations. We must organize an integrated navy and air force task force capable of defending itself against attacks from the air and the sea during its long voyage, so as to arrive at the theater of war without mishap. Marines and airmen would be the major shock troops for attacking the islands occupied by the enemies. Missiles and long-range bombers will be the key to breaking through the enemies' defenses.

Strengthening supplies. Before the war, sufficient support vessels must be mobilized to join the task force. Both the Paracels and the Spratlys can be used as transit depots. Owing to the length of the supply line, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft forces are essential.

Fast but steady operation, strict control. To prevent the prolongation and the escalation of the war—and, above all, to prevent the involvement of Japan and the United States—we must win fast in the Spratlys. When the assault succeeds, we should rapidly develop the fortifications on the various islands in the Spratly archipelago and establish an integrated defense system. Once this is accomplished, we should try our best to disengage from the enemy and declare an end to the war in order to concentrate on establishing permanent sea lanes.

How Would the War Be Fought?

The composition of the task force. The nucleus of the task force would naturally be guided missile destroyers, with their powerful penetrating

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capability. . . . Medium- and long-range missiles should threaten the enemies' warships in the Spratlys area.

Carrying out a powerful sea blockade. When preparing the task force, at least ten to fifteen submarines and three to five long-range bomber squadrons will be needed to blockade the Spratlys area in order to prevent our opponents from preparing a defense or sending reinforcements to the islands.

The landing operation. Regarding landing tactics, we should "besiege the main forces but drive the others out." That is, [we should] surround and annihilate Vietnamese troops on the major islands. But to defeat the defending troops on the other small islands, we should give them a way out and let them leave as soon as possible.

Before landing, [our forces] should bombard the fortifications and the enemy's concentrations for forty to sixty minutes. Then, the marines should cut the enemy up by thrusting into the gaps among the enemy forces . . . and attack strategic points. The enemy defense system will have largely collapsed by the time the main body of our troops has landed and been thrown into battle. It's predicted that the entire operation for recovering the islands can be completed in two days. Of course, the key will be the effectiveness of the blockade and the deployment, not the landing operations themselves.

The big question mark relates to defending the Spratlys. As the analysis above demonstrates, the Chinese armed forces can feel optimistic about the sea blockade, the general offensive, and the landings. But recovering the lost territory is only half of the problem; the other half is how to defend it. The flotilla cannot stay and defend the Spratlys. Nor is it realistic to post more troops on the various islands, which are surrounded by the various countries involved.

ASEAN countries may stay clear of our main force and strike at our weak points, engaging in a prolonged seesaw battle with us. That is, they withdraw their troops when the Chinese task force goes south but return when the task force leaves and returns north. Currently, the strength of the Chinese navy is insufficient to cope with such a situation.

The only hope of changing the question mark to an exclamation mark is China's aircraft carrier!

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Clinton's Clumsy Encounter with the World

by George Szamuely

Even his most ardent supporters would probably hesitate before attempting to advertise President Bill Clinton's foreign policy achievements. His first eighteen months in office have hardly been auspicious. His secretary of state is publicly humiliated on a visit to Beijing. He has had to rethink profoundly his policy on Russia. North Korea continues to defy him on international inspection of its nuclear facilities. A trade war with Japan has become a distinct possibility. He is still far from achieving his goal of restoring to power the president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. He has withdrawn American forces from Somalia, bringing to an end a mission that, despite the loss of life, accomplished very little.

To be fair, the president had never pretended that foreign affairs was his strong suit. He rose to prominence as the governor of a small Southern state. And (unlike Jimmy Carter, who had been involved with the Trilateral Commission) he evinced no interest whatsoever in foreign policy. Clinton had been chairman of the Democratic Leadership Council, yet took no part in the foreign policy debates of the 1980s within his own party. On SDI, on Central America, on what to make of Mikhail Gorbachev, he had nothing to say. Perhaps it was a lack of interest; perhaps a reluctance to upset important constituencies that would be critical to his nomination.

Whatever the reason, in 1992, Clinton neither sought nor received a mandate to change course in foreign policy. As his spokesmen delightedly repeated over and over again throughout last year, there was only one theme in the Clinton campaign: "It's the economy, stupid." And opinion polls throughout the year showed that by a substantial margin, the voters preferred to have George Bush in charge of the nation's foreign policy rather than Bill Clinton. Yet, for all of that, it was foreign, and not domestic, policy that proved decisive to his victory. After all, "New Democrat" Clinton's domestic agenda—new taxes,

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socialized medicine, an industrial policy—was bolder in its old-style liberalism than that of Michael Dukakis. Rather, it was their fresh approach to foreign policy that came to define the New Democrats marching under Clinton's banner. That was hardly surprising, since during the last quarter of a century, it was the Democrats' lack of credibility as stewards of the nation's *foreign* policy that kept them out of power.

Foreign Policy in the Clinton Campaign

Clinton and his advisers realized early on that there was no way he could occupy the White House unless he persuaded the American people that he was ready to defend, if necessary with force, the United States's national interests around the world. Accordingly, Clinton's campaign pursued a strategy similar to the one Jimmy Carter deployed to advantage against Gerald Ford in 1976. Back then, Carter had denounced President Ford's détente for its indifference to "human rights" behind the iron curtain and its failure to express American ideals. Carter was outraged at Ford's refusal to receive Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in the White House. In much the same way, Clinton criticized George Bush for insufficient vigor in pursuing American values around the world. He was indignant that the administration "would do business as usual with those who murdered freedom in Tiananmen Square."[1]

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In taking this line, Clinton managed to free himself of another burden. For years, the Republicans had delighted in portraying the Democrats as the counter-culture party. Who can forget Jeane Kirkpatrick's 1984 speech at the Republican Convention, where she coined the damning phrase "San Francisco Democrats"? Yet, here was Clinton, promising to pursue a foreign policy that would "draw more generously from American democratic experience and ideals and light fires in the hearts of millions of freedom-loving people around the world."[2]

Clinton criticized George Bush for his gun-shyness when it came to getting rid of Saddam Hussein, for trying his best to keep the former Soviet Union intact, for his lack of interest in Boris Yeltsin and the democratic forces in Russia that Yeltsin represented. Clinton berated Bush for his unfair treatment of Israel, for his reluctance to champion democracy (George Bush "does not

[1] *The New York Times*, Aug. 14, 1992.
[2] Clinton's speech in Milwaukee, *The New York Times*, Oct. 2, 1992.

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seem at home in the mainstream pro-democracy tradition of American foreign policy"[3]). Above all, he denounced the Bush administration's indifference to the suffering in Bosnia and declared that the United States "should take the lead in seeking U.N. Security Council authorization for air strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort."[4]

Clinton's strategy proved immensely successful. He needed to win back those Democrats who had voted for Ronald Reagan and George Bush because they—unlike their political opponents—had been ready to assert American values and interests in the world. In the end, he won over fewer "Reagan Democrats" than he had hoped—many turned to Ross Perot—but Clinton did gain something important: the endorsement of numerous "neo-conservative" intellectuals, editors, and columnists. This homecoming on the part of liberal intellectuals, who had deserted the Democratic Party when it shunned the legacy of Harry S Truman and John F. Kennedy in favor of George McGovern, did more than anything to smash the Reagan coalition of the 1980s.

Indeed, Clinton took a leaf from Ronald Reagan's book. Back in 1980, the former governor of California had actively courted New York intellectuals to gain the respectability he felt he needed to appeal to voters who, however sympathetic, could not quite bring themselves to support a candidate with a reputation for extremism. In much the same way, the Clinton campaign constantly reassured neo-conservatives that the Democrats now could be trusted to protect the nation's security, that they had shed their inhibitions about using armed force on behalf of American interests, that the party of George McGovern could safely be returned to the White House.

Foreign policy was important to Clinton's pitch in yet another way. He gave every indication of subscribing to the Democratic Party orthodoxy to the effect that Reagan's defense build-up had been ruinous for the American economy. It supposedly helped to generate the massive budget deficits that could only be paid for by borrowing from abroad, which in turn drove up interest rates and the value of the dollar, which in turn made American exports uncompetitive and sucked in imports from abroad. As a result, American industry was allegedly devastated, and the Japanese and Germans made a killing. He likewise endorsed the view that American spending on research and development was heartily skewed toward military technology as opposed to consumer products. As Labor Secretary Robert Reich put it, "Military research came at the expense of commercial research. Our fixation on technology to thwart the Soviets started to undermine our efforts to create commercial high-technology products that would compete successfully with the Japanese."[5] Consequently, the recovery of the American economy could only be achieved by massive cuts in defense. That was not simply a matter of scaling back arms now that the

[3] Ibid.

[4] *The New York Times,* Oct. 4, 1992.

[5] Robert B. Reich, *Tales of a New America: The Anxious Liberal's Guide to the Future* (New York: Vintage, 1988), pp. 70–71.

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cold war was over. For Clinton and like-minded Democrats, it was the essential prerequisite for American economic recovery. (Interestingly, for all his claims of being a New Democrat, Clinton never could quite bring himself to acknowledge that Western military strength—and, particularly, the strategic and ideological offensive of the 1980s—had anything to do with the fall of communism: "We must never forget that in the end, communism rotted from inside out."[6])

Indeed, Clinton repeatedly argued that the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policy was outdated. The Republicans had sapped the United States of its economic strength, undermining its foreign policy objectives. "In this new era," he declared, "our first priority in foreign policy and our first domestic priority are one and the same: We must revive our economy. America must regain its economic strength to play our proper role as leader of the world. . . . Mr. Bush's economic neglect has invited foreign pity. . . . The currency of national strength in this new era will be denominated not only in ships, tanks and planes, but also in diplomas, patents and paychecks."[7] Consequently, throughout the campaign, Clinton promised to be aggressive in penetrating foreign markets for American products. It was the one commitment he truly seemed to be passionate about, and the one that—for better or worse—he can be said to have honored.

Clinton and the Defense Budget: A Great Equation?

During the campaign, Clinton promised to maintain adequate defenses. He could hardly do otherwise. But he did not conceal the extent of the reductions he had in mind. He urged a $100 billion cut in defense spending by 1997—$60 billion more than what President Bush was proposing. He suggested reducing to seventy-five thousand the American troop presence in Europe.[8] Once in power, however, Clinton decided to be even more ruthless. Last March, he proposed to slash defense spending by $123.9 billion by 1997. Moreover, some of the money the administration allocated to defense spending was really intended to finance the conversion of defense industries to civilian production, leaving even less infrastructure for the maintenance of military strength.

Clinton's first defense secretary, Les Aspin, justified the cuts in a new military doctrine that aimed at a "one-and-a-half" rather than a "two-war" capability. The new strategy came to be known as "win-hold-win." Thus, if the United States were involved in two conflicts simultaneously, the aim would be to win in one theater, hold on in the other, then redeploy the victorious forces from the former to the latter to triumph there as well.[9] The response was not enthusiastic. It was immediately pointed out that if the United States only

[6] *The New York Times,* Aug. 14, 1992.
[7] *The Washington Post,* Aug. 14, 1992.
[8] *The New York Times,* Oct. 4, 1992; *The New York Times,* Oct. 21, 1992.
[9] *The New York Times,* June 12, 1993.

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possessed a capability to fight one war at a time, any adversary would seize on an international crisis as the moment to embark on some adventure, and there would be little Washington could do about it.

Consequently, a few days after promulgating the new doctrine, the defense secretary seemed to have second thoughts. Apparently, the administration would propose to fight and win two regional wars after all—but it had no intention of reversing its proposed defense cuts! So, American military strategy was to be based more on hope than reality.[10] As foreign policy analyst Joshua Muravchik—who had supported Clinton during the campaign—pointed out: "If there is one thing more dangerous than a one-and-a-half-war strategy, it is a two-war strategy with one-and-a-half war forces."[11]

On coming to power, the Clinton administration thus seemed to be committed to an interventionist foreign policy and an isolationist defense policy.

On coming to power, the Clinton administration thus seemed to be committed to an interventionist foreign policy and an isolationist defense policy driven by deficit-reduction targets. It would seek to penetrate new markets for American products, yet show no reluctance about criticizing the human rights practices of other countries. That the administration did not intend to think small became clear from the president's inaugural address. Clinton declared that when the "will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act, with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary." Just a few days before the inauguration, Clinton boldly called for a "New Covenant for American Security" based on the notion that "our definition of security must include common threats to all people." How was the administration going to pull off this feat? How might it arrive at a coherent stance given the incompatibility of its commitments? How might it square the circle?

There were only two possibilities. The first was suggested last spring in the course of a background press briefing by Peter Tarnoff, the undersecretary for political affairs in the State Department. The United States would henceforth concentrate on domestic problems, he announced. Clinton was elected to do something about the American economy and he intended to fulfill that promise. "It is necessary to make the point that our economic interests are paramount," Tarnoff explained. With limited resources, the United States must "define the extent of its commitment and make a commitment commensurate with those realities. That may on occasion fall short of what some Americans would like and others would hope for."[12]

[10] *The New York Times,* Sept. 2, 1993.
[11] Joshua Muravchik, "Lament of a Clinton Supporter," *Commentary,* Aug. 1993, p. 15.
[12] *The Washington Post,* May 26, 1993.

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The cold war was over. There existed neither the will nor the resources nor the necessity for the United States to continue to act like a superpower. "We simply don't have the leverage, we don't have the influence, the inclination to use military force. We don't have the money to bring positive results any time soon."[13] In other words, American foreign policy would be all talk and no action. The United States would still seek to realize noble aims but would no longer be prepared to expend capital to ensure their triumph.

This was the option Americans had chosen in the 1930s. The dictators were ritually denounced but no plans were put forward to stop them in their tracks. However, the 1990s are not the 1930s. Back then the United States was still a newcomer in world affairs. Tarnoff was suggesting that the United States do something no nation does unless compelled by military defeat or equivalent catastrophe: give up being a great power. And he was suggesting this at the very moment the United States had dispatched its totalitarian adversary in the cold war, then organized a victorious coalition to punish and reverse Iraqi aggression. Why would the United States want to give up the laurels of victory? Just how dire were the economic straits we were supposed to be in?

Tarnoff was suggesting the United States do what no nation does unless compelled by military defeat or equivalent catastrophe: give up being a great power.

Predictably, the reaction to Tarnoff's remarks was horror. There had to be more to being an American than worrying about how many roads or kidney dialysis machines were going to be built next year. Moreover, there were all those campaign promises as well as the heady talk of January and February about pursuing a foreign policy distinctly more activist than that of the Bush administration. So, the administration characteristically backed away in the face of outraged comment. "The United States recognizes its responsibilities as a superpower and intends to play a leadership role," a senior State Department official hastened to clarify the next day.[14]

But Tarnoff had obviously let the cat out of the bag. While trying to distance himself from his own undersecretary, Secretary of State Warren Christopher almost echoed him: "We can't do it all; we have to measure our ability to act in the interests of the United States, but to save our power for those situations which threaten our deepest national interest."[15] So, Tarnoff was right after all. As far as the Clinton administration was concerned, the United States did not have enough capital left, after attending to domestic needs, to address

[13] Ibid.
[14] *The Washington Post*, May 27, 1993.
[15] Ibid.

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the world's problems as well. It then hastily embraced the second option: sharing the burden of world leadership. Henceforth, the United States would act multilaterally in foreign affairs, either through international agencies or the United Nations.

That was the answer the administration was seeking. That was the way to meet all its needs at once. American foreign policy might still be ambitious, the brotherhood of man (and sisterhood of woman) might still be trumpeted, the Pentagon might still be slashed—and, if other powers *refused* to share the burden of some American initiative, then responsibility for the inaction would rest with them, not Washington. As early as the electoral campaign, Clinton had expressed enthusiasm for "multilateralism": "We will share burdens, where possible, through multilateral efforts to secure the peace, such as NATO, and a new voluntary U.N. rapid deployment force. In Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, and other torn areas of the world, multilateral action holds promise as never before, and the U.N. deserves full and appropriate contributions from all the major powers."[16] He was never stinting in his praise for the United Nations, a body he thought capable of "standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing mass violence against civilian populations, providing humanitarian relief and combatting terrorism."[17]

To understand the Clinton administration's commitment to multilateralism, it is instructive to look back on the foreign policy debates of 1992. The end of the cold war seemed to have given rise to a new doctrine. Twenty years after the ignominious withdrawal from Vietnam, liberal interventionism was making an intellectual comeback. Yesterday's doves—such as Anthony Lewis, Leslie Gelb, and *The New York Times* editorialists—had suddenly become hawks. From Bosnia to Somalia to Haiti, there seemed to be no end to what the United States was capable of achieving. They condemned vehemently the Bush administration's passivity in the face of all of the world's calamities. At the same time, they demanded defense cuts far greater than anything that had been contemplated hitherto. Ironically, various of yesterday's hawks were choosing that same moment to turn dovish, and as we have seen, Clinton exploited these remarkable reversals inspired by the end of the cold war.

Multilateralism and the New Interventionism

The case for the new liberal interventionism was presented most forcefully in June 1992 by the Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the New World in its portentously entitled report, "Changing Our Ways." The commission was chaired by Winston Lord, currently the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and it included David Gergen,

[16] *The New York Times,* Aug. 14, 1992.
[17] *The New York Times,* Oct. 10, 1993.

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Alice Rivlin (the deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget), and Admiral William Crowe (recently appointed ambassador to Great Britain). Also on board were Democratic Party luminaries, like Richard Holbrooke, C. Fred Bergsten, and William Gray. The report bemoaned the usual ills: "Meager savings and investment, a troubled public school system, an eroding infrastructure."[18] Echoing candidate Clinton, it declared that "America's first foreign policy priority is to strengthen our domestic economic performance."[19] But most interesting of all, calls for large cuts in America's armed forces along with the withdrawal of most of its troops deployed abroad alternated with belligerent proclamations like "the United States must be prepared . . . to engage in various forms of intervention, including forcible ones requiring U.S. military power."[20]

Yet, the only targets for intervention the Carnegie strategists had in mind seemed to be ones in which U.S. national interests were not engaged. Apparently, the United States had no enduring interests other than to promote democracy, provide humanitarian relief, and further the cause of a vague internationalism. Predictably, there was little mention of Russia in the report. The possibility that that great nation might once again reassert itself in disturbing fashion never crossed the minds of the authors. The highlight of the report was the promulgation of what it called "a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention": "The destruction or displacement of large groups of people within states justifies international intervention," it explained. "A new balance must be struck between traditional sovereignty and the world community's interest in human rights."[21]

How would this doctrine be put into effect? Simply, the report announced cheerfully: "Collective security has now come of age."[22] Not only was the United States no longer capable of carrying the burden of leadership alone, other powers were apparently eager to help shoulder it. "Clear trends more and more beckon us towards collective approaches: the diffusion of power, stronger friends to carry greater responsibilities . . . the growing effectiveness of multilateral institutions."[23]

The report took as axiomatic the debatable proposition that through collective action, the United States would be able to secure more of its global objectives than ever before. Taking part in multilateral institutions not only made financial sense, it was good for the soul. "Collective action will . . . have costs. Working with others can be cumbersome and demanding. It is terribly difficult to build consensus and forge a common agenda among sovereign countries. . . . Yet, if we are not prepared to address the interests and concerns of others, they will move without us."[24] And there was no shortage of multilateral

[18] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Changing Our Ways: America and the New World* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 8.

[19] Ibid., p. 18.

[20] Ibid., p. 51.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., p. 64.

[23] Ibid., p. 12.

[24] Ibid., p. 13.

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institutions ready to enforce global collective security. NATO "could monitor and ensure compliance with ceasefires, help disarm irregular forces, investigate charges of truce violations and provide humanitarian relief,"[25] while the Organization of American States was on hand to "support peacekeeping and the defense of democracy."[26] Above all, the United Nations had "been freed to take vigorous action unthinkable just a few years ago—mediation, peacemaking, and peacekeeping."[27] The unthinkable was to be made thinkable by making Japan and Germany permanent members of the Security Council (currently advocated by the Clinton administration) along with some representatives of the Third World, and by the United States chipping in much more money for U.N. peacekeeping operations. Now, Japan and Germany are not exactly breaking the door down demanding to have their say in world affairs. Nor is it easy to see how adding more potential vetoes into the deliberations of the Security Council would enhance the prospects for collective action. Nor does a larger financial contribution guarantee the effectiveness of peacekeeping—not to mention peacemaking—operations.

Of course, the reason why the United Nations became the repository of internationalist hopes not seen since the days of Woodrow Wilson has to do with the West's victory in the cold war and Gulf war. The Carnegie Commission shared the widespread belief that with the removal of the Soviet veto, the U.N. might finally fulfill the intentions of its founders and become the mechanism for a global collective security system. Yet, there were different views on how the United States was supposed to fit into this system. The Carnegie Commission and, quite obviously, the Clinton administration, firmly distanced themselves from the "New World Order" announced by Bush in the fall of 1990, which they along with many others—quite wrongly—took to be a proclamation of *Pax Americana.*

The Bush Legacy: A New World Order

Bush had allowed such a misinterpretation to take place because his rhetoric during the Gulf war suggested that the administration's overriding concern was to punish a violator of international law. The United States did not announce that it was going to war because, historically, it had never failed to act to prevent any power from dominating the Persian Gulf. Instead, it assembled a global coalition and moved to pass one United Nations Security Council resolution after another authorizing the use of force to punish a transgression of law.

The president declared that what he was seeking was the creation of "a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle."[28] Nonetheless,

[25] Ibid., p. 58.
[26] Ibid., p. 68.
[27] Ibid., p. 16.
[28] *The Washington Post,* Sept. 12, 1990.

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it is inconceivable that Bush would have gone to war had a vital American national interest not been at stake, or that he would *not* have gone to war just because the United Nations refused to sanction the use of force. Perhaps Bush did not feel that the American people would support armed intervention had he made such distinctions. If it were just a matter of oil, they might have found it too cynical. If it were just a matter of international law enforcement, they might have found it too burdensome. "America and the world must defend common vital interests. And we will," Bush promised. "America and the world must support the rule of law. And we will."[29] To his critics, what the president was suggesting was that the sanctity of the rule of law and U.S. vital interests were synonymous. Upholding the New World Order would mean, therefore, the enforcement of a global arrangement that happened to suit American interests.

In abandoning first the globalism of 1990–91 and then the unilateralism of 1992, the Bush administration was left with no foreign policy at all.

Thus, the New World Order was nothing more than the order that the victor in the cold war was imposing on the rest of the world. The Soviet Union had become a supplicant of the United States and seemed, in any case, about to disappear from the world scene. The days when we had to court the Third World were long gone. There was nothing to stop the United Nations from becoming, in effect, an extension of the U.S. government. Its only purpose would be to provide the imprimatur of legitimacy to any use of armed force by a U.S.-led West to secure its interests.

Yet, confronted by the complexity of many of the world's conflicts, the Bush administration soon lost interest in the idea of collective security—if indeed it ever had any. It certainly did not want a world governed by a body like the defunct League of Nations. The status quo was preferable: the United States could act when its interests were threatened, and use or ignore the United Nations as it chose. Certainly, Americans would *not* embark on foreign expeditions just to extend the writ of the United Nations. They would embark on United Nations expeditions to extend the writ of the United States.

The Bush administration subsequently viewed the Gulf war triumph as a vindication of the United States's military—rather than moral—leadership. For better or worse, Woodrow Wilson's inspiration got lost in the shuffle. The United States's strategy in the post–cold war era would be to maintain overwhelming military strength relative to other powers in order to have absolute freedom of action. In the spring of 1992, the Pentagon was on the brink of publishing a

[29] Ibid.

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policy statement that declared that the United States's overriding interest was to prevent any nation or alliance of nations from challenging American supremacy. The United States would have to persuade "potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role . . . to protect their legitimate interests. . . . We must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order."[30] The document was leaked to the press and caused a furor. What had happened to the hopes vested in the United Nations? What had happened to all the talk of collective responsibility and a New World Order? What had happened to burden sharing?

President Bush, already under serious challenge from an isolationist Pat Buchanan in the Republican Party primaries, beat a hasty retreat. The Pentagon document was declared to be a draft that did not reflect official thinking. Soon the administration was promising massive defense cuts. Yet, in abandoning first the globalism of 1990–91 and then the unilateralism of 1992, the Bush administration was left with no foreign policy at all. Since American interests were not being challenged, it found the present world order to its liking. But the administration had failed to mobilize popular support for the considerable levels of defense spending necessary to ensure that it remained that way.

That was why the Bush regime became so vulnerable to Clinton's attacks. It was committed to a New World Order but indifferent to human suffering if it did not impinge on American interests. It was committed to American military supremacy but lacked the political courage to make the case for it. It was committed to the United Nations yet would ignore the body when convenient—during the invasion of Panama, for example. It had argued that the United States had no business interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign member-states of the United Nations yet had imposed "no-fly zones" on Iraq as well as economic sanctions on Peru and Haiti—states that were safe to push around—because it disapproved of their domestic policies. It was committed to American hegemony but had failed to articulate the values on behalf of which it would be exercised.

Clinton took power with the obvious intention of trying to make good on his campaign promises. All of his early pronouncements suggested that he was seeking to execute the policies of the liberal interventionists. Indeed, Bush himself signalled the start of a new era with his military intervention in Somalia in December 1992. American forces were despatched to distribute food to the starving. When their mission was accomplished, most were to be withdrawn. Those who stayed behind would join U.N. forces to create a government under the rule of law. Here was the mighty United States joining hands with a number of nations to pursue a goal that was gloriously selfless. It was just the kind of operation that the Carnegie strategists anticipated with relish. President-elect Clinton warmly approved.

[30] *The New York Times*, Mar. 8, 1992.

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The Boondoggle in Bosnia

There was early and heady talk in administration circles of "democracy building" becoming "a hallmark of Clinton's Presidency in the same way that . . . Jimmy Carter is remembered for his championing of human rights."[31] The U.S. trade representative, Mickey Cantor, announced that the United States would drop duty-free privileges on imports from developing countries where workers' rights are supposedly abused.[32] Secretary of State Warren Christopher went to Ankara and offered the Turkish government "a detailed American proposal to help end widespread human rights abuses in the country."[33] Indonesia was told to get its act together.

No thought whatsoever was given to what was going to happen in Russia. That was thoroughly in keeping with the attitudes of the Carnegie strategists. The possibility of Russia's re-emerging as a nationalist, expansionist state was unthinkable. The struggle for global influence by the great powers was a thing of the past. The only problems left in the world were minor crises demanding multilateral, disinterested intervention. That was also a convenient assumption to make for an administration coming to power boasting of its intention to concentrate almost exclusively on domestic policy.

During its first few months, the administration seemed on the brink of using armed force on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims. Unlike President Bush, its spokesmen argued that there *was* a U.S. interest involved in the Balkans conflict. How Americans responded, Christopher explained sternly in February 1993, would test their "commitment to nurturing of democracy and the support of environments in which democracy can grow and take root. . . . And it tests what wisdom we have gathered from this bloody century, and it measures our resolve to take early concerted action against systematic ethnic persecution."[34] The secretary then stumped Europe in April in the vain attempt to get other countries to support the United States's possible use of armed force in the name of "multilateralism." The proposed intervention in the Balkans never materialized. Despite his claims that there were American interests at stake, Clinton suspected that most Americans did not agree with him and would object vehemently to the likely loss of life. So Clinton argued that his hands were tied: "I have proceeded all along on the assumption that whatever we did and whatever we could do, we would and should act through the United Nations in a multilateral way."[35] (That was how multilateralism was supposed to work. Clinton was, at least, more consistent than his liberal critics.)

The president had never been all that enthusiastic about intervention to begin with, and as time went on, the pressure on him to act began to ease. Last August, NATO threatened air strikes against the Serbs if they did not lift

31 *The Washington Post,* May 5, 1993.
32 *The Wall Street Journal,* June 28, 1993.
33 *The New York Times,* June 13, 1993.
34 *The New York Times,* Apr. 8, 1993.
35 Ibid.

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their siege of Sarajevo. The Serbs persisted, and nothing happened. But the Clinton administration proceeded to seize the high moral ground by rejecting the Vance-Owen peace proposal to divide Bosnia into ten ethnically based provinces as well as a subsequent plan for a three-way partition. That would have amounted to "rewarding" the Serbs' ethnic cleansing policy. In the end, Clinton paid no political price for his waffling. The Bosnian Muslims did: they received neither the promised air support nor the promised arms nor great power support for defensible enclaves. Then, in February 1994, a mortar-attack on the main marketplace in Sarajevo killed sixty-eight people. The televised scenes of bloody corpses and mutilated bodies sufficed to change U.S. foreign policy. For the first time since the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia, the American people seemed to be ready to support military action, and the administration was forced to respond. It was obviously loath to do so. "More than 24 hours after the Sarajevo attack, the White House was so determined to give the impression of business-as-usual that General John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was not invited to Sunday's meeting out of concern that his presence, if caught by television crews . . . might give the impression that military action was imminent."[36]

What could Clinton do? He might threaten air strikes again, but who would believe it? Luckily, help was at hand—but from an unlikely quarter. The French government had become convinced that the Serbs had won the war and that the only explanation for the continuing carnage was the Bosnian Muslims' reluctance to accept the fact. The United States was particularly culpable in encouraging them to hope that military intervention on their behalf was being seriously contemplated. The longer the war in Bosnia went on, the more it endangered European stability. The French decided that the time had come to issue an ultimatum. All heavy weapons—including any belonging to the Bosnian Muslims—must be withdrawn from the vicinity of Sarajevo or placed under the control of the United Nations, otherwise they would be subject to air attack.

That was the first time that the French were ready to sign on to NATO air strikes. In return, the Clinton administration seemed to be ready, for the first time, to accept a three-way partition of Bosnia and to dispatch thousands of U.S. peacekeeping troops to enforce an accord. In doing so, the administration was abandoning its stance as the protector—however ineffectual—of the Bosnian Muslims. As Albert Wohlstetter pointed out, the ultimatum "offered the Serbs the option of placing their guns under United Nations control, or just moving them out of range. . . . To their Bosnian victims it offered only the option of surrendering their meager artillery."[37]

All parties complied. The administration was euphoric and suggested that it was ready to threaten more air strikes to protect other Muslim enclaves in Bosnia. Faced with opposition from Moscow, however, it backed away from

[36] *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1994.

[37] Albert Wohlstetter, "Genocide by Mediation," *The New York Times*, Mar. 3, 1994.

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the idea. Things soon reverted back to normal. The United States brokered an agreement of sorts between the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia, who were to form a confederation, and who in turn would establish a federation with Croatia. The federation would control 51 percent of Bosnian territory. Such an arrangement could work, of course, so long as the Serbs were prepared to accept it and give up their present control of 72 percent of territory for a mere 49 percent. So far, there is little to indicate that this is the case. Moreover, it is not even clear if the Muslims are ready to settle for, in effect, the loss of half their country.

In the end, Clinton paid no political price for his waffling. Bosnian Muslims did.

Nor has NATO shown itself any more ready to use force now than before. To be sure, four Serb fixed-wing jets were shot down after they violated the "no fly zone." Yet, when Serbian artillery—including tanks and mortars—was discovered within the exclusion zone, no action was taken.[38] It then turned out that the United States was not prepared to support air strikes to protect any city other than Sarajevo. Last April, Secretary of Defense William Perry surprised many by categorically ruling out the use of force to prevent the predominantly Muslim town of Gorazde in Eastern Bosnia—designated bizarrely as a "safe haven" by the United Nations—from being overrun by Serbs. Not that American action had been expected, but it did seem strange that the administration should be encouraging the Serbs by committing itself to inaction.[39] Yet, a few days later, the administration again reversed itself and authorized air strikes against the Serb forces attacking the town. President Clinton justified this action—a potent escalation of the conflict—as merely a response to a U.N. request. Multilateralism was once more shaping American foreign policy. The administration has clearly betrayed the hopes of the Bosnian Muslims, but at least managed to escape, so far, the loss of American lives. It is questionable whether it can continue to do so.

The Boondoggle in Somalia

Clinton was not so lucky in Somalia. U.N. peacekeeping operations had been a shibboleth for the new foreign policy team. *The New York Times* reported last August that a presidential directive was being drafted that would announce that the United States was ready to play "a more assertive role in United Nations peacekeeping operations." In addition, it was to recommend that certain U.S. military units be trained exclusively to support U.N. operations.[40] Soon the

[38] *The New York Times,* Mar. 22, 1994.
[39] *The New York Times,* Apr. 4, 1994.
[40] *The New York Times,* Aug. 5, 1993.

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administration was suggesting that it would be perfectly happy to see American troops serve under U.N. commanders on a permanent basis. It "reflects a belief that military responsibilities must be shared in the post–Cold-War world."[41] A State Department official explained that the Clinton administration "envisions the United States, in principle, taking part in any peacekeeping operation in any capacity."[42]

It now seemed as if the administration was ready to sign on to every United Nations plan going. No questions were raised when American forces began to be used for the purpose of "nation-building" in Somalia. Nor when they were placed under U.N. command. Nor when the United Nations embarked on its pursuit to capture or kill the local Somali warlord, General Mohammed Farah Aidid. Creating viable political structures in Somalia seemed like a virtuous enough endeavor. But there was little prospect of success and, therefore, of American withdrawal anytime soon.

Moreover, the project had been undertaken in the name of no authority other than the United Nations. At least when the United Nations supervises a truce between two warring parties, it does so only after such assistance had been requested. But there existed no legitimate political authority in Somalia to ask for anything. The result was old-fashioned imperialism, only without any sense of imperial mission. The United Nations was eagerly accepting responsibility for Somalia's political future. So was the United States—for no other reason than that was what the United Nations wanted. And, as befitted the Clinton administration, it had undertaken a major military commitment while going out of its way to deploy as little armory as possible. The world the Carnegie strategists had dreamt of was coming into being.

The problem was that the American people did not think much of it. Few paid attention to events in Somalia until the casualties started mounting. When the public realized that young Americans were dying in pursuit of a policy shaped by secretary general of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, it responded in outrage. While the administration may have shown enthusiasm for U.N. peacekeeping operations in background briefings to reporters, it made no effort to persuade the rest of the country of its virtues. Multilateralism is one of those ideas beloved by intellectuals but detested by almost everyone else. However, by September and even before the disastrous raid on General Aidid's supposed stronghold, which led to the loss of eighteen American lives, the Clinton administration began to sense the danger it was courting.

What would a Ross Perot do with the news that American foreign policy was being conducted, not by the elected president, but by an Egyptian bureaucrat? As for the Republicans, here was an issue that could unite in opposition both the isolationists and the internationalists. So, the administration announced that it was reconsidering its commitment to multilateralism. Within a few days, four officials, including the president, made well-publicized foreign policy speeches.

[41] *The New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1993.
[42] Ibid.

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They had a single theme. The phrases employed were almost identical. When it came to multilateralism, the administration's position now was—to paraphrase T. S. Eliot—this is not it at all, this is not what we meant at all. There had been a dreadful misunderstanding.

To Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, the word "multilateralism" suggested NATO, "containment," the Gulf war. As for future U.N. peacekeeping missions, the United States would not join unless a number of criteria were satisfied. Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed peacekeeping mission have clear objectives? Is a cease-fire in place? Have the parties to the conflict agreed to a U.N. presence? Is the money there? Can an endpoint be envisaged?[43] The ambassador sounded an extremely skeptical note as to what the United Nations was capable of achieving: "The Berlin Wall would be upright today if we had relied on the U.N. to contain Communism."[44] To Christopher: "Multilateralism is a means, not an end. It is one of the many foreign policy tools at our disposal. And it is warranted only when it serves the central purpose of American foreign policy: to protect American interests. This country will never subcontract its foreign policy to another power or another person."[45] To National Security Adviser Anthony Lake: "multilateralism" suggested NATO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade. "We should act multilaterally where doing so advances our interests—and we should act unilaterally when *that* will serve our purpose."[46] The president himself, in his first address to the United Nations General Assembly, declared: "If the American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no."[47]

So, now we knew that the administration was no longer prepared to sign on to every United Nations program going. On the other hand, we still had no idea what Clinton's foreign policy was. Officials continued to see the United States's engagement with the world as entailing only "multilateral" operations to secure disinterested objectives. It was obviously difficult for these Democrats to think any other way. Indeed, in his speech, Clinton envisaged expanding the scope of U.N. peacekeeping: "The United Nations must . . . have the technical means to run a modern world-class peacekeeping operation. We support the creation of a genuine U.N. peacekeeping headquarters with a planning staff, with access to timely intelligence, with a logistics unit that can be deployed on a moment's notice, and a modern operations center with global communications."[48]

[43] Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks to the National War College, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Sept. 23, 1993.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Address at Columbia University, Sept. 20, 1993.

[46] Remarks of Anthony Lake, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., Sept. 21, 1993.

[47] *The New York Times,* Sept. 28, 1993.

[48] Ibid.

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The upshot of it all was that the administration abandoned the goal of trying to capture General Aidid and committed itself to withdrawing all American forces from Somalia by March 31, irrespective of what happened on the ground. The latter was all the administration accomplished. Its attempts to persuade the country's clan leaders to come to an agreement led to the signing of a "declaration of national reconciliation" just four days before the last American troops were scheduled to leave. It is unlikely to endure. Few doubt that the Somali warlords will go back to fighting among themselves exactly as they were doing when President Bush sent in U.S. troops on their mission of mercy. The first of the new type of military intervention had come and gone, leaving behind a number of American dead but few achievements. To be fair, the administration inherited a nasty situation from its predecessor. But, at no time did Clinton express any reservation either about the original "humanitarian" operation or its expansion, under U.N. auspices, into "nation building."

The Boondoggle in Haiti

In Haiti, too, the administration got itself into trouble by seeking to fulfill a commitment it had inherited from its predecessor. The attempt to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide, ousted from power in September 1991, met with determined resistance from the military leaders now ruling Haiti. The Bush administration had imposed sanctions on the impoverished island, thereby adding to its misery. Last July, it seemed as if Haiti's military and Aristide had reached agreement on Governor's Island in New York enabling the former president to return to office. But the accord broke down on the issue of amnesty for the coup leaders. In October, U.S. forces taking part in a U.N.-supervised handover of power were met at the dock by officially sanctioned riots and turned back.

In habitual fashion, the Clinton administration proceeded to follow up a show of weakness with an ultimatum: Haiti's military leaders must step down by January 15 or face further sanctions. The deadline passed, and no action was taken. By now, the White House had become somewhat disillusioned with Aristide as well, and demanded that he grant an amnesty to the coup leaders as a condition of returning to power. When Aristide refused, the administration reversed itself again and put further pressure on Haiti's leaders. Sanctions were to be tightened irrespective of the suffering they were unquestionably causing—mostly to Haiti's poor—and a new plan was put forward: the military leaders were to step down, Haiti's National Assembly would confirm a new prime minister named by Aristide, and a law granting amnesty to the military leaders would be enacted.[49] Neither Aristide nor the military showed any inclination of going along with the administration's proposal. As a result, the Haitians' misery continues, and the administration is stuck with a policy it cannot

[49] *The New York Times*, Mar. 27, 1994.

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justify. It is hard to explain Clinton's commitment to Aristide at such a terrible human cost other than by a reluctance to offend the Congressional Black Caucus.

"Enlargement" and the Boondoggles in Russia and China

By now the administration was thoroughly frustrated. The stakes involved in these multilateral, humanitarian interventions were peripheral to American national interests and the political costs vexingly high. So, the administration shifted gears again, announcing that, henceforth, it would pay attention only to big things. The Israel-PLO accord signed in Washington in September was a particular source of pride. So was the alleged triumph for U.S. policy on Russia. Western economic aid for the impoverished former superpower and unwavering support for Boris Yeltsin seemingly facilitated the apparently successful showdown in Moscow last October when the anti-democratic forces in Russia's Parliament were crushed.

The administration felt that the time had come for the formulation of some grand concept to still the voices that Clinton had no foreign policy, that he, too, lacked the "vision thing." The task fell to his principal foreign policy thinker, Anthony Lake. With much gusto, he coined a new term—"enlargement"—to characterize the strategy of the United States in the post–cold war era. Clinton's America would promote market democracies around the world, and "to the extent democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous and influential, while the broader world will be more humane and peaceful."[50] But that was more a tautology than a strategy, and begged every question as to how the desired state of affairs was to be attained. Was "enlargement" a long-term aspiration or a short-term plan for specific countries? If long-term, how did the new doctrine differ from what the United States has been pursuing since the end of the Second World War? The post-1945 world is replete with agencies trying to promote market democracies. There is the United States Information Agency, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Agency for International Development, Voice of America, Radio Liberty, Radio Martí, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and so on. If, on the other hand, enlargement was to be a short-term project, then it must inevitably involve the National Security Council and U.S. armed forces in an endless series of fiascoes like Somalia or Haiti in which the prestige of the United States would be staked on the attainment of any number of nebulous objectives. Nor, in the absence of clear American interests, could the administration hope to rally popular support for the necessary sacrifice of blood and treasure. The United States would end up with the worst of all possible worlds. The commitment would be there, the desired outcome would not. The liberal interventionist program, as articulated by Lake, reflects

[50] Lake, Sept. 21, 1993.

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what two recent authors have described as the "deeply ingrained American habit of willing grand ends through only limited means."[51]

The test of the enlargement policy was obviously Russia. If, with American assistance, a former totalitarian adversary could be made to join the community of "market democracies," then the strategy was obviously a valuable undertaking. But in fact the administration had no Russian policy at all other than to support Yeltsin. It gave little thought to who his successor might be, what lasting institutions were being established, whether a powerful democratic political movement existed. After the bloody fighting of October, the administration assumed that Yeltsin's faction would comfortably win the elections to the Duma scheduled for December. The triumph of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's nationalists and of the reactionary neo-communists came as a staggering blow. Washington's first response was to reverse its stance and lash out. Vice-President Al Gore denounced the International Monetary Fund for imposing hardship on the Russians. Strobe Talbott, the ambassador at large for Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union, criticized the Russian government's policy of "shock therapy." He claimed to want to see "less shock and more therapy."

The administration had no Russian policy at all other than to support Yeltsin.

Such statements went down badly in Washington and Moscow. The two principal reformers, Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fyodorov, were not in the new Russian government. They poured scorn on the notion that "shock therapy" had ever been tried in Moscow. Redundant state industries continued to operate, and inflation was still rampant. Fyodorov denounced Talbott for stabbing the reformers in the back and for strengthening the hands of the communists. So, the administration, as it had so often before, beat a hasty retreat. By the time Strobe Talbott came to testify before the Senate on his appointment as deputy secretary of state, he sounded a different note. "Gradual reform is a prescription for hyperinflation and economic collapse. . . . Slowing the pace of reform will not ease the social pain of economic transition. In fact, quite the contrary: slowing down is likely to prolong and worsen the pain and increase the threat of even more alarming political developments."[52]

Yet, instead of encouraging the reformers, administration policy seemed to be directed towards appeasing the opponents of reform. The IMF lent $1.5 billion in exchange for vague promises from the Viktor Chernomyrdin government to curb spending and to raise taxes. It is far from clear, to say the least, that this new government is truly committed to reform. Chernomyrdin had, after all, taken power announcing that the era of "the romance of the market" was

[51] Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992).

[52] *The New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1994.

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over. Yet, with the imprimatur of the IMF, it can appeal for more loans from the West. It is hard to see the IMF's action as anything other than a stopgap attempt to hold at bay the nationalist, populist elements in Russia. It is hard to see how this policy could possibly succeed.

The administration's response to the belligerent noises coming from Moscow was in much the same spirit. Several former members of the Warsaw Pact had expressed their desire to join NATO, both to hasten their integration into Europe and to shelter their independence from their giant neighbor and erstwhile oppressor. Russia, which only last August had raised no objections to Poland's entry, reacted with fury. Washington, anxious not to do anything that might energize Zhirinovsky and the political forces he represented, was bound to deny the East Europeans' request. At the urging of Strobe Talbott, the administration drafted a proposal called Partnership for Peace. Full membership in NATO was to be postponed into the indefinite future. In the meantime, many countries—including Russia—would be invited to join a loose association with NATO.

The countries of East and Central Europe were obviously disappointed but had to accept the offer as the best available. The policy seemed shortsighted, to say the least. A troubled and enfeebled Russia would not be able to do much beyond blowing off steam about their former satellites joining NATO. A revitalized and perhaps undemocratic Russia would down the road be able to do much more. In any case, the Russians continued to express their grievances even after their sensibilities had been stroked. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev denounced "the chauvinistic new banners that flap in the Washington wind." He announced that "Russia cannot agree to a subordinate global role."[53] Vladimir Lukin, former ambassador to Washington and now head of the foreign affairs committee of the Duma, proclaimed that Russia's joining the Partnership for Peace was, in effect, a submission to rape. President Yeltsin's press secretary complained that the program did not take full account of the "political and military might of Russia." Besides, he added (in tones reminiscent of the bullying ploys of Vyacheslav Molotov), the sincerity of the invitation had to be doubted in light of the "decision to celebrate the 50th anniversary of D-Day without Russia."[54]

The Clinton administration had banked from the first on Russia's ceasing to be a significant force in world affairs. Now, it displayed a case of nerves about Russia's intervention in Bosnia, its meddling in the affairs of neighboring republics, and threats over the treatment of ethnic Russians anywhere. At one point, Clinton voiced his concern that Russia's leaders, "in response to demands from their people, would begin the re-imposition of some sort of empire."[55] But, if that were indeed even a remote possibility, then it immediately raised

[53] *The New York Times,* Mar. 18, 1994.
[54] *The New York Times,* Apr. 1, 1994.
[55] *The New York Times,* Mar, 15, 1994.

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questions about the wisdom of the defense cuts the Clinton administration had already enacted and continues to count on.

The promotion of "market democracies" proved equally embarrassing in China. Which was to come first: "Markets" or "Democracy"? Clinton had denounced George Bush's supposed coddling of the perpetrators of the massacres at Tiananmen Square. But he had also promised to be aggressive in penetrating foreign markets for American products—and China seemed the most lucrative market of all. So, instead of revoking China's Most Favored Nation status, in the name of human rights, Clinton extended it for one year, promising to review it in light of the progress made on human rights. This policy was again the worst of both worlds. The Chinese, sensing that the United States needs them as trading partners as well as interlocutors with the North Koreans, were not going to listen to sanctimonious lectures on human rights. Instead, on the eve of Secretary of State Christopher's visit to Beijing, they arrested a number of dissidents and, in effect, dared the United States to cut off its nose to spite its face.

The Clinton administration now finds itself in much the same predicament as its predecessor, except that it does not have two successful military expeditions to its credit.

The Clinton administration now finds itself in much the same predicament as its predecessor, except that it does not have two successful military expeditions to its credit. It proclaims its intention of making the world a more moral, law-abiding place but lacks the will or power to act on that intention. It proclaims a mission to build democracy around the world, but is unable to explain to the American people why this should be such an overriding interest of theirs. In sum, the Clinton administration approaches foreign policy as if it were on a supermarket shopping spree, grabbing whatever it takes a fancy to, without worrying about the costs or whether the product is the right brand, or is genuinely needed. It sets out to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons one day, and announces the lifting of restrictions on the export of high-tech products the next. It seeks to penetrate the Chinese market one day, and denounces China's human rights practices the next. It takes punitive action on Japanese imports one day, and begs the Japanese to stop the flow of remittances to North Korea the next. It demands that Ukraine surrender all nuclear weapons to Russia one day, and asks Ukraine to balance Russian power the next.

The Clinton administration seems truly passionate about a sole foreign policy goal. It really does want to open up world markets to American products on the theory that economies are trumps and security issues are readily soluble in the post–cold war world by multilateral action. As a result, Clinton was blindsided by North Korea, Bosnia, Ukraine, China, Somalia, and Haiti, and has not known how to respond. The administration changes policy from day to

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day, lurching between threats and complaisance. What it really wants is for the demands of foreign policy to go away so it can get on with its domestic agenda. But its own amateurishness guarantees that the demands of foreign policy will not go away—and that its relationship with the world will continue to be stormy.

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The Fundamentals of American Security

by Angelo M. Codevilla

Our best journals and worst statesmen sound the same theme. A new era has dawned, and the lessons of past decades, not to mention centuries, no longer pertain. America's very national interests, and the means to advance them, must therefore be divined *de novo,* if not *ex nihilo,* in a quarrelsome cacophony of internationalists, economic nationalists, unilateralists, multilateralists, and neo-isolationists. On the one hand, we read that for the first time in over fifty years, no serious threat to U.S. security exists. On the other, we read that every global trend poses a long-term threat, be it disease and famine, ecological damage, drugs, pollution, ethnic strife, religious zealotry, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, or economic competition. Nowhere in the planning documents of the secretary of defense or Joint Chiefs of Staff do we read about potential threats from the former Soviet Union or China. No foundation supports research on potential great power conflicts; indeed, foundations seem to have lost interest in strategic affairs altogether. It seems that the Clinton administration and the foreign policy community in the United States are content to wonder only how much and how quickly the ranks of market democracy will be *enlarged,* as a matter of historical inevitability, not how they might be defended in need.

The real world, as always, suggests contrary prognostications. To be sure, it is safer now that no Politburo controls a four-million-man military armed with more modern weaponry than the rest of the world combined. Yet, we have no assurance that warlike tendencies will not recapture the former Soviet empire, no assurance that China will not succumb to territorial ambitions as its strength grows, and (if Bosnia is any indication) we have every assurance that Europe is less likely, not more, to stand up to a future Russian bid to intimidate. And what of ourselves? As our military shrinks, as we look increasingly inward, as the blunders of the current and former administrations sour the American people on foreign engagements, what is the chance that the United States will act with prescience and determination to nip future threats in the bud? And if we do not, in the face of new Russian or Chinese challenges, what will become

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of our European and Japanese alliances? All we need do is to assume that the governments and peoples of this "new era" will behave more or less as they always have done, and we can readily imagine minor threats turned into major ones, major potential threats becoming actual, and friends turned into bystanders. Think simply in terms of a decade or two and all manner of mischief becomes possible.

The intellectual training of the U.S. foreign policy establishment predisposes them to the most dangerous sort of pollyannaism.

The intellectual training of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, however, predisposes them to the most dangerous sort of pollyannaism. If there is a "conceptual poverty" in American foreign policy, it is a product of training, not experience. For a generation ago, the empirical study of the history and theory of statecraft gave way to two nefarious novelties: on the "hard" side, the systems analysts and theoretical model builders of political science; on the "soft" side the purveyors of "peace studies," "primacy of domestic policy," social history, and "new cultural history." The result is that many of the best foreign policy analysts today spin out jargonized extrapolations into the future of the global trends *du jour,* while the worst fixate on the micromanagement of the media crisis *du jour.* No wonder George F. Kennan recently groaned in public and asked what our Founding Fathers would make of us: "Yes, of course your world is complex. So was ours. . . . What you need are not policies—much less a single policy. What you need are sound principles."

This is common sense. All attempts to foretell the future divert our attention from the only things we can assert with confidence, which are (a) our identity as Americans; (b) our strengths and weaknesses as a society and a geographical state; (c) the principles we as a nation have learned with regard to protecting ourselves, our society, and our identity.

First Principles

The first principle of statecraft is to preserve the regime, which means that every act of a statesman, every policy and alliance, every word he utters ought to strengthen his people's will to sacrifice and, if need be, risk their lives for the regime. Some states, from the Roman Empire to the Soviet, relied on a combination of repression and stylized patriotism. Others, from Genghis Khan to Napoleon, appealed to tribalism and the thirst for booty and glory. The Swiss and Swedes make service an ingrained duty of civic culture. But in the United States, a land of individualistic, deracinated immigrants, the will to sacrifice and risk taking cannot be produced by any of those things. Americans are "E pluribus unum" because of our common "dedication to a proposition" and perception

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of common selfish interest. We Americans bet our lives only for the protection of home and hearth—as any people would—or because we are persuaded that, in a given situation, not to fight would be contrary to what it means to *be* an American.

The hoary opposition set up by pundits between moralism and realism in U.S. foreign policy is of no use.

That is why the hoary opposition set up by pundits between moralism and realism in U.S. foreign policy is of no use. Realpolitik may help us to understand the policies of European kings in the last century, but a purely "realist" approach would, in the American context, be profoundly *un*realistic, since it would command no loyalty. By the same token, a purely moralist approach to foreign policy would itself be *im*moral in its neglect of the difference between the wishing of good and the doing of good. American pragmatism means to learn, preferably early in life, to match one's reach with one's grasp, not to start what one cannot finish, and to take responsibility for the consequences (not only the motives) of one's action. To understand how to approach American foreign policy, therefore, we must begin with a review, not of new world trends, but of old American principles, dating back to the Founding Fathers.

Experience—not theory—taught our forefathers that America's greatest strength is precisely that it is "the land of the free and home of the brave." The colonists were inferior to the British Empire by every measure. But they were accustomed to bearing arms in self-defense, they were fighting on their own turf for a cause much greater than that of the British occupiers, and they learned in their homes, churches, and schools that rights, freedoms, and duties were all of a piece. But the colonists would never have risked their lives to expel a (rather mild) oppression if they had not believed (a) it was right to try; and (b) it could be done. Turning to geography, the leaders of the American rebellion recognized at once that their long Atlantic littoral, a boon to trade and fishing, was a shocking vulnerability in war. So, however much they yearned to escape the politics of the old world, they readily ratified the French alliance and finally triumphed when, off Yorktown, a French fleet temporarily stole command of the seas from the Royal Navy.

From this experience, the Founding Fathers distilled the first principles of American security policy. First, the American people, not just their army, must be free to bear arms—the Second Amendment's "militia" is meant to be synonymous with "citizenry." Secondly, only the Congress should have the power to declare war, so as to ensure that America's wars are popular, directed toward well-defined objectives, and (above all) rare. Thirdly, since permanent alliances with other powers are important for a young and weak nation, treaties should require super-majorities, such as two-thirds of the Senate. Finally, the early administrations set out to construct world-class warships like the *U.S.S.*

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Constitution, to protect America's vulnerable shores in future. Much is made of the Federalists' Anglophilia and the Republicans' support of the French Revolution. But both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson warned against permanent and entangling alliances, and both knew how to capitalize on Europe's disputes to defend and expand American hegemony in North America. The proof of this wisdom was the evidence of how foolish was James Madison's War of 1812. But both the Yankees and British learned their lesson from that wasteful, pointless stalemate. Henceforth, they respected each other's possessions in the New World and contrived to push third powers (Spain, France, Russia) out of the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine may have been a bluff for some decades, but it was based on the sound principles of John Quincy Adams. America would inevitably expand so long as it remained true to its own principles of freedom at home and pragmatic national interest abroad. Hence, for the United States to have exercised less influence in Latin America would have been untrue to our interest of keeping other great powers away, untrue to our interest in open access to the markets of the world, and untrue to the universal claims of our own Declaration of Independence. To have intervened *more* in Latin America, or to have participated in the European scramble for colonies, or even to have tried to export our system of government to Latin countries, would have violated our own identity.

When men unlearn something, they always suffer twice: first from the consequences of their folly, and again when they draw the wrong lessons from it.

In sum, nineteenth-century U.S. policy was neither isolationist nor imperialist, but prudent. The Mexican War was ugly, to be sure, but Americans resisted the temptation (shouted by some) to annex all of Mexico and not just the nearly empty provinces we took—and the corrupt, brutal Mexican military dictatorship contributed mightily to its own despoilment. But the point is not that American principles are hogwash because we never lived up to some saintly standard. Rather, the point is precisely that *even the United States* has fallen far short of its own standard, which is to say that Americans, while never hesitating to call barbarism or tyranny abroad by its proper name, were never under the illusion that they could bring about universal peace and justice no matter how strong their military or how idealistic their policy. The United States was a Christian, primarily low-church Protestant nation in the nineteenth century. Not even Jesus Christ promised to bring peace and justice to a fallen world; quite the contrary. The civil government of the United States, therefore, would most certainly not try to do so. As late as the start of the twentieth century, by which time the United States was a mighty industrial and naval power, the traditional principles of the Founding Fathers still held sway: promote freedom

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at home, keep other powers out of the hemisphere, deploy a navy sufficient to protect our shores, and command respect for Americans and their products in the wide world. Theodore Roosevelt's "speak softly and carry a big stick" summed up American wisdom for his adage was—by later standards especially—eminently humble.

The Wilsonian Debacle

Had Woodrow Wilson looked at the world as Benjamin Franklin, Washington, Jefferson, and the younger Adams did, the United States would never have entered the Great War. Imperial Germany did not threaten our shores or commerce any more than Britain did; indeed, the differences between the two coalitions were grossly exaggerated at the time and since. But be that as it may, by 1917, the Europeans had killed five million of each other, and exhaustion was on the verge of trumping madness. American interest lay primarily in the continued division of Europe into several countervailing powers. The best outcome for the United States was a negotiated settlement, either brokered by the United States or (preferably) arrived at by the desperate Europeans themselves. The worst outcome for the United States was a victory and dictated peace for either side. Yet Wilson expended a quarter of a million American lives to achieve precisely that worst outcome. What is more, by associating U.S. prestige with his utopian goals of universal peace, ethnic sovereignty, and democracy, he only brought discredit on all America stood for. Finally, his ruinous reversal of the principles of the Founding Fathers worked a revolution in American foreign policy thinking that survives to this day. Now, the Founding Fathers never believed for a moment that democracy in and of itself guaranteed decent government *even in the United States,* much less abroad, nor that it was the business of the United States to export it. But Wilson's crusade, beginning in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and ending in his refusal to help the Anglo-French fight Bolshevism in Russia, began a career of selective American meddling in the internal affairs of other countries justified by grandiose, ill-defined projects for global uplift.

When men unlearn something, they always suffer twice: first from the consequences of their folly, and again when they draw the wrong lessons from it. For the American policy elite did not return, after 1920, to the principles of the Founding Fathers, but conjured up, in their disillusionment, still more deviations from sound doctrine. In other words, heresy does not lead back to orthodoxy, but to still newer heresies. So it was that many Americans in the interwar years embraced a mythical isolationism that had in fact never before been practiced, while others said "forms of government be damned," condemned the British and French for imperialists, and paid no mind when Italy and Germany went fascist. The Wilsonian streak, meanwhile, lived on in the spreading peace movement, in which "idealists" gathered to denounce *America's* attachment to armaments and national interest.

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These first peaceniks, whether out of cynicism or naïveté, demonstrated extraordinarily bad political judgment. They refused to believe that Stalin was a monster, admired Mussolini's economics, and apologized for Hitlerism as an understandable reaction to the Versailles Treaty. To be sure, they were quick to condemn fascist aggression in the 1930s, but insisted that appeasement, not U.S. military power, was the appropriate response to it. As World War II approached, this combination of a "realism" that embraced the fantastic and an "idealism" that could not tell right from wrong weakened America more than its anemic military budget. Even if Franklin Roosevelt had understood the need to throw America's weight behind Britain, France, and China before it was too late, the unholy domestic alliance of fascist sympathizers, communist sympathizers, and populist isolationists would undoubtedly have stayed his hand.

Utopianism Redivivus

World War II was a bewildering emotional high for the American people as fear, pride, vengeance, loss, duty, an exhilarating team spirit, and an undeniable generosity born of freedom and faith crowded together in the hearts of men and women. But World War II was a new intellectual low for the American policy establishment. Far from fleeing from their pre-war folly back to the principles of the Founding Fathers, the Roosevelt New Dealers pronounced Wilsonianism correct after all. This time it was not enough to defeat the evil represented by the Axis powers, it must be replaced by an absolute good represented by a United Nations that would subsume all national agendas. So strongly was the Roosevelt administration committed to its new world order that it never thought to tell this simple truth to the American people: that the alliance with Stalin was an expedient, a necessary evil. Instead, the administration depicted the USSR as a loyal and indispensable partner in the United Nations, and proceeded—in the name of solidarity with Moscow—to firebomb Dresden, send millions of refugees and POWs to Siberian death camps, wink at the communization of Eastern Europe, offer to surrender our monopoly of nuclear weapons, and even to extend Marshall Plan assistance to the Soviet Union. And the only defense the "idealists" could raise, retrospectively, on their behalf, was a (dubious) appeal to military and diplomatic "reality." Republican Senators Robert Taft and Arthur Vandenberg abominated this dealing with the devil, not to mention the subordination of American interests to a United Nations. But they had no alternative vision of their own. So it was up to Stalin himself to create a postwar doctrine for American foreign policy: a feat he accomplished by turning down America's offers of nuclear and economic aid, and otherwise behaving so obnoxiously that by 1949–1950 the American wise men finally saw his regime for what it was.

The cold war retaught the U.S. policy establishment some of the fundamental truths of international life: for instance, that most governments treat their own people abominably; that most governments respect countervailing force more than pious precepts; that no nation—even the mighty United

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States—could either ignore the world or remake the world in its image. The choice between waging offensive war on distant continents to "rollback" an enemy and waging serial defensive wars at times and places of the enemy's choosing was an awful one. So our cold war captains, inspired by Kennan, resolved to forge the alliances and weapons sufficient to deter aggression while waiting for communism's internal diseases to kill it. Would the Founding Fathers have approved? Perhaps. But would they have approved of the bizarre contradictions involved in attempting to prop up an enemy at the same time you are hoping to topple it? Why did Dwight Eisenhower (to the applause of the foreign policy establishment) ignore the Hungarians in 1956 and instead join with the USSR in denouncing the Anglo-French defense of their rights in Suez, an act that hastened the premature birth of the benighted "Third World"? Why did Richard Nixon sign (to the applause of all moderate and liberal pundits) arms control agreements freezing Soviet superiority in strategic nuclear weapons at the same time American troops were dying to stop communism in Southeast Asia? Why did Gerald Ford sell wheat, at subsidized prices, to the USSR in the 1970s? Why did Jimmy Carter so punish our *allies* for human rights violations that Henry Kissinger quipped that being America's friend is invariably fatal? Why did Ronald Reagan negotiate more treaties with, and extend more financial aid to, the "evil empire" than all his predecessors? Why, as late as August 1991, did George Bush tell an incredulous crowd in Kiev that Ukraine's best future lay within a reformed Soviet empire?

To be sure, one may stress the revolutionary role played by nuclear weapons. Thus, the United States and USSR shared an interest in managing their strategic relationship even as they competed fiercely at lower levels and through proxies. Likewise, one can argue plausibly that economic, cultural, and technological links to the USSR helped to undermine the ability of the Soviet heirarchy to bully its people. But those are arguments about tactics. What were America's *goals* in the cold war? What was it hoping to achieve in its long and costly strategic and regional confrontations? With what was it hoping to replace the cold war? Those questions are more difficult to answer.

Consider, for instance, the concept of "victory," the natural end of war according to Aristotle. Since 1945, the United States has not legally been involved in any war at all, despite its expenditure of some 120,000 lives in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Kuwait, and elsewhere. Instead, we have engaged "adversaries" in "police actions" that were "limited" and "managed" by "appropriate means" in order to achieve "conflict resolution." The justification for such euphemization of foreign relations is that war is unthinkable nowadays, and it follows that where there is no war, neither is there victory. As a result, our adversary Kim Il Sung still rules in Pyongyang and now threatens his neighbors with nuclear holocaust, our Vietnamese adversaries not only rule in Hanoi, but in Saigon, where their tanks bashed in the American embassy in 1975, and our adversaries in Bagdad and Mogadishu are as entrenched as ever, rightly confident that the Americans will never return. So instead of war being rare for America, as the Founding Fathers intended, it has become common; instead of ratified by the people's representatives, it is contrived by unelected mavens in the executive

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branch or media; and instead of victories, it breeds humiliation. There is no such thing as a limited war to the parents of a dead G.I. or airman. Such is the decadence visited upon America by the policy elite under the pressure of open-ended, self-assigned global responsibility.

A similar deterioration of reason describes our approach to weaponry. Now, weapons are tools, no more, and must be judged solely on their capacity to help us do a job. Our Founding Fathers knew that: their Declaration of Independence condemned the savagery visited upon settlers by hostile Indians, but they did not blame the Indians' tomahawks. Since 1945, however, numerous Americans have made fine careers peddling the notion that weapons are bad, the more powerful they are the worse they are, and that nuclear weapons especially are diabolical. That well-known dove Ronald Reagan proclaimed that "nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought" and Strobe Talbott wrote that "nuclear weapons exist to be talked about, not to be used." Even nuclear weapons designed for nothing more than the killing of tanks or ships are the object of animus precisely because their undeniable *ordinariness* threatens to dispel the mystical aura conjured up around nuclear weapons. This meant in practice that during the cold war, U.S. policy makers envisioned their task as one of educating the Soviets to design their nuclear systems, not to help them fight wars, but to cause Armageddon in case deterrence failed. Alas, the Soviets didn't sucker for our pitch. By the time the USSR collapsed—and according to the latest START agreement—the USSR would still deploy some 3,500 warheads available to hit some four hundred strategic U.S. targets. No wonder that Condoleezza Rice, former NSC staff member, gave thanks for the political collapse of the Soviet Union since, if we had had to fight its war machine at full strength, we would have lost.

The nuclear kakatopia that is mutual assured destruction required, of course, that no weapon be built that might thwart Armageddon. So it was that our policy elite anathematized anti-missile systems by 1970. Now, the U.S. Constitution states that our government exists, first and foremost, to "provide for the common defense," and most Americans believe that the military budget is spent to prevent enemies from harming our country. But almost all of our foreign policy community, public and private, Democrat and Republican, still act on the assumption that the best means of protecting the United States against weapons of mass destruction is to advertise our very vulnerability and do everything possible to prevent the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. The *Defense* Department and North American Aerospace *Defense* Command are thus two more examples of the Orwellian newspeak that now prevents any genuine idealism or realism from informing our policy discourse.

Perhaps the most profound origin of our current anomie with regard to strategy and purpose in foreign and defense policy is the alienation of our current generation of leaders from traditional American values themselves. Whereas the Founding Fathers believed that the American people must embody the virtues of classical and Christian antiquity if their free institutions were to survive, the Prodigal Sons that govern us today denounce or reject those same virtues as a major cause of what is wrong with America and the world. Beginning

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in the late 1950s, books like William Appleman Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* and C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* instructed a generation of bright but impressionable and indulgent youth that the *real* enemy in Vietnam and the nuclear arms race was America. Anticommunism was in such bad odor that anyone suspected of it was held to be unsophisticated, even primitive, and certainly dangerous. That was not, by and large, because the new generation admired communism but because they had been taught to despise or distrust American patriotism. Indeed, there were no more patriots: only "superpatriots" and "right wingers." Accordingly, value-free social science taught moral relativism, destroying young people's ability to draw distinctions between political regimes even as it extolled "human rights" and the "Third World." It became commonplace—remember when it happened?—for policy makers and policy analysts to refer to the United States itself in the third person, thus placing the United States on a level plane with other governments and disassociating the speaker and hearer from his own *patria.* Even the CIA National Intelligence Estimate (1982) stated that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." And when Reagan called the USSR by its right name—"evil empire"—the cognoscenti blushed.

Perhaps the most profound origin of our current anomie is the alienation of our current generation of leaders from traditional American values themselves.

Not surprisingly, a generation taught to think this way is not inclined to summon or applaud martial virtues even in defense of its own nation's values or interests. So, during the latter stages of the cold war, our government got into the habit of taking its most forceful actions *covertly,* not to cloak them from our enemies abroad, but from the enemies of assertive foreign policy at home. Not that the new generation is simply isolationist—that at least would be consistent. On the contrary, it is more interventionist in spirit than Wilson or Harry Truman ever dreamed of being possible—so long as American power and American interests are not asserted. Nowadays, we speak loudly and carry a puny stick, and the reason for this, we are told, is that military power is passé and economic competition the defining feature of the new order. The fullest statement of this thesis was British professor Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.* "Can the U.S.A. preserve the position it has occupied in the world during the lifetime of most of us here?" Kennedy asked the Woodrow Wilson Center? "No. . . . What the U.S.A. can do, however, is to slow down the tendency toward relative economic decline by a massive commitment to civilian as opposed to military-related research and development . . . employ diplomacy, find new allies, settle differences with potential foes, withdraw from extended positions." Accordingly, Defense Secretary Les Aspin's "bottom up"

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review instructed the Pentagon to contribute to a "strong, competitive, growing economy" by slashing its budget to about 3 percent of the GNP.

Kennedy's thesis is not wrong; indeed, it is simply the truism that a nation's reach must not exceed its grasp. But the equation of power and wealth it is based on is historically inaccurate. "Power" is an abstraction. What one must ask—as George Washington did—is whether sufficient force can be mustered at a particular time for the achievement of a particular vital purpose. It is simply nonsense to suggest that any nation becomes "stronger" by disarming itself. The prescription of the declinist school—a national industrial policy and domestic spending—is no more convincing. Japan may well have become wealthy not because of its centralized bureaucratic planning apparatus but in spite of it. The deterioration of cities like Detroit preceded, rather than followed, the foreign challenge to our automobile industry. The quality of American education does not improve in proportion to the amount of money spent on it—the numbers show exactly the opposite. But since the regnant elite will not, under any circumstances, entertain the proposition that America's relative decline is the product of indiscipline, cynicism, hedonism, welfarism, the collapse of the family, morality, private responsibility, and civics, it has no choice but to propose "throwing more money at the problem"—money the United States can no longer afford to spend.

The fact that the Soviet empire did collapse, that democracy and capitalism have spread to more and more nations, that the United States is now more secure than it has been in half a century—is one of the miracles of modern times. But *pace* George Bush, the United States cannot take the credit. Rather, our leadership did all it could to prop up the Soviet system to the end, and subsidized the most corrupt forms of socialist demagoguery in the Third World. In a sense, we—oops, can't say "we"—the Free World—oops, can't say that—the United States and its allies "won" the cold war despite themselves.

The Current Wisdom

What are the predispositions of the contemporary American policy establishment? It is "idealistic" in its concern for human rights, but only according to a situational ethics. One must not, for instance, acknowledge that torture and killing are the very stuff of politics in several black African states, or that the white South Africans display a greater regard for life and property than several of the black factions opposing them. Our policy establishment likewise touts "democracy" as a panacea, but is reduced to confusion whenever "progressive" forces are inexplicably defeated in elections. Mere democracy has already given the world the ayatollah's regime in Iran, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, and may soon inflict on us the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovsky in Russia. Clearly a devotion to ballot boxes does not comprise a doctrine. Our establishment lays claim to a higher realism when it calls for military budget cuts in order to compete economically. But such "realism" has already effectively de-nuclearized the U.S. military by shutting down the production of tritium and the infrastructure

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needed to manufacture warheads. The Clinton administration tells us that we must be able to fight two Gulf-sized wars simultaneously, but at current levels we would have to stretch to repeat one such operation. It seems to think it can continue to recruit professional troops with whom to play global chess (subject to approval by the U.N. bureaucracy and never pursuant to a Congressional declaration of war) even as the commander-in-chief evinces contempt for the military. And it seems to think that a reduction of military expenditures to 3 percent of the GNP will restore our economic vigor even as the overall governmental burden on the economy grows to 40 percent of the GNP.

Our policy makers and opinion leaders, whatever their party, understand neither power nor morality.

Our policy makers and opinion leaders, whatever their party, understand neither power nor morality. From Iraq and Ukraine to Bosnia and Haiti to Somalia and North Korea, the Bush and Clinton regimes were constant only in their inconstancy, alternating between immoral moralism and unrealistic realism, accomplishing nothing at great cost. Does anyone think that the United States is prepared to do to North Korea what the Israelis did to the Iraqi reactor? If not, then U.S. policy toward Northeast Asia consists of begging China to intercede with Pyongyang, thereby making China, not the United States, the guarantor of Japanese and South Korean security. In Russia, Clinton is supporting Boris Yeltsin as mindlessly as Bush did Mikhail Gorbachev, even though the reform movement is hopelessly stalled and most of the Soviet apparatus and personnel remain in place against the day when a new leader appears. Nor is that day far off, for the post-Soviet governments in the successor states are, in many cases, as unpopular as the Communists used to be. The tragic result is that more and more Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and others are turning anti-*American* even as they turn anti-Yeltsin. And our sole initiative has been to force Ukraine to give us its nuclear weapons, the sole guarantee of its independence.

Abiding Wisdom

The violence that may erupt in the post-Soviet compost heap, the sophisticated armed forces of China and Iran, the Muslim identification of America with a corrupt and immoral secularism—none of these would be threatening if only our leaders still honored our country's founding principles, understood our geopolitical requirements, appreciated the correct uses of military force, and possessed the moral authority to wield it. What are those principles, requirements, uses, and sources of authority?

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First, policy makers must work for the country they serve, not for allied unity, world order, or the United Nations. International "regimes" are, at worst, figments of the imagination and, at best, marginal tools for the promotion of *national* interests. In any case, the availability of allies is inversely proportional to the need for them. If the United States wants collaborators for the management of regional or global problems, it need only hearken to Machiavelli: "If one has good arms one will always have good friends." Perhaps the signal error made by almost every American crusader since Wilson is that the United States has possessed some sort of "moral leadership" to which other countries are bound to pay obeisance. That is especially ludicrous in an era when America's own leaders daily mock the moral values for which America used to stand.

Secondly, policy makers must understand that the United States is not a world power because of its population or even economic strength. The source of American power lies in the patriotic sacrifice of money and blood for the common defense. The people are willing to make that sacrifice because of their enduring belief that the United States stands, or at least endeavors to stand, for the good. But the people's will to sacrifice has been steadily eroded by decades of obfuscation, hypocrisy, and anti-Americanism practiced and preached by their own leaders: the *trahison des clercs*. To repair that damage, our policy makers and opinion leaders must eschew euphemism and cynicism, explain their policies honestly, admit when they are, or have been, mistaken, articulate the national interests of the American people, and stand ready to share in the sacrifices they ask of the citizenry.

Thirdly, policy makers must undertake no engagement overseas—whether military or financial—that does not stand a reasonable chance of success as defined by clear and prudent goals, budgets, risk analyses, and timetables. And they must not only ask, but demand, that Congress deliberate, debate, and approve of such operations. It is not too much to expect that the members of the legislative, as well as executive branch, will take responsibility for the sacrifices they ask of the people, then face the voters for an accounting.

Fourthly, policy makers must formulate a strategy of national defense that really defends. No ideological bullying should dissuade the United States from building several kinds of antimissile missiles at once and *deploying them* as protection against the rogue regime bent on nuclear terrorism. By way of deterrence, the United States should maintain and update a nuclear arsenal by which we may target at least one warhead on every other nuclear weapon in the world situated in countries not allied to us. Nuclear weapons have not been disinvented, and deserve to be treated with respect. A defense that defends must also honor the first principle of the Founding Fathers' geopolitics: the United States must never lose control of the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific and must strive, at least, to project enough naval power to the "farther shores" to support friends and prevent potential enemies from upsetting the balance of power there. But prudence (not "isolationism") dictates that we must not be tempted to commit massive air and ground forces to regional conflicts in Europe and Asia. And we should never have to do so if the United States conducts wise and forceful prophylactic diplomacy. Of course, we cannot alone prevent

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a new struggle for the mastery of Europe or Asia. Paul Kennedy is right that we need not only the alliances we have but broader and deeper ones. But he is wrong to think that alliances will allow us to cut the military. Our military power is precisely what wins and keeps foreign friends. Nor should our hand be stayed from cooperating in need with ugly governments. Judaeo-Christian morality does *not* preclude dealing with the wicked; it only commands that we get the better of the deal, and, above all, that we never confuse devils with angels.

Finally, the security of the United States will best be served by leaders who, like their forefathers, served in the armed forces alongside their fellow citizens. There is no substitute for personal contact with the bloody bottom line of foreign affairs. "Duty, honor, country"—hokey as they seem—are the best antidotes to "realism" based on fantasy and "idealism" that cannot tell right from wrong.

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Non-proliferation

Time for Regional Approaches?

by Gerald M. Steinberg

Since 1970, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) has been the primary mechanism for efforts to slow or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This agreement has been the cornerstone of a global non-proliferation regime that includes the verification mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), unilateral as well as bilateral limits of exports and agreements on ballistic missile technology, chemical weapons, and biological agents. Most American officials, academics, and private analysts consider non-proliferation an essential pillar of U.S. foreign policy and international stability, especially after the end of the cold war. The NPT will be reconsidered in April 1995 in a review conference mandated by the treaty. The Clinton administration, as well as non-proliferation activists outside the government, have placed a high priority on the indefinite extension of the agreement.[1]

The utility of the existing NPT regime can be maximized only if buttressed by regional frameworks addressing the reasons why states go nuclear.

At the same time, the global non-proliferation regime has many critics. The cases of Iraq and North Korea, as well as deep suspicion regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions, have demonstrated the problem of enforcement under the existing system. Nor is there much prospect at present of convincing three of the major NPT hold-outs—Israel, India, and Pakistan—to accede to the treaty. This refusal is likely to be cited by some signatories as justification for opposing indefinite extension. It is time to realize that the NPT regime has reached its maximum extent; efforts to gain universal acceptance are not the best means

[1] Lewis A. Dunn, "NPT 1995: Time to Shift Gears," *Arms Control Today,* Nov. 1993, p. 14.

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of limiting proliferation and enhancing stability and the security of individual states. The utility of the existing NPT regime can be maximized only if buttressed by regional frameworks addressing the reasons why states go nuclear.

The Limits of the Global Regime

The NPT was opened for signature in 1970, and, since then, over 150 states have signed and ratified the agreement. The basic goal of the treaty, as stated in Article I, is to restrain signatories from providing technology or materials to other states for use in the development of nuclear weapons. While the five existing nuclear powers were recognized as such, the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) agreed not to develop nuclear weapons. However, the NNWS were allowed by the treaty to acquire materials, technology, and facilities for civil nuclear applications, and even for "peaceful nuclear explosions." Article IV notes that "nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination."

In order to verify that NNWS do not transfer know-how and material from civil nuclear programs to weapons development, the NPT depends on a system of safeguards and inspections administered by the IAEA. Upon signing the NPT, member states are required to negotiate an agreement specifying verification procedures for declared nuclear materials and facilities. To limit the impact on national sovereignty, safeguards were designed to be non-intrusive and to allow for the unfettered operation of "civil" nuclear power and research facilities. The IAEA safeguards were not designed to prevent cheating, but only to provide "timely warning" of a diversion to a military program. Evidence of violations are referred to the IAEA Board of Governors, which can then alert the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council and its members can then be authorized to impose sanctions or take military action designed, at least in theory, to block completion of a nuclear weapon.

For the first ten or fifteen years, this system was generally successful. Most states signed and ratified the NPT, and the treaty established a widely respected set of international norms. A few states, however, including India and Brazil, refused to sign, rejecting the NPT's de jure discrimination between nuclear "haves" and "have nots," and noting that while the NNWS were prohibited from obtaining such capabilities, the major nuclear powers failed to honor commitments in the NPT to reduce their own atomic arsenals.[2] In 1974, India detonated a nuclear device, but no other states formally joined the exclusive club. A number of states were reportedly seeking nuclear weapons, but the NPT and IAEA system, supplemented by export restrictions and other measures, seemed to retard this process significantly. Slowly, many of the original holdouts, including, in the past few years, France, China, and South Africa, joined the regime.

[2] K. Subrahmanyam, "Export Controls and the North-South Controversy," *The Washington Quarterly,* Spring 1992, pp. 135–44.

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These apparent successes, however, are tempered by the blatant failure in Iraq and the ongoing dispute with North Korea. Iraq was a long-time NPT signatory, and Saddam Hussein's efforts to obtain the capability to produce nuclear weapons were well known for many years. Indeed, as early as the mid-1970s, the evidence clearly showed that the NPT structure was exploited by Baghdad to *obtain* nuclear technology. As Paul L. Leventhal notes, "Iraq laid to rest a long-standing belief that a state will not join the NPT for the purpose of cheating. In this case, Iraq cheated on its treaty commitments, and the treaty did not inhibit Iraq's ability to go forward with a dedicated nuclear weapons program, including the acquisition of unsafeguarded equipment and technology for enriching uranium to weapons grade."[3] Iraq acquired nuclear materials and facilities that were not reported to the IAEA, as required by the NPT, and the infrequent inspections and other safeguards on declared civil facilities and material stockpiles were inadequate to insure "timely warning" of diversion. Only after the invasion of Kuwait and the defeat of the Iraqi military in the 1991 Gulf war, did the IAEA and the U.N. Special Commission created by the Security Council undertake intensive inspections that uncovered the extent of the nuclear effort.

Defenders of the IAEA and NPT regime have argued that the Iraqi case was unique, and with some tightening of safeguard procedures, access to intelligence (from the United States, in particular), and the use of the provisions for special challenge inspections, similar cases can be avoided.[4] These claims, however, are not reassuring to those states most threatened by potential violations of the NPT. Indeed, if Saddam had not alarmed the entire world community by invading Kuwait, Iraq would probably have developed nuclear weapons without interference. The North Korean case provides an additional example of the precariousness of the existing regime. Three years of negotiations and pressure from the United States have not forced Pyongyang to accept IAEA inspection of all suspected nuclear sites. Other would-be nuclear powers, including Iran and Algeria, are likely to follow the Iraqi route.

The limitations of the NPT/IAEA system result precisely from its universalism. All states are eligible for membership, and, once they have signed and ratified the treaty, are positively encouraged to exercise their "inalienable rights" to develop a civil nuclear infrastructure. "Non-discrimination between states is one of the underlying principles of implementation; the [regime] does not make judgements about the credibility of a state's non-proliferation commitment."[5]

[3] Paul L. Leventhal, "Plugging the Leaks in Nuclear Export Controls: Why Bother?" *Orbis,* Spring 1992, p. 172.

[4] Hans Blix, "Verification of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Lessons of Iraq," *The Washington Quarterly,* Autumn 1992, pp. 58–59; Donald G. Boudreau, "On Advancing Non-Proliferation," *Strategic Review,* Summer 1991, pp. 61–67.

[5] Lawrence Scheinman, "Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing World Order," *Security Dialogue,* Dec. 1992, p. 40.

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The Iraqi and North Korean cases demonstrate that the non-proliferation regime's single standard of behavior is unrealistic and, in such cases, counter-productive. Since closed nondemocratic states can hide evidence of a nuclear weapons program until its final stages, rogue leaders willing to bear the brunt (or bluff) of sanction will not be deterred by the existing regime. Clearly, the IAEA's single and undifferentiated global system of safeguards and inspections and the absence of a credible enforcement mechanism, mean that the NPT regime cannot stop nuclear proliferation among the states in need of control. In any case, three major proto-nuclear states—India, Pakistan, and Israel—remain outside the NPT system, and are singularly resistant to external pressures, threats of sanctions, or external "security assurances." For these three hold-outs, the NPT/IAEA regime fails to provide an answer to perceived national security requirements.

In most problem regions, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is directly related to and inseparable from threats posed from other weapons, conventional weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction.

What, then, are the policy alternatives to the futile effort to extend the global NPT/IAEA regime to cover problem states and regions? One option is simply to accept the process of nuclearization as inevitable and irreversible, and to develop policies to minimize the inherent dangers. Indeed, some analysts point to the case of the superpowers and conclude that the development of a regional "balance of terror" can be stabilizing. Kenneth Waltz goes further, arguing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in areas of regional conflict would inhibit conventional as well as nuclear war.[6]

There are, however, substantial structural differences between the U.S.-Soviet models of nuclear deterrence and the factors and major actors in regional conflicts. The latter are multipolar and multi-dimensional, involving ethnic, national, linguistic, and religious factors. Wars in South Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and other areas are frequent and escalate quickly, with few, if any, limitations on weapons or targets. From this perspective, proliferation of nonconventional weapons to regional powers is seen as dangerous and unstable, and Waltz's models are not reassuring.[7]

[6] Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,* Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981); Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); see, also, Stephen Van Evra, "Primed for Peace," *International Security,* Winter 1990/1, p. 54.

[7] Yair Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma* (Israel: Hakibutz Hameuchad, 1987); Steven David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," *International Security,* Winter 1992/3, pp. 127–59.

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The other option is to shift the emphasis on non-proliferation to the development of regional regimes as a means of supplementing the NPT and IAEA in those areas in which the existing system has proven inadequate. The regional approach can, at least in theory, address the motives for proliferation that are beyond the scope of the NPT. In most problem regions, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is directly related to and inseparable from threats posed from other weapons, *conventional* weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, regional regimes can provide for verification and safeguards systems specifically adapted to the conditions and requirements of each region. In areas such as the Middle East and Korean Peninsula, where the general system of IAEA inspections and safeguard technologies are unreliable, more intrusive verification agreements can be negotiated. Local frameworks would not require states to rely on uncertain intermediaries, such as the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, to take action in the event of violations.

In a number of other areas, regional regimes exist alongside global frameworks, supporting the latter by providing the adaptations necessary to fit local characteristics. In the realm of international trade, specific regional groups, including the European Union, supplement the global General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system. In the realm of non-proliferation, regional frameworks, such as the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), predate the NPT framework. As will be discussed in detail below, regional security and non-proliferation regimes would seem to provide the best means of responding to the weaknesses in the NPT framework.

The Regional Approach to Non-Proliferation

Given the various causes of proliferation and the vast differences in verification requirements for diverse states and regions, it would be surprising if any global approach was successful in dealing with all regions and factors. Regional frameworks and regimes can provide more flexibility in developing security arrangements in place of reliance on nuclear weapons, and in applying safeguards and verification systems, than is the case in the global regime. During the past decade, as the inherent limitations of the NPT/IAEA regime have become increasingly visible, discussion and (in some cases) development of regional arms control arrangements have increased. Regional structures already exist in a number of the major problem areas for non-proliferation: South Asia (India and Pakistan), South America (Argentina and Brazil), and, in embryonic form, the Middle East. (By the Treaty of Rarotanga, which entered into force in 1986, a nuclear-weapon-free zone was created for the South Pacific, but this region is not considered a major problem area for nuclear proliferation.) Analysis of the specific sources of proliferation, and of the history of efforts to develop local security regimes in these regions, reveals the potential contributions and obstacles of the regional approach.

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South America

For many reasons, the South American case is the archetype for regional non-proliferation arrangements and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The two primary actors, Brazil and Argentina, are among the few NPT hold-outs, and have always viewed non-proliferation in a regional context. Indeed, discussion of this framework predates the NPT, and can be traced to 1962, when Brazil introduced the concept of a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone in the United Nations. That led to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco. The treaty established the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which is responsible for verification and has the authority to undertake special inspections when requested by the signatories. The treaty was far-reaching in its scope, but in the face of the long-standing nuclear programs of Argentina, Brazil, and, to a lesser degree, Chile, it was not implemented for many years.

In the late 1980s, however, after the military regimes in Brazil and Argentina were replaced by civilian governments, the situation changed. The new leaders moved to suspend development of nuclear weapons and began cooperative measures under the 1988 Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy, aimed at prohibiting nuclear weapons and testing.[8] These measures include cooperative bilateral verification and inspection, and an agreement with the IAEA for implementation of full-scope safeguards. Argentina and Chile have signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Brazilian Senate is expected to complete the final step in this process in the near future.

In 1991, the Argentina-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was established to verify bilateral limitations.[9] The headquarters of the ABACC is in Rio de Janeiro and has a staff of eight professionals and fifty inspectors, seconded from the two countries.[10] The inspectors are responsible for implementing the Joint System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Lists of materials and facilities from both states have been exchanged and verified through on-site inspections meant to supplement, not replace, those of the IAEA. In fact, the latter is authorized to make special inspections if "the Agency has reason to question the adequacy of the information it has received."[11] (On September 5, 1991, the leaders of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed the Mendoza Agreement, prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, storage, or transfer of chemical and biological weapons.[12])

[8] Zachary Davis, "Non-Proliferation Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Policies to Control the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Missiles," Congressional Reference Service Issue Brief (Washington, D.C., Apr. 1, 1991), p. 9.

[9] Brad Roberts, "Arms Control and the End of the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1992, pp. 39–56; Leonard S. Spector, "Repentant Nuclear Proliferants," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1992, p. 26.

[10] John R. Redick, *Argentina-Brazil Nuclear Non-proliferation Initiatives*, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Issue Review No. 3, Jan. 1994.

[11] Ibid., p. 1.

[12] Michael Krepon et al., eds., *A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security* (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, Sept. 1993), p. 15.

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Despite these agreements, however, uncertainty persists. In both Argentina and Brazil, elements of the military establishment are reluctant to give up the option of producing nuclear weapons. Argentine president Carlos Menem, a supporter of bilateral non-proliferation agreements, has announced that Argentina will sign the NPT before the 1995 Review Conference, even if Brazil does not.[13] But, in Brazil, following the impeachment and resignation of President Fernando Collor de Mello, support for the bilateral process has decreased. Analysts conclude that Brazil will probably complete the ratification of the bilateral agreements, but implementation of effective non-proliferation arrangements still faces long-term obstacles.[14]

South Asia

India's nuclear policy has always been characterized by ambivalence and internal conflict. In the 1950s, while India was seeking to develop its role as a leader of the Nonaligned Movement in confrontation with the superpowers, Nehru favored a policy based on "permanent nuclear abstinence." The military and the scientific establishment rejected this view and supported the development of nuclear weapons, however, arguing that this was necessary to counter "atomic colonialism."[15]

The pro-nuclear position triumphed in the wake of conflict with China and the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964. The Indian nuclear program accelerated after the 1971 India-Pakistan war, as New Delhi became increasingly concerned about a perceived Pakistan-China-U.S. alliance.[16] One year later, the Indian government decided to proceed with the production of a nuclear device, and in 1974, it conducted a test.[17] In recent years, India has reportedly produced the components for seventy to one hundred weapons and may have developed the technology for thermonuclear weapons.[18]

The Pakistani program is essentially a response to the Indian capability, although the Indian conventional threat is also a major source of concern.[19]

[13] Redick, *Argentina-Brazil Nuclear Non-proliferation Initiatives,* p. 4.

[14] Ibid., p. 3; see, also, Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," *International Security,* Winter 1992–93, p. 177.

[15] Achin Vanaik and Praful Bidwai, "India and Pakistan," in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., *Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 261; Ashok Kapur, "India: The Nuclear Scientists and the State, the Nehru and Post-Nehru Years," in Etel Solingen, ed., *The Science Compact: Scientists and the State in Comparative Perspective* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming).

[16] Vanaik and Bidwai, "India and Pakistan," pp. 264, 266.

[17] Ibid., p. 261. As these and other analysts note, the precise timing of the test was determined by Indian domestic politics and Indira Ghandi's reelection campaign, but the overall momentum behind the program was more closely related to the perceived external threats.

[18] Leonard S. Spector, *Deterring Regional Threats from Nuclear Proliferation* (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Mar. 12, 1992), p. 23.

[19] Lewis A. Dunn, "Rethinking the Nuclear Equation: The United States and the New Nuclear Powers," *The Washington Quarterly,* Winter 1994, p. 8; see also Vanaik and Bidwai, "India and Pakistan," p. 264.

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Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once declared that Pakistanis would rather eat grass than surrender the nuclear option, and successive Pakistani governments have continued to develop the nuclear option, despite growing American pressures.[20] The Pakistani program developed slowly during the 1980s, and, according to some reports, in 1990, during a crisis over Kashmir, all the components for nuclear weapons were manufactured.[21]

India and Pakistan are prominent hold-outs in the NPT system, and, as noted above, both countries have rejected all multilateral or American pressure. In the past few years, however, a bilateral framework for the negotiation and implementation of confidence-building measures has been developing. In 1988, Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto met in Islamabad and signed an agreement pledging not to attack each other's nuclear installations.[22] The terms state that each party will "refrain from undertaking, encouraging, or participating indirectly or directly in any action aimed at causing the destruction or damage to any such installations or facilities in the other country."[23]

In 1990, the Kashmir crisis (which, according to some accounts, posed a danger of a nuclear exchange[24]) delayed implementation, but bilateral talks continued. In the fifth round of talks that took place in October 1991, an Indian official reported that "Pakistan and India had for the first time squarely addressed disarmament issues."[25] In January 1992, the 1988 accord was ratified, and lists of nuclear power, research, and enrichment installations covered under the accord were exchanged. In addition, in December 1990, Indian and Pakistani military leaders agreed to resume weekly meetings and to negotiate an advance notification agreement to cover military exercises.[26]

While progress is slow, these negotiations and agreements constitute a foundation for a bilateral approach. Officials from both India and Pakistan have acknowledged the potential benefits of mutual limitations. Pakistan has led this process, at least in a rhetorical sense, and Pakistani officials have introduced a variety of proposals for regional denuclearization in the United Nations, in bilateral discussions, and in other contexts. The proposals include a bilateral treaty renouncing nuclear weapons, the simultaneous signature of the nuclear NPT, and the establishment of a South Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. Some analysts have dismissed these efforts as designed to give Pakistan "the moral

[20] In 1985, the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act made assistance to Pakistan contingent upon the president's certifying that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons. In 1990, President George Bush did not issue such a certification, leading to a cut-off in aid.

[21] Spector, *Deterring Regional Threats from Nuclear Proliferation,* p. 11.

[22] Bhabani Sen Gupta, "South Asia," in Jayantha Dhanapala, ed., *Regional Approaches to Disarmament: Security and Stability,* United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (Hampshire, U.K.: Dartmouth, 1993), p. 79.

[23] Geoffrey Kemp, *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), p. 171.

[24] Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," *The New Yorker,* Mar. 29, 1993.

[25] Gupta, "South Asia," p. 79.

[26] Kemp, *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race,* p. 170.

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'high ground' in the war of words against India."[27] However, there are also substantive incentives for Pakistani participation in a regional limitation regime. Pakistan's nuclear program is largely a response to the Indian effort; agreement to dismantle nuclear weapons programs would increase Pakistani security. For Pakistan, an ambiguous nuclear option provides the minimal deterrent deemed necessary to balance the Indian capability, and decision makers in Islamabad have indicated a willingness to take measures that would prevent an all-out nuclear arms race.[28]

For India, three factors contribute to the interest in potential regional or bilateral limitations: the continuing divergence between holding a nuclear weapons capability and the efforts to lead the Third World and Nonaligned Movement in the campaign against the nuclear arsenals of the major powers; the high costs of developing a strategic weapons capability; and the inherent instability of the situation and the fear that a crisis over Kashmir or another flash point could lead to a devastating nuclear exchange. Indian analysts have noted that the nuclear weapons efforts of India and Pakistan have created "a classical 'security-insecurity trap.'"[29] As in the case of the United States and the USSR, this situation and the instabilities and uncertainties of mutual deterrence could eventually lead India and Pakistan towards bilateral cooperation and arms limitation agreements.[30]

Still, significant obstacles remain to a bilateral non-proliferation framework in the Subcontinent. Some analysts conclude that there is a "solid consensus among Indian decision makers on keeping the nuclear weapon option open."[31] Many Indians still view a nuclear capability as necessary to counter the "atomic colonialism" of the United States and the other major nuclear powers.[32] In this context, nuclear weapons are the basis of equality, or even the basis for "asserting a more powerful international role, perhaps even as a vehicle for membership in the U.N. Security Council."[33] Some analysts argue that India has learned to live with the Chinese nuclear capability and point to the absence of attempts by China to exploit its nuclear advantage vis-à-vis India. But it seems clear that without limits on China's nuclear force, India will continue to maintain a nuclear capability.[34]

Nevertheless, in the long term, the bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan may allow for the gradual evolution of a freeze in both nuclear programs and expanded confidence-building measures. Although this process

[27] Vanaik and Bidwai, "India and Pakistan," p. 265.

[28] George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," *Foreign Policy,* Summer 1993, pp. 85–104.

[29] Vanaik and Bidwai, "India and Pakistan," p. 258.

[30] Arun P. Elhance, "A Geographical Perspective," in Stephen P. Cohen, ed., *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Prospects for Arms Control* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), p. 124.

[31] Vanaik and Bidwai, "India and Pakistan," p. 275.

[32] K. Subrahmanyam, "Export Controls and the North-South Controversy," *The Washington Quarterly,* Spring 1992, pp. 135–44.

[33] Ronald F. Lehman II, "Arms Control: Passing the Torch as Time Runs Out," *The Washington Quarterly,* Summer 1993, p. 43.

[34] Vanaik and Bidwai, "India and Pakistan," pp. 267–68; Gupta, "South Asia," p. 85.

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is clearly slow, and progress is not guaranteed, this approach appears to be more promising than efforts to impose the NPT on both countries.

The Middle East

In contrast to South Asia and South America, in which the development of constraints on nuclear weapons development focus on two central states, the Middle Eastern situation is far more complicated. Efforts to develop nuclear weapons are at various stages in Iraq, Israel, Iran, Algeria, and Libya. In the past, Egypt and Syria have also sought to develop a nuclear infrastructure, and renewed efforts by these states cannot be ruled out. Likewise, the military cooperation between Iran and Syria, including joint operation of ballistic missile production facilities supplied by North Korea, raises the prospects of similar cooperation with respect to nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the weaknesses of the global NPT approach are most in evidence in the Middle East. The Iraqi case damaged the credibility of IAEA verification and an enforcement process that relies on the member states of the IAEA Board of Governors (which, until recently, included Iraq). Lastly, the failure of the NPT regime to encompass conventional weaponry renders it especially problematical in this region. The Israeli effort to acquire nuclear weapons, begun in the early 1950s, was a clear function of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's fear that the Arab states would eventually translate their economic and demographic superiority into conventional forces three, four, or even ten times larger than those of Israel.[35] Hence, Israel developed the nuclear option as a deterrent or "weapon of last resort" against full-scale attacks that threatened the survival of the state. To be sure, Israeli conventional military capability has grown significantly since the 1950s, but their "worst case scenarios" still envision massive ground and air attacks by Syrian, Iraqi, and Egyptian forces, possibly with chemical weapons. These scenarios continue to dictate Israeli defense planning, hence the imperative of a strategic deterrent.[36]

The security dilemmas of the Middle East, therefore, cannot be untangled by a universal regime addressing nuclear issues only. In recent years, Egypt, Israel, and Iran have all introduced proposals calling for the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Although the details of each proposal differ in important ways, a regional system that includes limits on other weapons and mutual inspection can be adapted to the particular conditions and problems of the Middle East. The creation of a Middle East section of the IAEA, in which Israel, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and other states

[35] Evron, *Israeli's Nuclear Dilemma*; and Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Nuclear Ambiguity: Evolution and Evaluation," in Louis René Beres, ed., *Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 29–44.

[36] Not all Israeli defense analysts view nuclear weapons as necessary, even in response to "worst case scenarios." See, for example, Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence without the Bomb* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987).

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would negotiate an acceptable framework, has also been proposed. Such a regional structure would force each of the states to address each other's problems and concerns, rather than attempting to use international organizations, such as the IAEA, to impose limitations unilaterally on the others.

While these proposals can be dismissed as political posturing (as in the case of India and Pakistan), more substantive activities are taking place. The multilateral negotiations that began after the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid include a section on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS). Four plenary sessions have been held in Moscow and Washington, and a number of subgroups were created to develop confidence-building measures in the areas of information exchange and pre-notification, communications, incidents at sea and search and rescue, and to discuss long-term objectives. Participants include Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and a number of North African and Persian Gulf states. (Syria has refused to participate in the multilateral talks until there is "substantial progress" in the bilateral talks with Israel. If the peace process is successful, however, Syria is expected to join the ACRS process.[37])

Still, Israel rejects immediate consideration of nuclear arms limitations, insisting instead that the peace process make significant progress on all fronts and the state of war existing with most Arab states since 1948 be ended. For Israel, confidence- and security-building measures must come first, followed by limits on conventional forces, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and, finally, nuclear weapons. The Arab states have reverse priorities, but the Israelis have, for the first time, signalled a willingness to discuss limits on nuclear weapons and helped to design mechanisms for mutual inspection and verification administered not by the IAEA but through direct and detailed information sharing among Middle East states themselves.

The fact remains that the two largest—and most threatening—nuclear candidates in the region—Iraq and Iran—have no links to these discussions, and strongly oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process. (Libya is in a similar category, and Muammar al-Qaddafi has made a number of attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.) Iraq is expected to resume its nuclear program as soon as international sanctions are lifted and inspections stop, while Iran is continuing to make progress in developing its nuclear infrastructure. Unless and until domestic political changes bring moderate regimes into power in Bagdad and Teheran, a nuclear arms regime encompassing the entire Middle East will remain impossible. One can only hope that international pressure and stronger export limitations led by the United States might frustrate the nuclear weapons programs in Iran and Iraq, which in turn might allow the other states in the region to proceed with arms limitation.

[37] See Gerald M. Steinberg, "Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security," *Survival*, Spring 1994, pp. 126–41.

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The Korean Peninsula

Following the setbacks to the Iraqi efforts in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, the North Korean nuclear program emerged as the major challenge to the NPT regime. North Korea has had a nuclear program since the 1950s, but efforts to develop weapons increased in the late 1970s.[38] Pyongyang agreed to sign the NPT in 1985 but did not negotiate a full-fledged safeguard agreement with the IAEA. According to reports, a thirty megawatt reactor became operational near Yongbyon in 1987 and construction of a plutonium extraction facility began.

Six years of negotiation with the IAEA over inspections and safeguards ensued. In 1991, the United States agreed to remove its nuclear weapons from South Korea, and, in early 1992, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed the safeguards agreement. In addition, in December 1991, North and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The Declaration restricts the possession or use of nuclear weapons as well as facilities for nuclear processing and uranium enrichment. The agreement did not include verification arrangements, however, and has not been implemented. Since 1992, the Joint Nuclear Control Committee and Subcommittees on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchange have met repeatedly at Panmunjon.[39]

In March 1993, the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. This declaration was suspended under U.S. pressure, but IAEA safeguards were nonetheless tampered with and access to key nuclear facilities and sites denied. IAEA director-general Hans Blix informed the United Nations of the North Korean refusal to comply, and by a vote of 140 to 1, the General Assembly approved a resolution calling for North Korean cooperation with the IAEA.[40] The United States has discussed the imposition of sanctions with other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. That has not changed North Korean policies or led to adherence to the NPT requirements. In other words, the NPT has failed in the case of North Korea, as it did Iraq.

Given the secrecy of the Kim Il Sung regime, the motivations for this program are hard to assess, as are the prospects for the development of a regional security and non-proliferation framework. Some analysts view the North Korean policy as a deterrent against external threats. They note that the DPRK has become increasingly isolated following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the increasing cooperation between the United States and China. The South Korean economy grew rapidly in this period, and Leonard Spector speculates that Kim Il Sung's decision to develop a nuclear option may have been the result of "concerns that the regional balance would soon shift" against the North. Possession of nuclear weapons may have been seen as a means of insuring "the continued existence of the Democratic People's Republic on a divided Peninsula and rule out political absorption by the South."[41]

[38] Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 125.

[39] John Simpson, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in 1991," *1992 Verification Report,* p. 95; Krepon et al., eds., *A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security,* p. 30.

[40] Programme for Promoting Nuclear Proliferation (PPNN), Newsbrief No. 24, 4th Quarter, 1993, p. 2.

[41] Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions,* pp. 124–25.

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It is entirely possible that North Korea will be no more responsive to a regional security framework than it has been to the NPT. If Kim Il Sung views a nuclear weapon capability as providing a foundation for regional ambitions, such as the eventual absorption of South Korea for use vis-à-vis Japan or for challenging the United States and other external powers, no realistic regional framework will succeed in curbing North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

On the other hand, following a regime change in Pyongyang, a regional security regime might develop that included a reduced presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and confidence-building measures involving Japan. Under these circumstances, a new leadership in North Korea might be willing to accept IAEA inspection and to freeze or dismantle its nuclear weapons development. As in the case of India and Pakistan, or the Middle East, such a wide-ranging security regime is beyond the scope of the existing NPT framework.

Evaluation of the Regional Approach to Non-Proliferation

Realistically, the prospects for rapid development of regional nuclear non-proliferation regimes in the problem areas are low. The probability of success is greater, however, than is the case for efforts to extend the global NPT regime in these regions. In South Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, dedicated bilateral or regional non-proliferation frameworks are more likely to make progress, however slow, than the existing global regime. Regional arrangements provide the flexibility needed to address the complexities of the regional security environment, in sharp contrast to the universal approach of the NPT/IAEA system.

That does not mean, however, that the NPT regime is no longer useful, or that the outcome of the 1995 Review Conference is of little significance. For most of the world, the NPT provides an important norm that, in itself, serves as a barrier to nuclear proliferation. For these states, the NPT and IAEA, reinforced by the various supplier limitation agreements, provide a technical framework for the application of safeguards and inspections. In the absence of the NPT, it is likely that more non-nuclear-weapons states would seek nuclear weapons and would have less difficulty in obtaining the material and technology. Hence, regional arrangements should be conceived of as complementary to a global NPT regime that is just not relevant or sufficient in all times at all places.

The Role of U.S. Policy

In order to foster the development of regional non-proliferation frameworks, the United States will have to change its policy significantly. For many years, U.S. government officials and most of the non-proliferation community in Washington have focused exclusively on the global regime, taking the initiative to create not only the NPT and IAEA but also the London Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Chemical Weapons

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Convention. Like the NPT, these are global agreements, based on the concept of "non-discrimination" among participating states, and a single standard of behavior and verification requirements.

The U.S. government also supports the development of two potential additions to the global regime; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and a cut-off in the production of fissile material. The CTBT may be acceptable to all the holdouts, since none requires tests, and verification is relatively straightforward. If the fissile material cut-off that was proposed by the Clinton administration in September 1993 is designed to be universal, however, it will face many of the same difficulties regarding verification that plague the NPT and IAEA.

In the end, Clinton paid no political price for his waffling. Bosnian Muslims did.

By contrast, the U.S. non-proliferation community, both public and private, has been wary of regional regimes, particularly when these are seen as competition for the NPT/IAEA system. Many advocates argue that the flexibility of regional frameworks would erode the global norm that has blocked the development of nuclear weapons in most states. From their perspective, even the current system has too much room for maneuver; hence they call for a tighter, less flexible set of rules and regulations for controlling nuclear proliferation. Critics of U.S. policy generally seek NPT compliance via greater pressure on Pakistan, India, and Israel, rather than a loosening of the global system.[42]

However, there are also signs of change in U.S. policy based on a recognition that such pressures are unlikely to produce a change among the target states, especially in the Middle East. In May 1991, shortly after the Gulf war, President Bush presented an initiative specifically designed to further arms control in the region.[43] This proposal marked a major change in the U.S. approach, linking limitations on conventional and non-conventional weapons for the first time. The proposal also subordinated the proposed regional measures to the global regime, however, and called for adherence to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards, thereby demonstrating the confusion of American policy. The United States is also the major sponsor of the Middle East multilateral ACRS talks, and conflict has emerged between these activities and the NPT-oriented non-proliferation policies.

For this process to expand, the United States government will have to acknowledge the need for regional arrangements to reinforce the NPT, IAEA, and other global institutions. For example, John Deutch notes that in the case

[42] See, for example, the testimony of Ambassador Gerard Smith, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, *Proliferation and Arms Control,* May 17, 1990, p. 4.

[43] Fact Sheet on Middle East Arms Control Initiative, White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 29, 1991.

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of Korea and Latin America, bilateral agreements can supplement the IAEA inspection regime.[44] Blix has also raised the possibility of "tailor-made" approaches to inspections in specific countries and "customized, two-tiered verification arrangements cooperatively linked with the IAEA's system."[45] Thus, within the non-proliferation community, there is a greater awareness of the need for dedicated regional arrangements.

Conclusion

In the months remaining before the opening of the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the efforts to gain support for indefinite extension of the treaty are going to lead to intense pressures to gain the signatures of the major hold-outs, but there is no evidence that these pressures will succeed. Pakistan, India, and Israel are unlikely to accede to the NPT, under any circumstances, regardless of external threats and sanctions. Indeed, such threats are likely to be counter-productive, and could lead these states to convert their covert arsenals to visible weapons systems. At the same time, renegade signatories, such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran will continue to pursue their weapons programs, regardless of the efforts highlighted in the preamble to the NPT to prevent "the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war."

The 1995 conference presents us with a rare and precious opportunity to re-imagine the future of non-proliferation, to address the deficiencies of the treaty's global approach, and to harness the very regional factors that otherwise stymie expansion of the NPT regime. Indeed, the regional approach is more likely to succeed in advancing the non-proliferation process precisely because it is *not* global in nature, does *not* seek to apply a single standard of behavior to diverse situations, and does *not* depend on the fiction of equality among states.

[44] John M. Deutch, "The New Nuclear Threat," *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1992, p. 129.

[45] Hans Blix, "Verification of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Lessons of Iraq," *The Washington Quarterly,* Autumn 1992, p. 60.

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Non-proliferation

Brazil's Secret Nuclear Program

by Jean Krasno

Is the Southern Cone of Latin America on the verge of a nuclear arms race, or is this an obsolete question? Recent agreements suggest that the Brazilian and Argentine governments are substituting economic and security cooperation for their traditional rivalry. Nevertheless, findings reveal that both countries may already be capable of producing weapons-grade, nuclear material sufficient for a device comparable to the Hiroshima bomb.[1] Since these data are in the public domain, both Argentina and Brazil are well aware of each other's achievements. One can only surmise, therefore, that Brazilian and Argentine policy makers have come to an unwritten agreement *not* to take the last step. The Brazilian military, on the other hand, has consistently pursued a nuclear capability through its secret program developed during the years of the military regime.[2]

In sum, the rivals in the Southern Cone may now be collaborating in such a way as to satisfy their mutual desire for a nuclear capability, without antagonizing the leaders of the NPT regime on whom they depend for capital, technology, and trade. So long as the last step—a nuclear breakout—can be averted, Brazil and Argentina may have their cake, and eat it too.

Nuclear Motives

In the 1970s and 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina developed nuclear enrichment programs "to 'master' all phases of nuclear energy production, including those with potential military applications."[3] While agreements between Argentina and Brazil have recently agreed to conduct mutual inspections on all

[1] Leonard Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); *Gazeta Mercantil,* Mar. 12, 1993.

[2] See "Final Report of the Parliamentary Commission to Inquire into the Parallel Program," Brazilian National Congress, Dec. 14, 1990. Copies of this report are available through the Brazilian Congress.

[3] Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions,* p. 221.

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nuclear installations, the Brazilian Senate has only recently (February 1994) approved the 1991 agreement that would include inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nevertheless, Brazil's nuclear program continues to be under the complete control of the military, which has not been enthusiastic about IAEA inspections.[4] Inasmuch as neither state appears to have any serious threat to its national security, what motives foster proliferation in the region?

In most cases of nuclear proliferation, governments acquired or produced nuclear weapons in reaction to an external threat of aggression, often from countries that had, or were on the brink of having, nuclear weapons themselves. One thinks of the U.S./Nazi Germany, USSR/the U.S., Britain/USSR, China/everybody, India/China, Pakistan/India, and Israel/the Arab states. In the case of Gaullist France, however, the deterrence motive was leavened by a rich sense of national pride. In reaction to U.S., British, and Soviet efforts to maintain exclusive control over nuclear knowledge, "the French, proud as ever, came away feeling that they had been wronged, and saw little choice but to strike off on their own, and in the most ambitious way. This independence and self-reliance have marked the French nuclear program ever since."[5]

Brazil's military may see nuclear research and technological achievements as a niche and "raison d'être" in a society that is pressing to gain civilian control and marginalize the formerly powerful armed forces.

The case of Argentina and Brazil bears comparison to the French scenario. To be sure, occasional border disputes, competition, and abiding antagonism have defined relations between Argentina and Brazil, but the last war between the two countries was in 1825–28.[6] Hence, Brazil and Argentina seem to be motivated more by a desire to achieve military and scientific prestige vis-à-vis each other and the "northern" nuclear club than by any real fear of aggression. In a 1984 article in *Orbis,* David Myers wrote: "One result of the 1982 Malvinas Islands conflict between Argentina and England has been Argentina's renewed effort to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Brazil would never allow Argentina to become the only country in South America with such weapons."[7]

[4] Tania Malheiros, *Brasil: A Bomba Oculta* (Rio de Janeiro: Gryphus, 1993); Mark Hibbs, "Brazil's Military May Block Safeguards with Argentina," *Nucleonics Week,* Nov. 28, 1991, p. 10.

[5] Steven R. Weissman and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb* (New York: Times Books, 1981), p. 68.

[6] Ronald M. Schneider, *Order and Progress: A Political History of Brazil* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 35–36.

[7] David J. Myers, "Brazil: Reluctant Pursuit of the Nuclear Option," *Orbis,* Winter 1984, pp. 881–911.

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A nuclear capability may also serve Brazil and Argentina as a bargaining chip in their relations with the First World. Daniel Poneman, special assistant to the president in the National Security Council and senior director for non-proliferation and export controls, explains: "Acquiring the nuclear weapons option might be sought by either Argentina or Brazil for the more limited purpose of obtaining political leverage and prestige. Both nations are rivals for regional influence; both also (though especially Argentina) exploit their purposeful nuclear ambiguity to increase their leverage in dealings with the nuclear suppliers."[8] In addition, Brazil's military may see nuclear research and technological achievements as a niche and "raison d'être" in a society that is pressing to gain civilian control and marginalize the formerly powerful armed forces.

Nuclear Agreements

Brazil has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) and has continued to fund secret research to develop weapons-grade nuclear material.[9] Brazil has continued to use the technological experience gained through its contracts to build nuclear power plants with the United States and particularly West Germany in order to develop a "parallel program" of nuclear technology to keep open the option of producing a bomb.[10] Although its Angra I power plant has experienced major operational difficulties while Angra II is still not completed, Brazil continues its program of research on weapons-grade material.[11]

In December 1991, Brazil and Argentina signed a nuclear safeguards agreement (referred to as the Quadripartite Agreement) with the IAEA. The four parties to the agreement are the governments of Brazil and Argentina, the IAEA, and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The ABACC has recently established its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and it is intended that the agency will work with the IAEA to establish a joint system for on-site inspections and inventory accounting of nuclear material. In a show of support for the agreement, Presidents Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil and Carlos Menem of Argentina flew to Vienna for the signing.

[8] Daniel Poneman, "Latin America," in R.W. Jones et al., *The Nuclear Suppliers and Non-Proliferation* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 180.

[9] Malheiros, *Brasil,* pp. 83–86.

[10] Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil: Danger for All," *Foreign Policy,* Summer 1976, pp. 155–204; "Final Report of the Parliamentary Commission to Inquire into the Parallel Program"; Ruy de Goes Leite de Barros, ed., *De Angra a Aramar: Os Militares a Caminho da Bomba* (São Paulo: The Metallurgists Union, Ecumenical Center for Documentation and Information [Centro Ecumènico de Documentaçao e Informaçao—CEDI], Department of Socio-economic and Political Studies-Central Workers' Organization [Departamento de Estudos Socio-econômicos e Políticos-Central Union de Trabalhadores—DESEP-CUT], and Ipanema Hill Ecological Center (Núcleo Ecológico Morro de Ipanema—NEMI).

[11] *O Estado de São Paulo,* Feb. 2, 1992.

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However, this new accord with the IAEA left some doubts among experts. Serious opposition to the agreement emerged, and the military reportedly threatened "to torpedo the accord."[12] The Senate finally approved the agreement on February 9, 1994, after more than two years of delays.[13] Ratification of the accord, however, still leaves open many questions. The Senate approved the agreement only only after accepting a "supplementary adjustment" to the accord, which essentially exempts the Aramar centrifuge enrichment facility from on-site inspections in order to protect "industrial secrets." Moreover, "regarding inspections, Brazil will not be obligated to show how the uranium is enriched."[14] It has been reported that Brazil's navy has developed highly advanced carbon fiber ultracentrifuge technology that it wants to protect.[15] That means the capacity of the Aramar facility to enrich uranium to high levels in greater quantities is being substantially increased just at the moment when IAEA inspections are being denied in the name of national sovereignty. In addition, an amendment added to the accord denies the IAEA the right to visit any nuclear facility outside the normal schedule, a provision of the original agreement. Another question arises in the area of accounting. The accounting of already-enriched nuclear material will be provided by the Brazilian military to the IAEA and the ABACC with no way to verify the actual amount.[16] Therefore, if the navy were to store undeclared quantities of 20 percent enriched uranium and later decided to run it through its cascade of carbon fiber ultracentrifuges, it could produce 90 percent nuclear enriched material considerably faster.

The Brazilian military has a history of circumventing civilian controls ever since the former Collor administration enacted tighter restrictions on military activities. In August 1991, it was disclosed that $65 million more than was authorized in the national budget was spent on the Aramar facility. It was suspected that the money was spent on foreign-made centrifuges.[17] While $65 million may not seem much money for nuclear development by American standards, in Brazil, where the minimum wage is around $50 a month, $65 million can go a long way. According to President F.W. de Klerk, the entire South African program, which produced seven bombs, cost a mere $250 million.[18] Finally, Article 13 of the agreement states that nuclear materials intended for use to power vehicles, including submarines, need *not* be inspected. Both Argentina and Brazil have devoted a significant portion of their nuclear research to submarine propulsion. So while the Brazilian Senate has now approved the

[12] Mark Hibbs, "Brazil's Military May Block Safeguards with Argentina," *Nucleonics Week,* Nov. 28, 1991, p. 10.

[13] *O Estado de São Paolo,* Feb. 10, 1994. The House of Deputies had approved the Quadrilateral Agreement in Sept. 1993, and it was sent to the Senate the same month. See the report by the secretary of the science and technology section at the Brazilian embassy in Washington, Carmen Lidia Ribeira Moura, "Brazilian-Argentinean Nuclear Policy," Dec. 3, 1993.

[14] *Jornal do Brasil,* Feb. 8, 1994.

[15] *O Estado de São Paolo,* Feb. 11, 1994.

[16] Ibid.

[17] *Veja,* Aug. 14, 1991.

[18] *The New York Times,* Mar. 25, 1991.

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agreement, the critical facilities, for instance at Aramar, appear to have escaped inspections.

A Brief History of Brazil's Nuclear Development

Brazilian interest in nuclear research goes back as far as the 1930s, when initial studies on nuclear fission took place. By the mid-thirties, it was known that Brazil had uranium deposits, and an abundance of monazite sand on the beaches in the state of Espírito Santo about five hundred kilometers from Rio de Janeiro.[19] Monazite contains thorium used in the nuclear process. The first nuclear agreement between Brazil and the United States involved the sale of this monazite sand to the United States in 1940.[20]

The National Commission for Nuclear Energy (CNEN) was created in 1956 under Brazil's president Juscelino Kubitschek, and by 1959, planning began for a nuclear reactor to produce electricity. In 1968, it was decided that CNEN, in cooperation with Electrobras, would build a nuclear power plant at Angra dos Reis. In 1971, contracts were signed with Westinghouse, which would supply all the technology. In 1975, contracts were signed with the West German company, Kraftwerk Union, an affiliate of Siemens, to build several more nuclear power plants.

During the military regime (1964–1985) and into the administration of José Sarney (1985–1990), the Brazilian military developed a secret nuclear-weapons program referred to as the "parallel program." As the story goes, a Brazilian admiral, Alvaro Alberto, having already approached France and the United States without success, went to West Germany in 1953 and met with Paul Harteck of Hamburg's Institute of Physics. Harteck put Alberto in touch with physicist Wilhelm Groth, who grabbed Alberto's proposal with both hands.[21] Since West Germany was forbidden to pursue nuclear enrichment at a level that might produce a bomb, German scientists welcomed an opportunity to do research abroad.

Only a handful of high-level Brazilian officers knew about Alberto's arrangements to import German ultracentrifuges for nuclear enrichment. (An initial $80,000 was deposited in an account in Bonn on behalf of Sartorius-Werke AG of Göttingen.[22]) But the CIA found out, tipped off the British, and the centrifuges were confiscated twenty-four hours before they were due to be shipped. Only in 1956 did the centrifuges eventually reach Brazil under the auspices of the University of São Paulo.[23] The next step was to acquire the centrifuge enrichment process, but the British and Americans refused to let West Germany sell this technology to Brazil. So the Brazilians instead reached

[19] de Goes, *De Angra a Aramar,* p. 18.
[20] Frederico Fullgraf, *A Bomba Pacifica* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1988), p. 38.
[21] Ibid., p. 42.
[22] Ibid., pp. 44–45.
[23] Ibid., p. 55.

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a secret agreement, under cover of a deal involving jet nozzle technology, by which the Germans would help Brazil develop centrifuge enrichment.[24]

Thus began the parallel program, to be carried out by the three branches of the military at different sites using different techniques for nuclear enrichment. When President Collor took office in 1990, a congressional investigatory commission discovered that the military had been carrying out a secret program to develop a nuclear bomb and had built a test site at Cachimbo in the state of Pará. It funded the program through a series of secret bank accounts called the "Delta Accounts."[25] To this day, the military maintains control of the nuclear research facilities under the authority of the secretary of strategic affairs's Special Projects division.

When President Collor took office in 1990, a congressional investigatory commission discovered that the military had been carrying out a secret program to develop a nuclear bomb and had built a test site at Cachimbo in the state of Pará.

Each branch of the military has its own nuclear enrichment and research projects. The navy project operates out of the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (IPEN) at the University of São Paulo. Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, who received a masters degree in nuclear engineering from MIT in December 1977,[26] heads the Navy Ministry's Special Projects Coordinating Board (COPESP), located across the street from IPEN. The navy facility, which conducts its centrifuge enrichment research, is located at the Aramar center for research in Iperó, a town outside of São Paulo. After a visit to the Aramar facility in 1987, nuclear physicist and rector of the University of São Paulo, José Goldemberg, explained that the facility at Aramar could enrich uranium to the 20 percent level, and, with the addition of more centrifuges, that level could be increased to the minimum level of enrichment needed for nuclear-weapons material.[27]

The air force conducts research on laser enrichment at its facility, the Center for Aerospace Technology (CTA), in São José dos Campos near São Paulo. The air force facility is directed by Colonel Reginaldo dos Santos, who received his doctorate from Purdue University, specializing in the study of laser technology.[28] The army has a jet nozzle enrichment facility at Resende, near

[24] Ibid., pp. 61–99; Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All."

[25] See "Final Report of the Parliamentary Commission to Inquire into the Parallel Program."

[26] See "Fuel Element Performance Maps for Nuclear Reactor Operational Decisions" (master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977).

[27] de Goes, *De Angra a Aramar,* p. 82.

[28] *O Globo,* Sept. 30, 1990.

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Rio de Janeiro, and a gas graphite enrichment research project at Centro Tecnológico do Exército (CETEX), in Guaratiba, outside Rio, which is to produce small quantities of plutonium. The director of the army's CETEX project is General Romero Lepesqueur. All three military branches use the Cachimbo test site, with its two underground wells for detonating explosions, located at the Military Geographic Center.[29]

To date, the only government oversight of these military projects is conducted by CNEN. As stated above, CNEN was created in 1956 during the Kubitschek administration to promote the development of nuclear technology. During the years of military dictatorial rule, CNEN managed the Delta Accounts. Needless to say, opponents of the nuclear program today question CNEN's ability to monitor these R&D facilities in the interest of non-proliferation, and demand inspections by civilian experts, either from Brazil or the IAEA. For example, the Brazilian Physics Society's Commission on the Nuclear Question has made a proposal for a Brazilian system of oversight. An organization of mayors and citizens of the region surrounding Aramar named the Regional Council for the Inspection of Aramar (Conselho Regional Acompanhamento Fiscalizaçao Aramar—CRAFA) has also called for civilian inspections. As of December 1993, however, the military has warded off all outside interference. The ABACC is scheduled to begin inspections soon. It remains to be seen whether these inspections will be carried out to the satisfaction of those who are concerned about military intentions.

Brazil's leaders have, at various times, expressed the intent to develop nuclear weapons primarily as a symbol of attaining world-power status.[30] Former navy minister Admiral Maximiano Fonseca stated in September 1986: "If it was up to me to decide, I would make an atomic bomb and detonate it in front of international observers to demonstrate the extent of national technical know-how. . . . One hates to see the big powers developing and detonating atomic, cobalt and neutron bombs without being able to do something ourselves."[31] According to army minister General Leonídas Pires Gonçalves, "Countries that do not complete the nuclear fuel cycle by the 21st century, will not be considered a world power."[32]

How Close Is Brazil to Having a Bomb?

There appears to be some controversy over how close Brazil is to being able to make a nuclear bomb. As of January 1993, a nuclear non-proliferation official in the U.S. State Department believed that Brazil had not yet gained the ability to produce weapons-grade fuel in the necessary quantity. However, a

[29] "Final Report of the Parliamentary Commission on the Investigation into the Parallel Program."

[30] Leonard Spector, *Going Nuclear* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishers, 1987); Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions*.

[31] Spector, *Going Nuclear*, p. 206.

[32] Ibid., p. 202.

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group of Brazilian nuclear physicists predicted in 1989 that this capability may be only a few years off,[33] while the former president of Brazil's Physics Society, Luis Pinguelli Rosa, testified in December 1992 that the Aramar facility is continuing to expand and that about nine hundred centrifuges were in operation. He also stated that while Aramar can enrich uranium to 20 percent in its present condition, within a few weeks, a different configuration of the centrifuges could be arranged in such a way as to begin enrichment to the 90 percent needed for weapons-grade material. It is not clear whether Brazil has any highly enriched uranium (90 percent). What is clear is that it has the capacity to produce it, and so long as these facilities continue to operate without credible inspections and accounting procedures, one can only wonder about Brazil's intentions.

A recent article stated that Admiral Pinheiro da Silva, director of Aramar, projected in March 1993 that "Brazil will expand its capability to produce enriched uranium by 29 percent this year. . . . He stated that 'our objective is to set up a pilot plant with approximately 8,000 high-speed centrifuges' and added that 'because of a political decision' the enrichment of uranium will be limited to 20 percent." The admiral's statement is curious because the level of enrichment needed for submarine propulsion is only 3 to 5 percent. The same article claimed "a confidential government report recently disclosed that there are some 3,000 high-speed centrifuges in Brazil."[34] Because the program at Aramar is under tight secrecy, speculations on the number of centrifuges are impossible to confirm or deny. But whatever the number of centrifuges, da Silva's statement would confirm that the project is moving ahead. Reports in 1994 indicate that a new floor is being added onto the main structure at Aramar.[35]

In addition to having the capacity to enrich uranium to the degree necessary for a bomb, Brazil has its own uranium deposits and manufactures missiles and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.[36] If Brazil intended to develop a nuclear capability, it could become completely self-sufficient in a matter of a few years.

Military Autonomy

Despite democratization and the transition to civilian rule in Brazil, the military has retained substantial prerogatives over its own domain. Former president Collor, the first popularly elected president since the military era, dismantled the secret intelligence service, National Information Service (Serviço

[33] See Antonio de Castro, Norberto Majlis, Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, and Fernando de Souza Barros, "Brazil's Nuclear Shakeup: Military Still in Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* May 1989, pp. 22–25.

[34] *Gazeta Mercantil,* Mar. 12, 1993.

[35] Author's telephone interview with Tania Malheiros, Feb. 21, 1994.

[36] Spector, *Going Nuclear,* pp. 208–9; *The Chicago Tribune,* Mar. 5, 1989; Warren H. Donnelly, "Nonproliferation Regimes: Policies to Control the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons and Missiles," *Argentina, Brazil, and Nuclear Proliferation: A Congressional Research Service Issue Brief* (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 1990).

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Nacional de Informaçoes—SNI), as soon as he took office in March 1990, and placed intelligence under the civilian secretary of strategic affairs. The military still maintains autonomous control of its own affairs, however, including the military industry and nuclear fuel enrichment. A Brazilian military specialist explained in an interview that he had conducted a study to see if a Congressional commission set up to oversee the military had ever carried out its function. *None* of the military personnel he interviewed had even heard of the commission or knew any of the names of the senators on the commission.

> Isn't that curious? If you are asking if the military has autonomy, the answer is, yes. And it is because of this. It goes on because of the disinterest of the Congress and because of fears which are not based in reality. They are afraid because of the past history of the military. They are afraid that someone might put something in their morning coffee.[37]

Now that Collor has been impeached and forced to resign, it appears President Itamar Franco is less interested in controlling the military. A *New York Times* article in May 1993 stated: "Indeed, the quiet re-emergence of Brazil's military in politics is a measure of the weakness of Mr. Franco."[38] Emerging military pressure was also evident when it was revealed that in the fall of 1993, the three military ministers backed President Franco against an unsuccessful coup attempt by mid-level military officers and business leaders from São Paulo.[39]

It is important to understand the role that the Brazilian military plays in terms of national security. The military is not only responsible for defense against external threats but also for maintenance of internal order. That is written in the new constitution completed in 1988. An army officer interviewed for this study explained: "The Constitution states that the military must defend the order of the nation and the Constitution itself. . . . The military serves the nation and defends the state, but first it defends the nation, meaning the history, the culture, the language, and the tradition."[40] What that means is that the military is given the task of defending the nation (the culture) and not necessarily a particular government. If there is a threat to the country, the military has the right to take over the government to save the country. While some Brazilians do not agree with this premise, this definition of the role of the military is a part of the Brazilian political culture and remains in the constitution.

Moreover, the end of cold war competition raises the fear among Brazilian decision makers—civilian and military alike—that Brazil's leverage in world politics will shrink even further and expose the country to concerted First World pressure on economic and environmental issues. Recent efforts by international groups to stop the burning of Brazilian rain forests is an obvious

[37] Author's interview, June 5, 1991, São Paolo. This information, and other information throughout the manuscript was gathered from the author's interviews with sixty members of the Brazilian elite from several sectors of society.

[38] *The New York Times,* May 27, 1993.

[39] *Jornal do Brasil,* Jan. 6, 1994.

[40] Author's interview, June 24, 1991, Rio de Janeiro.

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example of the sort of external mitigation of national sovereignty feared by Brazil.[41] Whatever the merits of the environmentalists' concerns, Brazilian officials would prefer to make policy according to Brazil's needs. Yet, Brazil is also dependent on the industrialized countries to provide relief for its debt obligations and technical assistance to develop industry. It is, therefore, vulnerable to outside pressure from the industrialized states and is bound to resent interference in Brazil's internal affairs.

As Brazil emerges from the political crisis surrounding the corruption scandals and removal of Collor from office, the Itamar Franco administration and any new administration following this year's presidential elections will need to formulate a policy on nuclear development. Despite Collor's political problems, his strong anti-nuclear policy was applauded by the non-proliferation community. The loss of his leadership in Brazil may leave a vacuum in decision making on nuclear policy that the military might quietly choose to fill.

Incentives and Disincentives for a Brazilian Bomb

The incentives behind a Brazilian nuclear bomb include enhanced power, leverage, and military prestige vis-à-vis Argentina, Latin America generally, and, ultimately, the First World. The disincentives include the economic and social costs, Brazilian public pressure and concerns for safety, and pressure from the international community, primarily the United States. But a psychological factor often overlooked by analysts from the developed states is the Brazilian resentment—and perception of threat—directed against the First World itself. The Falklands/Malvinas War and the Gulf war demonstrated the military vulnerability of developing countries in the face of high-technology weapons and the diplomatic helplessness of these countries in the face of First World coalitions. How better to overcome that vulnerability than by acquiring the capability to go nuclear?

When asked whether Brazil's leaders could trust the great powers never to attack Brazil with nuclear weapons, 59 percent of them answered no. A political journalist interviewed for this study put the matter as follows: "There was a time when the military wanted the bomb as a symbol of being an important country, just like the U.S. or the Soviet Union. It is a matter of military logic and they are not going to stop thinking in this manner." A social scientist specializing in military affairs explained: "It is mainly prestige. Nuclear weapons are a symbol of technological advancement. . . . It is something that is in the heads of the military. It is the way they think. And it is a matter of nationalism, patriotism. There are plenty of people outside the military who think that way, too."[42]

[41] *The New York Times,* Sept. 17, 1989.
[42] Interview with author, Apr. 30, 1991.

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Brazilians who follow these issues are well aware of the prevalent military thinking. Former minister of the navy, Admiral Maximiano da Fonseca, questioned under oath during the Congressional investigation of the parallel program, said that "to build an atomic bomb would be stupid." Yet, he defended the notion "that Brazil possesses the equipment and the technology to produce it, when necessary."[43] A military officer explained, "In my opinion, Brazil should continue with research on nuclear technology. I think it is right. It is the aspiration of any nation to want to join the developed world." The interviews revealed that, for some Brazilians, the symbol of prestige that is offered by becoming a member of the nuclear club is important.

Implications for Non-Proliferation

Brazil still denounces the Non-Proliferation treaty as discriminatory, and there seems little chance that Brazil would join the NPT in the near future, even if Argentina should decide to join.[44] While it looks like Brazil may put the Treaty of Tlatelolco into effect, the treaty still has the clause that allows the development of nuclear fissionable material for peaceful explosions. Controls placed by the major powers on the export of nuclear material and technology may also fail to retard Brazil at this point in its nuclear development. In April 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an informal group of twenty-seven states, extended its export controls to include industrial technologies that have nuclear applications.[45] These measures may slow down the proliferation process, but Brazil has already acquired, or developed indigenously with the help of Germany, the necessary technology and is unlikely to be affected by these new measures. Meanwhile, Brazil retains the option of selling nuclear material and technology to other would-be nuclear states. In 1981, the military regime in Brazil secretly shipped eight tons of uranium to Iraq.[46] A number of Brazilian engineers were working in Iraq until shortly before the Gulf war under the direction of Hugo Oliveira Piva, a former Brazilian general who had been the head of the secret nuclear parallel program. After the Gulf war, quantities of Brazilian-produced uranium dioxide (UO_2) were found in Iraq by the United Nations inspection team.[47]

About three-fourths of the elite officials and opinion makers interviewed in this study do not support the sale of nuclear technology by Brazil to non-nuclear states. But neither the government nor the military are united on the issue, and Brazil's agreement with the IAEA still leaves doubts. It exempts

[43] "Final Report of the Parliamentary Commission to Inquire into the Parallel Program," p. 9.

[44] Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions*; *Jornal do Brasil*, Apr. 8, 1990.

[45] Leonard Spector, "Repentent Nuclear Proliferants," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1992, p. 24.

[46] Fullgraf, *A Bomba Pacifica*, p. 156.

[47] "8th U.N.-IAEA Special Report," U.N. Document #S/23283, Dec. 12, 1991. (The on-site inspection in Iraq that took place Nov. 11–18, 1991, produced this report.)

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certain enrichment facilities from inspections, including those which produce nuclear material intended for use in submarines.[48] In any case, there is reason to doubt the IAEA's ability to detect clandestine activities under conditions of concealment. IAEA's failure to detect Iraq's nuclear program is a case in point. The IAEA is under tremendous pressure with its work in Iraq, the failure of inspection efforts in North Korea, and the breakup of the Soviet Union, and can expect little increase in its woefully inadequate 1992 budget of $60 million.[49]

Implications for U.S. Policy

The United States, not the United Nations, will most likely wield the greatest influence over nuclear issues in Brazil. But heretofore, American reliance on export controls, treaties, verification and enforcement sanctions, and security assistance have had only a marginal impact on nuclearization of the Southern Cone. That is so because the United States has rarely given non-proliferation top priority, because its restrictive regime (often applied unevenly) perversely creates resentment among Brazil's military elite, and because the universal non-proliferation regimes now in place call on *all* states to renounce weapons without addressing the political conflicts or ambitions that give rise to nuclear programs in the first place.

So what can the United States do to persuade Brazil, and therefore Argentina, to go no further on their road to nuclearization? One answer is to strengthen the U.S. commitment to the NPT at the review conference scheduled for 1995—the unraveling of the NPT would hardly be productive—but also to go beyond the universalist prescriptions of the past and reinforce the local and regional forces for non-proliferation. A comprehensive global test ban, for instance, would enhance the credibility of the nuclear states in the eyes of nuclear aspirants. A substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals in the developed world might likewise reduce resentment of the existing "nuclear club." What would likely *not* be productive is direct pressure on Brazil to sign the NPT. As Daniel Poneman stated in 1985: "If there is a common theme, it is that overt pressures from abroad to comply with nonproliferation criteria or make concessions inflames nationalism and invites rebuffs."[50]

Secondly, the United States must live up to its own controls on nuclear and dual-use technology exports as mandated by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992. A Congressional Research Service report has criticized U.S. export-control policies for being "inconsistent, confusing, and ineffective," pointing especially to the scandalous leakage of U.S. strategic technologies into Iraq. But once again,

[48] John R. Redick, *Argentina and Brazil's New Arrangement for Mutual Inspections and IAEA Safeguards* (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Control Institute, 1992).

[49] "Nonproliferation Regimes: Policies to Control the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons and Missiles," Congressional Research Service Report, Mar. 1993, p. 8.

[50] Poneman, "Latin America," p. 182.

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unilateral restrictions meant to deny a proud country something many other states already have run the risk of encouraging Brazil's military to procure technologies elsewhere or develop them internally. The United States might be better served by selling sensitive technologies itself, contingent on its monitoring the use of the technology, supporting the development of a credible inspection regime, and establishing controls on the resale of materials and technology to third parties. The United States should also involve Brazil in linkage, making trade and debt modifications dependent on a credible oversight system.

But, ultimately, the key ingredient to credible oversight must be the involvement of local political and environmental groups in Brazil itself. There is a strong anti-nuclear movement in Brazil and its self-interested vigilance would dramatically enhance transparency. But, local cooperation depends in turn on the continued democratization of Brazil under conditions of economic and social stability—conditions over which the United States has little control.

Finally, non-proliferation can only succeed under conditions of regional cooperation in the Southern Cone. Through open dialogue and regional pacts, Latin American countries may erase rivalries and perceptions of threats, and substitute mutually beneficial economic regimes. Indeed—and ironically—the shift in global rivalries from an East-West to North-South axis may even encourage Latin American states to put aside their own wasteful quarrels, seize the moral high ground against the nuclear club, and form a united front against the industrialized "North."

Through their recent agreements, the civilian governments of Brazil and Argentina have moved to prevent a nuclear arms race even as they appease their respective militaries with sophisticated research programs. It remains imperative, however, that the United States continues to oversee this progress so that South American nuclear material is not diverted or stockpiled for weapons use. And the best way of ensuring that recent trends are not stalled or reversed is to treat *non*-members of the nuclear club with at least as much respect as members—as paradoxical as that may seem.

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

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Non-proliferation

An Indian Critique of U.S. Export Controls

by Brahma Chellaney

Although Orbis's *mission is to publish articles dedicated to advancing the American national interest, the editors believe the following article, which provides an Indian perspective on U.S. policy, merits an exception. Provocatively, the author contends that U.S.-inspired export controls on technology are unfair and ineffective and are spurring India towards self-sufficiency in the development of missiles and space-launch vehicles.*

India's perceived need for a missile-based nuclear deterrent derives from genuine regional concerns. India confronts China, a country with a burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and one that is fast emerging as Asia's premier military power. China has provided covert nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan in an apparent strategy to build a countervailing power to tie down India south of the Himalayas. Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran and the presence of SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles in Kazakhstan, close to India's northern frontiers, have heightened New Delhi's security concerns. In the post–cold war world, the United States and India share many common security interests, but the expanding web of U.S.-led technology-export controls tends to hinder the strategic programs of America's potential friends more than its potential enemies. The controls appear counterproductive because they goad a country like India to redouble indigenous efforts to build missile, space, and nuclear capabilities. Indeed, the monopolistic, discriminatory policies of technology cartels like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) tend to exacerbate Gaullist-style resentment in India, reinforcing its drive for an independent deterrent.

India's missile and nuclear advances and its rejection of U.S. pressure to enter into regional arms-control arrangements are the main sources of discord between the world's most populous and most powerful democracies at a time when both New Delhi and Washington are trying to forge better economic and

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political ties. U.S.-Indian non-proliferation differences have persisted for more than three decades and are unlikely to disappear soon. As a country of major "proliferation concern" to U.S. policy, India increasingly has been shut out from most advanced technologies, hurting its civilian modernization. The bilateral non-proliferation conflict mirrors the intense struggle between one country's determination to control the global diffusion of sensitive technologies and another country's resolve, also rooted in security considerations, to build technological independence.

India's nuclear and missile programs have been a major spur to multinational and national export controls. India's 1974 nuclear detonation impelled the secret formation of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group ("London Club"), the reshaping of the international non-proliferation regime, and the inclusion of dual-use items in Western technology-export controls. It also was a major impetus for the 1978 U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the attachment of non-proliferation conditions to foreign aid, and the emergence of the sanctions approach to proliferation. India's space and missile programs have likewise inspired U.S. space- and missile-technology controls.

Two Indian developments provided an impetus to MTCR's formation. The first was India's launch in 1980 of a tiny civilian satellite, *Rohini I,* into low-earth orbit aboard an indigenous rocket. The success made India the sixth country after the Soviet Union, the United States, France, Japan, and China to perform such a feat. The military significance of the development of the SLV-3 launch vehicle was immediately underlined by the country's top space official who said the rocket could be converted into a 930-mile intermediate-range ballistic missile.[1] A second development was the inception of a ballistic missile program in 1983. India had made itself the Third World leader in satellite technology, demonstrating a greater depth of experience than China in this field, but it lagged behind in rocket technology because of its pursuit of exclusively civilian space applications. When the government finally decided to approve military missile development, a conscious effort was made to extend the fruits of civilian space research to the missile program. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, the scientist who headed the successful SLV-3 project, became the program chief, and established close ties between civilian and military research, setting off alarm bells in Washington.

Like other major multilateral cartels, MTCR's formation was a clandestine affair. The United States already had unilateral controls on the export of missile and launch-vehicle technology when it began discussions with its allies on establishing a missile technology cartel along the lines of the London Club. The MTCR was established after four years of secret negotiations among the seven major Western industrial states—the so-called G-7 group.[2] Even after the regime

[1] Indian Space Research Organization chairman Satish Dhawan, in Department of Space, *The Space Program Till 2000 A.D.* (New Delhi: Department of Space, 1988), p. 6. Also see Jerrold F. Elkin and Brian Fredericks, "Military Applications of India's Space Program," *Air University Review,* May–June 1983, pp. 56–63.

[2] Leonard S. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), p. 36; and Uzi Rubin, "How Much Does Missile Proliferation Matter?" *Orbis,* Winter 1991, p. 31.

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had been put into force, however, the formal announcement on its formation was delayed for two years until 1987.[3] The public unveiling of the cartel coincided with the test launch of the Indian Trishul missile. MTCR's techniques, like those of the London Club, hinge on technology control and denial.

The first flight test of the Indian IRBM, Agni, less than two years after the MTCR, was another landmark event that shook the U.S. non-proliferation community. The successful test belied the MTCR's premise to the effect that a suppliers' cartel could be effective in halting Third World missile programs.[4] Agni's development was seen as "a sign that India intends to assert its military dominance in the region and eventually to move into the ranks of the world's military powers."[5] The launch helped focus greater American attention on the potential security threats to the United States from the Third World proliferation of ballistic missiles. The Agni prompted a revision of the U.S. policy on technology sales to India. During 1984–86, as part of a strategy to weaken Soviet influence and carve out a bigger role for itself in Asia, the United States decided to sell technology products to India. A memorandum of understanding on civilian technology sales was signed in 1984, while military technology was promised in 1986 by Caspar Weinberger during the first-ever visit to India by a U.S. defense secretary. But even that limited technology-transfer relationship with India dissolved in the aftermath of the Agni test, with leading members of the U.S. Congress questioning the "wisdom of providing any high-technology sales to India."[6] A study of Department of Commerce export approvals shows that no major hi-tech item was licensed for export to India for nearly three years after the first Agni test. On the contrary, the U.S. government turned down dozens of applications for the export of technology during 1989–1992 in response to rising concerns over the Agni program, including its long-term implications for U.S. security.

Significance of MTCR Controls

The non-proliferation policies of Western powers are founded on a strategy of preventing Third World development of technologies that might impinge on the Western powers' military and economic interests. The fundamental interests of the United States include: prevention of direct or indirect threats to the American homeland and regional allies; preservation and expansion

[3] Janne E. Nolan, *Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 116.

[4] Aspen Strategy Group report, *New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery Capabilities in the Third World* (Aspen, Colo. and Lanham, Md.: Aspen Strategy Group and University Press of America, 1990), p. 14.

[5] *The New York Times*, May 23, 1989.

[6] Letter of 22 senators and representatives to President George Bush, May 22, 1989. The principal sponsors of the move were Senators Jeff Bingaman (Democrat of New Mexico) and John S. McCain III (Republican of Arizona) and Representatives Gerald B.H. Solomon (Republican of New York) and Howard L. Berman (Democrat of California).

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of an open world economy; unimpeded access to Persian Gulf oil and Third World raw materials; and prevention of the rise of hostile hegemons in areas of strategic importance.[7] These interests have driven U.S. policy makers and lawmakers to make effective control of the diffusion of advanced technology a cornerstone of American national-security policy. While working to dismantle global import and investment barriers, Washington has helped to erect new and stronger barriers to trade in technology. U.S.-sponsored export controls should be viewed as a "unilateral, artificial, politically-motivated barrier" to the otherwise liberal trade regime that the United States has always so ardently advocated.[8]

In helping to erect Western export barriers, the United States has worked with the very industrial powers with whom it has been engaged in fierce technological competition. The erosion of the United States's technological dominance only underscores the importance of multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, regimes for the control of technology dissemination. The end of the cold war, ominously, has led to a large expansion of multinational and national export barriers, with the focus of controls now increasingly on dual-use technologies. Since all advanced technologies have dual applications in the military and civilian spheres, the new export-control strategies carry the danger of severely curtailing the flow of technology at the cutting edge of civilian modernization. Also, technology controls now are portentously changing from an East-West perspective to a North-South perspective. Nothing can better illustrate that than the U.S.-led initiative to do away with the cold war cartel, CoCom, and bring Russia, China, and several East European countries into a new and stringent regime to control exports of leading-edge technologies to targeted countries. CoCom was fashioned and nurtured for four decades principally to target the East bloc. On March 31, 1994, CoCom was dissolved, although its technology controls remain in force until the establishment of a successor regime. The controls apply to the following strategic technologies in CoCom's "core list": electronics, telecommunications, material processing, advanced materials, computers, marine technology, sensors, navigation and avionics, and propulsion systems. Many controls on exports to the former Soviet bloc and China, however, have been lifted to facilitate the formation of a larger cartel.[9] The new regime, to be unveiled by October, will allow the winners and losers of the cold war jointly to tackle potential strategic threats from elsewhere in the world, although "Western allies will continue to hold closely among themselves their most sensitive technology."[10] The Central Intelligence

[7] See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense," *International Security,* Spring 1991, pp. 7–10; and Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, "Force Planning for the Post–Cold War World: What Can We Learn from Geopolitics?" *Strategic Review,* Winter 1991, pp. 26–36.

[8] William J. Long, *U.S. Export Control Policy: Executive Autonomy vs. Congressional Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 13.

[9] Rich Miller, "U.S. Will Scrap Cold War Controls," Reuters, Washington-datelined dispatch, Mar. 31, 1994.

[10] U.S. officials quoted in Jon Schaffer, "Western Nations Agree to Phase Out CoCom," in United States Information Agency, *Wireless File,* Nov. 18, 1993, p. 23.

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Agency contends the United States faces potential threats from twenty-five countries "many hostile to our interests . . . that are developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons."[11]

The MTCR, London Club, Australia Group, and CoCom are technology trade cartels or oligopolies, as opposed to international agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. These oligopolies—born in secrecy—seek to control the market, not for pricing reasons, but to retain market dominance and strengthen their long-term security and economic interests. Cartels like the MTCR, therefore, lack international legitimacy. The MTCR is not backed by any international accord or United Nations sanction. It remains a surreptitious club of white countries, many former colonial powers that employed their superior military strength derived from industrial and technological advantage to subdue the world's most ancient civilizations. Today, it seeks to prevent the former colonial world from acquiring even commercial technologies critical to economic development because of the potential military applications of these technologies.

The MTCR is a surreptitious club of white countries that seeks to prevent the former colonial world from acquiring commercial technologies critical to economic development.

Missile proliferation has received special attention because of its potentially adverse consequences for Western fundamental interests. The spread of missile technology would impinge on the present capabilities of major powers to police international seas and intervene in regional conflicts without incurring significant political or military costs. The proliferation concerns are reinforced by the fact that, unlike other weapon systems, there are no adequate defenses available against ballistic missiles, particularly medium- and long-range missiles, because they travel at high speeds. Cruise missiles, whose attraction as delivery systems is growing, are even more difficult to defend against.[12]

The missile non-proliferation regime is even more inequitable and discriminatory than the NPT, owing to an absence of any mutuality of obligations between the missile and non-missile states. The MTCR incorporates no commitment on the part of the missile powers—akin to the NPT's Article VI—to work toward complete missile disarmament. Instead, it implicitly sanctions their continued missile modernization, with these states now increasingly focusing

[11] Director of the Central Intelligence Agency R. James Woolsey, Official text of remarks to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Jan. 25, 1994 (Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency), p. 3.

[12] Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?" *International Security,* Summer 1991, p. 39.

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on advanced sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles. The MTCR also lacks any monitoring and verification measures to detect and forestall transfers of missile components and technology to client states by member-states or regime adherents, such as U.S. transfers to Israel for the Arrow program or the Chinese transfer of M-11 technology to Pakistan.

The expansion of MTCR controls has effectively banned the sale of even short-range missiles to a Third World country, although the original guidelines were to be applied to items and technologies that could produce missiles capable of carrying at least a payload of five hundred kilograms three hundred kilometers. In practice, all delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) now are banned for export, irrespective of their potential payload or range. The revised guidelines of January 1993 shift the focus of MTCR controls from preventing the development of nuclear-capable delivery systems to vehicles able to deliver any kind of weapon of mass destruction.

Of greater concern to a state like India is the MTCR's effort, despite its disclaimer, to thwart civilian space programs in the Third World. The new guidelines require supplier states to consider the "capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state" and also the general "concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" before agreeing to export any item or technology. Since an indigenous space-launch vehicle arms its possessor with potential IRBM capability, the civilian space program of a Third World country is bound to become a target of MTCR controls. Indeed, the new guidelines state unambiguously that there will be a strong presumption to deny missile systems, subsystems, and technologies "regardless of their purpose."[13] Through such sweeping controls, the cartel is implicitly protecting the existing suppliers' multibillion-dollar monopoly on commercial space-launch and satellite communications services. The ability of some major developing countries to employ their civilian space assets for meteorology, communications, navigation, mapping of underground water resources, and even military reconnaissance is seen by some U.S. officials as posing a potential threat to U.S. interests. According to Henry D. Sokolski, deputy for non-proliferation in the Office of the Defense Secretary, "The spread of relatively secure communications systems and rudimentary surveillance satellite capabilities could make it much easier for regional powers to target our forces or those of our friends and make it more difficult for us to know what these regional powers are doing."[14] Current export controls on technology for inertial navigation systems (INS) for commercial aircraft are testament to the extension of MTCR barriers to civilian fields.

[13] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Revisions to MTCR Guidelines: Missile Technology Control Regime" (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Jan. 7, 1993).

[14] Statement by Henry D. Sokolski before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 11, 1990, quoted in Thomas G. Mahnken, "Why Third World Space Systems Matter," *Orbis,* Fall 1991, p. 566.

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One of the chief features of the MTCR regime is its inconsistency. For instance, the cartel's first publicly stated task was to block the Argentinean-led Condor II missile project, which had received technical assistance from Egypt and funding from Iraq. Sustained U.S. pressure forced Egypt in 1989 to drop out of the consortium, and Argentina later suspended the project, citing MTCR controls and its own economic problems. This victory encouraged the MTCR members to increase their pressure on India.

And yet, Israel's broad-based missile and nuclear programs continued to receive overt and covert technological assistance from the United States, France, and other Western countries.[15] Never has Washington even expressed an inclination to do with Israel what it has publicly sought to achieve in South Asia—"first to cap, then over time reduce, and finally eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery."[16] Despite Israel's deployment of nuclear-capable Jericho and Jericho II missiles,[17] the United States is currently helping Israel to develop an anti-tactical ballistic missile system, the Arrow, in conspicuous violation of America's own MTCR guidelines. Under a 1988 accord, Washington has pledged to bear 80 percent of the cost of the Arrow project, and the project has even come under criticism from the General Accounting Office because of an absence of oversight and control to deter possible diversion of supplied technologies and components to other weapon programs. (In response to a 1993 U.S. General Accounting Office report on this subject, the State Department said: "The U.S. government controls the export of U.S. components and technology for the Arrow program through established licensing procedures operated by the Departments of State and Commerce. We have no reason to believe that these procedures have been ineffective, or that Israel has failed to honor end-use assurances provided under our memorandum of agreement."[18])

In sharp contrast, the Indian Agni, Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), and Geostationary Launch Vehicle (GSLV) programs are viewed with deep concern in Washington, and India now heads the MTCR list of troublesome countries. To be sure, Israel faces severe regional threats as well, but the United States must understand how the MTCR double standard is viewed in non-hostile states like India.

[15] *International Herald Tribune,* Oct. 21, 1991; Jane Hunter, "Israel, South Africa and the Bomb," *Middle East Report,* Nov.–Dec. 1986; *The Washington Post,* Oct. 31, 1986; *The Sunday Times* (London), Oct. 12, 1986; *The Washington Post,* May 14, 1985; and Nolan and Wheelon, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," p. 96.

[16] U.S. Department of State, "Report to Congress on the Progress toward Regional Nonproliferation in South Asia" (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, May 5, 1993).

[17] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *International Arms Transfers and World Military Expenditures: 1988* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1989), p. 18; and "Israel in Second Secret Test of Jericho IRBM," *Jane's Defence Weekly,* Nov. 19, 1988, p. 1258. According to some American reports, Israel has armed the Jerichos with nuclear warheads.

[18] United States Information Agency, *Wireless File,* Aug. 27, 1993, pp. 1–2.

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The Impact on India

Has the U.S.-led MTCR succeeded in slowing down India's civilian space and ballistic missile programs? Export controls have indeed forced Indian planners to revise their project timetables and delay a number of programs. But the end result has only been to encourage Indian R&D agencies to build at home what they cannot purchase abroad. Consider two specific cases of denial, one involving an item sought by the Indian missile program and another a technology needed for civilian space-launch services.

The Agni test. The Agni test prompted Washington to deny India a $1.2-million Combined Acceleration Vibration Climatic Test System (CAVCTS), used to test re-entry vehicle components for their ability to withstand the heat and stress of flight. Known as a "shake-and-bake" device, the CAVCTS was to have a force-level capability of 545 kilograms, well below the MTCR's limit of 10,227 kilograms. Soon after the Agni test, the issue of licensing the sale of CAVCTS turned into "a policy battleground" among the State, Defense, and Commerce Departments, and the CIA.[19] The intra-executive squabble over the CAVCTS was, however, a product of India's proverbial red tape. The Indian government allowed a 1985 CAVCTS export license to lapse and then made the American manufacturers reapply just after the MTCR had formally come into force through notification to the U.S. Congress. President George Bush ended two years of interagency fighting over the issue by barring the sale of CAVCTS to India.

Cryogenic-engine technology. Cryogenic technology combines super-cooled liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen to form a rocket fuel with maximum lift-off power. A recent denial of cryogenic-engine technology to India, by pressuring Moscow to break a binding contract, was a major triumph for U.S. non-proliferation diplomacy, which is backed by a threat of unilateral sanctions and military interdiction of ships in international waters. Such incidents occurred when the United States worked with the United Arab Emirates and West Germany to block an Indian ship, *Sea Crest Pioneer,* from unloading its chemical cargo at Dubai or proceeding to Iran in 1989;[20] when it took the help of Cypriot authorities in 1992 to blockade an Indian shipment of a dual-use chemical to Syria;[21] and when it forced the search of a Chinese ship, *Yin He,* at a Saudi Arabian port in 1993 on the false charge that it was carrying chemicals used to make weapons to Iran.[22]

Russia was the second country to be successfully persuaded by Washington not to sell cryogenic technology to New Delhi. When India began shopping for the technology during 1989–1990, it received bids from the United

[19] *The Washington Post,* July 17, 1989.

[20] *The New York Times,* July 10, 1989.

[21] *The Washington Times,* Oct. 12, 1992.

[22] "U.S. Had Credible Reports about Chemicals on Chinese Ship," United States Information Agency, *Wireless File,* Sept. 7, 1993, pp. 1–2; and Nick Driver, "China Demands U.S. Compensation for Chemical-Free Ship," United Press International, Beijing-datelined dispatch, Sept. 5, 1993.

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States, France, and the Soviet Union. The U.S. offer from General Dynamics evoked little interest because the firm sought to sell ready-made engines without any intent to transfer technology for their local manufacture. India first attempted to buy cryogenic engines and related technology from Arianespace, the French-led European consortium, but Paris immediately came under U.S. pressure. The French government initially insisted the sale would not violate the MTCR guidelines and pointed out that it had received firm end-use assurances. It also argued that a decision on the sale of technology had to be the sole, sovereign judgment of the MTCR member-state. But the United States insisted that since the MTCR was designed as an extension of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, exports of space-related technology should not be made to a country like India, which had indicated its potential for promoting nuclear proliferation by refusing to sign the NPT. France ultimately bowed to U.S. pressure and suspended negotiations, prompting New Delhi to turn to Moscow.

Russia was the second country to be successfully persuaded by Washington not to sell cryogenic technology to New Delhi.

Moscow's decision in July 1993 to break a seventy-five-million-dollar contract with India climaxed two years of sustained U.S. pressure that included trade sanctions against the Russian Glavkosmos agency and Indian Space Research Organization. Punitive sanctions were imposed despite both parties' pointing out repeatedly that the "agreement does not come under the purview of the MTCR since the intended use . . . is only for launching geosynchronous satellites for peaceful uses toward national development."[23] The contract involving technology transfer and supply of two cryogenic-stage units in six years incorporated end-use assurances and safeguards against technology diversion to a third country. When Glavkosmos and ISRO did not wilt under the sanctions, the United States resorted to coercive diplomacy, sending Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis, Ambassador-at-Large Strobe Talbott, and other officials to Moscow in 1993 to warn the Russians of the consequences of fulfilling the contract. New sanctions were threatened against Russian firms, and Moscow was cautioned that its refusal to scrap the deal could spark congressional opposition to the continued flow of U.S. aid. The Russians were told "a viable Indian missile capability could one day pose a security threat to Russia itself."[24] Carrots also were dangled: new trade concessions and joint U.S.-Russian space collaboration.

A breakthrough to resolve what had become one of the thorniest issues in U.S.-Russian relations emerged only after President Bill Clinton personally

[23] Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, "Cryogenic Rocket Engine Deal with Russia—Prime Minister's Statement" (New Delhi: Indian Parliament, Aug. 18, 1993).

[24] *The Washington Post,* July 14, 1993.

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took up the matter with his Russian counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, at the Tokyo G-7 summit. Within days, Moscow invoked a *force majeure* clause of the 1991 contract to announce it was "resiling from its contractual obligations" on grounds of "unforeseen circumstances."[25] In return, the United States agreed to a broad program of space cooperation with Moscow, including the Russian launching of U.S. civilian satellites and joint collaboration on a space station.[26]

India's interest in cryogenic-engine technology comes from its desire to develop independent launch capabilities for large multipurpose satellites being locally built in the Insat-2 series. Such capabilities will make the country self-reliant in space technologies and enable it to compete in the lucrative international space market. Today, India remains heavily dependent on foreign launch services for lofting its indigenous satellites. Its latest satellite, *Insat-2B*—whose total construction cost was $25 million[27]—was placed in orbit aboard the Ariane rocket of the European Space Agency last year. India had to pay seven million dollars more to launch the satellite than to build it.

Indian efforts to develop independent launch capabilities in the post-MTCR era have encountered some major failures. The country's newest and most powerful rocket, the fifteen-million-dollar Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), on its maiden flight in September 1993, climbed to barely half of the programmed distance into outer space and failed to place a remote-sensing, reconnaissance-capable satellite in orbit. Two launches of the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) failed in 1987 and 1988, while a third flight in 1992, described as a success, placed its payload so close to Earth's atmosphere that it burned out in fifteen days. The Russian decision to terminate the cryogenic contract has been a serious setback to the Indian space program's goal of building powerful but cost-effective launch vehicles by 1997. It seems unlikely that India's indigenous cryogenic technology, which is still at an embryonic stage, will be available for space missions in this decade.

The Indian Response

Western export barriers have compelled Indian space and missile scientists to develop locally the components and equipment denied to them, even at additional costs. Hence, MTCR controls are only *promoting* Indian self-reliance in an array of strategic technologies. Already, India has mastered solid propellants and satellite technology and has made rapid strides in earth-storable liquid propulsion technology, navigation, guidance and control systems,

[25] Rao, "Cryogenic Rocket Engine Deal with Russia."

[26] Edmund F. Scherr, "Russia 'Freezes' Sale of Rockets to India," United States Information Agency, *Wireless File,* July 19, 1993, pp. 7–8; and *Asian Wall Street Journal,* Sept. 6, 1993.

[27] Neelam Jain, "Indian Satellite to Provide New Services," United Press International, New Delhi-datelined dispatch, July 23, 1993.

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and telemetry, tracking, and command systems. In barely seven years after its establishment, the ballistic-missile program flight-tested five separate missile systems. India has built a latent intercontinental ballistic missile capability, despite recent launch-vehicle setbacks. MTCR controls have encouraged an explicit linkage between the civilian and military applications of space technologies in order to reduce the time and cost of R&D. The indigenously developed closed-loop, strapped-down inertial guidance system has found both civilian and military applications. In sum, India's civilian and military space programs, with all their mutual spinoff benefits, are developing in tandem in exactly the same fashion that the U.S., Soviet, Chinese, and French missile programs developed two or three decades ago.

In some cases, MTCR controls have helped India to design and produce locally what it was denied abroad.

In some cases, MTCR controls have helped India to design and produce locally what it was denied abroad. Citing its export controls, the United States refused in 1976 to sell India a shell catalyst for rocket fuel. A shell catalyst is employed to trigger an instant decay of hydrogen fuel and thereby produce a propellant jet flame. In less than two years, India indigenously developed the technology and began commercial production of the shell catalyst. In the 1980s, the United States declined to sell W-band, 94-gigahertz antennas for the Nag, an anti-tank rocket that employs an imaging infra-red seeker. Today, India is one of a handful of countries manufacturing this antenna. Similarly, India was denied magnesium plates for the Prithvi short-range ballistic missile. India now is commercially producing these plates and is in a position to export them.[28]

Other success stories of Indian indigenization include the development of radiation-hardened integrated circuits for satellites, maraging steel for launch-vehicle motor casing, electro-optical sensors, liquid apogee motors, a spacecraft propulsion system, HTPB propellant resin for launch vehicles, and ammonium perchlorate, a solid-propellant oxidizer. To be sure, MTCR and other export controls do retard Indian projects an average of five to eight years, and Indian space and missile programs will no doubt continue to suffer under the cumulative weight of multilateral and national export controls. But in the long run, India's burgeoning scientific and technological complex will become immune to such controls and achieve the country's two major goals: to develop an independent launch capability so as to compete in the global space-services market, and to build a missile deterrent against China, Pakistan, and extra-regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran.

[28] Examples cited are based on author's interviews with Indian scientists during 1993–94.

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The Challenge to U.S.-Indian Relations

Why, then, does the United States persist in technology-trade barriers that are counterproductive and damaging to bilateral relations with an important and potentially friendly regional power? Perhaps one answer lies in the fact that technology controls, although rooted in strategic concerns, are driven also by long-term American and First World economic interests. Export controls reinforce existing technology monopolies and hence the dependence of developing states. To be sure, export barriers also entail economic costs for the producers. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences estimated that in 1985, high-tech export curbs cost the American economy nine billion dollars and its 1991 study recommended that the United States should limit its controls to specific, militarily useful technologies and items so as to avoid "imposing significant economic costs that may be disproportionate to their effectiveness."[29] But nine billion dollars was a mere 3 percent of that year's defense spending. The relative cheapness of the effort to protect long-term American strategic and economic interests may explain the bipartisan U.S. policy consensus on controlling the flow of advanced technology.

The challenge for India is not only how to overcome the rigors of Western export curbs but also to withstand the political and economic pressures now being directly mounted by the major suppliers in conjunction with their technology controls.

The challenge for India is not only how to overcome the rigors of Western export curbs but also to withstand the political and economic pressures now being directly mounted by the major suppliers in conjunction with their technology controls. In an unprecedented action, the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Australia submitted separate but almost identical diplomatic notes to India in July 1993 urging that it freeze the Agni project, halt the deployment of its short-range Prithvi missile, scrap its fast-breeder project, stop further fissile-material production and accept full-scope nuclear safeguards.[30] (The Indian foreign ministry subsequently confirmed receiving such demarches, with one official dismissing them as "marshmallows.") However, India's present economic problems have exposed it to pressure from

[29] Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences, *Executive Summary: Finding Common Ground* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 23–24.

[30] United Press International, New Delhi-datelined dispatch, Aug. 28, 1993.

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external credit lenders and forced it to slash military spending. Also, India's current economic-liberalization program, aimed at integrating the world's most populous country with the global economy, needs Western capital and technological assistance to succeed. With its rich technical manpower and low-wage structure, and now shorn of its licensing controls, India has the potential to attract substantial Western investment. An important challenge for Indian policy makers is how to blunt Western pressure without compromising the country's strategic and economic interests.

India's emergence as a potentially major second-tier supplier has resulted in Washington's openly seeking New Delhi's compliance with the guidelines of the MTCR and other technology-control cartels, such as the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. The success of U.S. policy in bringing Beijing into the NPT's fold, and the current plan to establish a revamped, renamed CoCom with the assistance of Russia and some other ex-communist states, undergird American determination to build greater legitimacy for the technology-control regimes by providing them a broad-based, non-ideological framework. The United States also has sought to "internationalize" the MTCR's norms and guidelines by pressuring even non-member states to adhere to the cartel's regulations and by seeking to extend the jurisdiction of its proliferation-related domestic laws beyond U.S. borders. The main tool employed to demand an extraterritorial jurisdiction for the U.S. Missile Technology Control Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act, and other laws is the threat of sanctions. The sanctions habit has made Washington act as the world's sole policeman for deterring violations of export controls, human rights, and free trade principles. No wonder it is the only MTCR member to slap sanctions against governments, state agencies, and companies for activities related to missile proliferation, proclaiming at least nine separate punitive actions between 1991 and 1993 alone.

Washington has employed its favorite carrot-and-stick approach to help persuade India to adopt the export guidelines of multilateral regimes. It has held out the promise of space cooperation with New Delhi if India becomes an MTCR observer and abides by the cartel's guidelines. According to State Department spokesman Michael McCurry, "We're working now with India to further those goals, including adherence to the MTCR," and "the possibility of expanded space cooperation with India."[31] India's publicly stated position is that it opposes discriminatory, ad hoc regimes, such as the MTCR, but is committed to preventing proliferation. Today, through its export policies, India already is respecting the guidelines of the MTCR and Nuclear Suppliers' Group and, to a lesser extent, the Australia Group. The United States, however, would like India to incorporate into its national law multilateral export-control standards, procedures, and lists commonly used by Western suppliers. Should New Delhi extend cooperation to such technology-control regimes even though they have consistently targeted India and are likely to continue blocking exports to it even

[31] Cited in Scherr, "Russia 'Freezes' Sale," p. 7. See also the remarks of Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis, Ibid.

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Table 1
China's Regional Missile Capabilities

	Payload/Yield	Range (km)	Status
Land-based missiles			
DF-5A (ICBM)	4-5 mt warhead	12,500-15,000	4-10 deployed
DF-4 (IRBM/ICBM)	3 mt warhead	4,750+	15-20 deployed
DF-3A (IRBM)	3 mt warhead	2,600-2,800	70-125 deployed
DF-21 (IRBM)	200-300 kt	1,800	36 deployed
DF-31 (ICBM)	200-300 kt	8,000	being developed
DF-41 (ICBM)	MIRVed	12,000	being developed
Sea-launched ballistic missiles			
JL-1	0.5-1 mt	1,700	24 deployed
JL-2	0.5-1 mt	8,000	likely to be deployed soon
Tactical missiles and nuclear-configured bombers			
DF-15 (M-9)	500 kg payload	600	deployed
DF-11 (M-11)	800-1,000 kg payload	300	deployed
H-7, H-6, H-5, Q-5 bombers	20 kt-3 mt single bomb	400-3,500	180-200 bombers deployed
HY-2, HY-1, HY-4 anti-ship cruise missiles	400-500 kg payload	40-150	deployed
HY-3, C-101	400-500 kg payload	45-130	being developed

Sources: R. Norris, A. Burrows, R. Fieldhouse, *British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons*, vol. 5 of *Nuclear Weapons Databook* (1994); *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armament and Disarmament*; *Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems*, Mar. 1990; *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1993; interviews with the author.

if it were to join them? Although there is little incentive at present for India to lend support to a cartel like the MTCR, New Delhi has informed Washington of its willingness to join the regime as a full member. The United States, however, is ready to grant only an observer status to India. One can only conclude, therefore, that the technology-development strategies of major regional powers like India need to proceed on the basis that the suppliers' cartel is unlikely to crack in the foreseeable future, and that repressive high-tech export controls are going to remain a long-term reality.

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Table 2
India's Regional Missile Capabilities

	Payload/Yield	Range (km)	Status
Land-based missiles			
Prithvi SRBM	500-1,000 kg payload	150-250	first batch of 150-km range deployed 1993
Agni IRBM	1 ton payload	2,000-2,500	under testing
Agni-2	2-2.5 ton payload	4,500+	on drawing board
Akash SAM		25	to be deployed 1995
Trishul multi-purpose		9	to be deployed 1994
Lakshya UAV/cruise missile	200 kg	250-500	under testing
SLVs if adapted as ballistic missiles			
GSLV	2.5 ton	14,000	being developed
PSLV	1 ton	8,000	under testing
ASLV	500 kg	4,000	in service
SLV-3	350 kg	2,500	out of service

Sources: B. Chellaney, *Nuclear Proliferation: The U.S.-Indian Conflict* (1993); Washington Council on Non-Proliferation, *Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S. and India* (1993); *Missile Monitor*, no. 3 (1993); interviews with author.

Nor is the Asian security scenario likely to change anytime soon. India faces a multitude of potential missile threats from Central Asia, Iran, and the Middle East, and its principal adversaries, China and Pakistan. Easier and cheaper to operate and maintain than manned fighter or bomber aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles now have become an integral component of modern military machines and doctrines, and the expanding missile programs of China, Pakistan, Iran, and other Asian states will only reinforce the Indian desire to build missile deterrent capabilities. China has played a pivotal role in creating and enlarging missile threats to India. Saudi Arabia's thirty Chinese-supplied DF-3s (CSS-2s), capable of traveling 2,700 kilometers with a 1,500-kilogram warhead,[32] can strike targets in more than half of India, including the capital. China has also sold Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran and is now engaged in nuclear cooperation with it. The 1993 revelations on Beijing's transfer of M-11 missile technology to Islamabad were the latest chapter in a long saga of clandestine

[32] "Missile and Space Launch Capabilities of Selected Countries," *The Nonproliferation Review*, Winter 1994, p. 98.

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Table 3
Pakistan's Regional Missile Capabilities

	Payload/Yield	Range (km)	Status
DF-11 (M-11) SRBM	800-1,000 kg payload	300	transferred by China
Hatf-3 IRBM	500 kg	800	being developed with Chinese help
Hatf-2 SRBM	400 kg	300	being developed with Chinese help
Hatf-1	400 kg	80	built with French/Chinese sounding rocket technology; likely to be deployed soon

Sources: *The Nonproliferation Review*, Winter 1994; *Survival*, Autumn 1993; *Defense Monitor*, no. 1 (1993); Washington Council of Non-Proliferation, *Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S. and India* (1993); interviews with author.

Chinese nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan. According to U.S. Central Intelligence director James Woolsey, "China has consistently regarded a nuclear-armed Pakistan as a crucial ally and counterweight to India."[33] Pakistan's reported flight-tests of Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 in 1989 surprised the world, which until then had believed the country's capabilities were limited to firing elementary French-design sounding rockets. The M-11 and Hatf-2, a two-stage version of Hatf-1, can strike some major Indian cities.

Indian security planners cannot ignore China's burgeoning arsenal of nuclearized and conventionally armed missiles. Relations between the world's most populous countries went through difficult times in the past four decades, mainly owing to Beijing's redrawing of frontiers that removed Tibet as a historical buffer between the two ancient civilizations and the subsequent invasion in 1962 that led to the annexation of parts of Indian Kashmir. Today, China is the only state with nuclear weapons that is still committed to conducting atomic tests and retaining certain classes of missiles—tactical (ground- and sea-launched) and intermediate range—that Washington and Moscow are eliminating from their arsenals. The Chinese nuclear testing clearly is linked to the country's ambitious military modernization program, and Beijing, despite international pressure, should be expected to carry out more detonations while supporting a total test ban starting in 1996.[34] The disadvantage of geography in relation to

[33] Testimony of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey before the Senate Government Affairs Committee, Feb. 24, 1993 (Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency, Feb. 1993).

[34] Paul Godwin and John J. Schulz, "Arming the Dragon for the 21st Century: China's Defense Modernization Program," *Arms Control Today*, Dec. 1993, pp. 3–8; and Vipin Gupta, "The Status of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Testing," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Jan. 1994, pp. 31–35.

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China has been a major motivation for the Indian desire to develop a long-range missile capability. While China can strike India's main Gangetic plain even with short-range missiles from Tibet, India would need missiles with a range of more than three thousand kilometers to strike major industrial, military, and civilian targets in the Chinese heartland. The Agni, with a one-ton warhead, could barely reach such targets if fired from along the Himalayan border. The current Agni R&D is aimed at perfecting a reentry vehicle for "long-range missions,"[35] reflecting the planners' determination to build missiles with payload ranges that could effectively counter regional and extra-regional threats.

Needed: A New Paradigm

The end of the cold war has led to a U.S.-sponsored national and multinational tightening of the reins on the flow of advanced technology to the developing world. There now appears greater consensus and cooperation among the advanced industrial states on issues of technology-export controls. India is likely to remain a major target of such controls in the years ahead. But the MTCR, while hindering several of India's space and missile projects and driving up developmental costs, has only stiffened New Delhi's determination to develop an indigenous capacity. It is significant that the main progress in the development of India's ground-to-ground missiles occurred *after* the cartel was formed. Universalized technology-control strategies can never work as a long-term solution to perceived regional security problems. Moreover, problems of international legitimacy are going to continue to plague the MTCR since it lacks the support of a central, validating treaty. The cartel places no restrictions on vertical missile proliferation, provides for no mutuality of obligations between the missile and nonmissile states, and unabashedly seeks to keep critical space, missile, and aerospace technologies in the hands of a few states. Above all, it conspicuously discriminates against Third World civilian space programs.

What, then, does the future hold for the MTCR? As a suppliers' cartel designed to protect an oligopoly or perpetuate military superiority, the regime is on slippery ground. History bears testimony to the ineffectiveness of technology-control strategies. If the MTCR is sincere in seeking to prevent terrible arms races among countries that can scarcely afford them, then it should shed its "white-nations-only" image and co-opt countries like India that are willing to cooperate. The regime has succeeded in drawing the world's attention to missile proliferation but its own long-term future will be determined not by its coercive, technology-denial measures but by a shift to cooperative, demand-side-oriented arms control. Technical "fixes" can never resolve political problems. What is needed is a political, consensual approach to help establish a global, non-discriminatory missile regime. Such a regime will ensure open access to

[35] United News of India, Interview with A. Sivathanu Pillai of the Defense Research and Development Laboratory, Ahmedabad-datelined dispatch, Aug. 16, 1993.

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safeguarded civilian space technology, reverse the expanding web of export controls, and work toward realistic regional and global arms-control pacts with the aim of eliminating all classes of ballistic missiles. Third World countries should be allowed to develop space-launch capabilities under a system of international assistance, monitoring, and verification. Because of the dual applications of space-related technologies, full-scope safeguards seem impracticable, but sensors operating in the visible, infra-red, and radar spectra, electronic intelligence, information exchanges, and inspections could reliably monitor compliance. Ballistic missiles are easily distinguishable from civilian launchers by such observable characteristics as rocket design, configuration and payload, flight trajectory, physical capabilities, reentry vehicles, and the state's development infrastructure. An essential first step to the creation of a non-discriminatory regime will be a ballistic missile flight test ban since no missile system can be developed without detectable tests.

One may well ask: if regional missile threats are the spur to India's own programs, why not pursue a regional arms-control pact? But regional regimes cannot be an answer to the problems of missile proliferation *even if* designed as interim proposals to achieve global arms-control measures. How do you define a region in the light of potential IRBM, ICBM, and SLBM threats from beyond the region? A South Asian missile-free zone, for instance, cannot address India's concerns over Chinese ICBM and SLBM deployments, Saudi DF-3s, or the ICBMs of the ex-Soviet states. What is needed, therefore, is an international missile regime that will apply its controls uniformly and concurrently across national boundaries.

Regionally, the focus will have to be on confidence building, military transparency, and crisis stability in southern Asia since the interstate conflicts—rooted in disputes over colonially demarcated frontiers—defy easy political solutions. The 1993 Sino-Indian accord to maintain border peace provides an example of how festering disputes can be politically kept aside to allow improvement of bilateral relations. China, India, and Pakistan should be encouraged to adopt missile and nuclear transparency measures and to strengthen national export controls on sensitive technology and materials. Missile-related confidence-building measures could include prior notification of missile and space flight tests, transparency in deployments, and the establishment of non-missile buffer zones along the borders. India and China, and Pakistan and India, should sign bilateral pacts pledging not to carry out missile attacks on population centers and industrial and civilian installations. Even more reassuring would be no-first-use nuclear and missile agreements among the three countries, which make up more than two-fifths of the world's population. But so long as regional tensions and rivalries persist, none of the states involved will forgo the weapons of deterrence simply because the club of MTCR powers wants them to do so. Whatever the solution to proliferation, technology control and denial cannot by itself be an effective answer.

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The Russian Military's Strategy For "Sixth Generation" Warfare

by Mary C. FitzGerald

Western observers tend to assume that, for the foreseeable future, only the United States will have the capability to revolutionize military technology and doctrine. And why not, given the evidence of the Gulf war and the collapse of the Soviet Union? But the Soviet military declared, back in the early 1980s, that a "military-technical revolution" (MTR) was afoot. Today, the Russians argue that precision-guided, non-nuclear, deep-strike weapons, and the systems used to integrate them, are revolutionizing all aspects of military art and force structure—and elevating combat capabilities by a million-fold. Russia's first official military doctrine, approved by President Boris Yeltsin and the Security Council in November 1993, clearly reflects the ongoing civil-military consensus on the nature and requirements of the MTR. The document directs that research and development (R&D) efforts focus above all on the development of the new deep-strike weapons, information weapons (advanced C^3I systems), and electronic warfare (EW) assets.

In the short run—despite the ongoing political gridlock and economic chaos—the Russian General Staff continues to devise sophisticated technical and operational counters to the new technologies of "air-space war." For the long term, they have oriented most of their limited resources toward creating an infrastructure that ensures rapid surge production of these technologies as the situation warrants. And for the transitional period in between, they have revived the nuclear war-fighting option to cope with a variety of worst-case scenarios. Civilian and military leaders agree that the potential for waging air-space war and competing in the MTR are Russia's main guarantees for preserving great-power status.

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The Russian Image of Future War

According to Russian military scientists, such as General-Major V. Slipchenko, head of the Scientific-Research Department of the General Staff Academy, warfare has evolved through at least five generations. The first generation of warfare involved infantry and cavalry without firearms. The second generation saw the development of gunpowder and smooth-bore firearms. Rifled small-arms and tube artillery were introduced in the third generation of wars. In the fourth generation, automatic weapons, tanks, military aircraft, signal equipment, and powerful new means of transporting weapons were used. The fifth generation of warfare includes, of course, nuclear weapons. In the impending sixth generation of warfare, a superior military will be able, through advanced data-processing and C^3I systems, smart weaponry, EW and air defense assets, and space-based reconnaissance and weaponry, to destroy discrete targets and inflict military and political defeat on an enemy, all at a low cost in casualties and without occupying enemy territory.[1]

In sixth-generation warfare, the main vector of combat will be the aerospace coordinate, with operations on the ground playing the supporting role.

As the newest precision weapons under development and testing enter the inventory, Slipchenko foresees corresponding changes in the structure of armed forces and the forms and methods of their employment. Finally, he expects yet another panoply of futuristic technologies to enter the inventory by the turn of the century: directed-energy weapons, automatic and automated high-precision weapons systems, more powerful explosives, deep-penetration ammunition, and super high-speed data processing and electronic warfare equipment. Space will become a new theater of military operations, even as the United States and Russia significantly reduce offensive nuclear weapons. These nuclear weapons will be replaced by non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons. Gradually, large ground-force operations and nuclear missiles will recede, being replaced by high-precision conventional weapons.

Sixth-generation warfare has already changed the laws of combat and the principles of military science. In past generations, the battlefield was confined to the earth's surface, with the vertical coordinate (primarily air) playing an auxiliary or supporting role. In future wars, the emphasis will be reversed. The main vector of combat will be the vertical or aerospace coordinate, with operations on the ground playing the supporting role.

[1] Author's conversations with General-Major V. Slipchenko, Moscow, May 1993.

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Thus, as past belligerents relied on ground forces to destroy an enemy's military assets, occupy his territory, and overthrow his political system, future non-nuclear strategic air-space offensives will efface an enemy's most important military and economic facilities, rendering him impotent to counterattack. As Defense Minister P. Grachev put it in early 1993: "If a war begins, it will be with an *air-space offensive operation by both sides.* Strikes on the main facilities and troops will be made from space and from the air [emphasis added]."[2] The first facilities to be hit would be nuclear power plants, chemical plants, dams, and hydroelectric centers, creating huge zones of radiation, chemical contamination, and flooding. In such a war, there will be no front.

Russian Views on Future Trends

In analyzing the destructive properties of various types of weapons, General-Lieutenant A. Paliy notes that despite their diversity, the effect on targets is determined primarily by three basic forms of energy—physical, chemical, and biological.[3] Thus, the new weapons of war inflict not only mechanical (kinetic) destruction, but also acoustic, electro-magnetic, and thermal destruction. They disrupt or destroy personnel, installations, and structures; affect people's minds and behavior; and inflict delayed hereditary, carcinogenic, fetal, or environmental damage. Inasmuch as there are properties common inherent to acoustic, electromagnetic, and certain other kinds of destruction that are of a radiated (wave) nature, they may all be classified conditionally as "radiated destruction." The Russians term the infliction of such damage, as well as protection against it, "radiated warfare," and already means of radiated destruction—laser, radio-frequency, accelerator, and infrasonic—are beginning to enter the inventory (see table 1).

Radiating weapons and equipment for electronic countermeasures (ECM) use one and the same kind of energy, but, depending on their magnitude, they can do anything from suppress the operation of enemy electronics, to irradiate personnel and hardware, to reduce national infrastructure to chaos. Therefore, ECM should be considered a type of radiated destruction, and EW a component part of radiated warfare and warfare as a whole.

Reconnaissance, of course, remains a critical element of any battle and *not a kind of support,* since effective destruction and protection of targets is possible only after timely identification of their composition and coordinates. The *unity* of reconnaissance and combat is illustrated by the introduction of "reconnaissance-strike" and "reconnaissance-fire complexes" to armed forces. According to Soviet and Russian military scientists, reconnaissance-strike (stra-

[2] Interview with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, "General Grachev on the Army and on the Soldier," *Argumenty i fakty,* Feb. 1993, pp. 1–2.

[3] General-Lieutenant A.I. Paliy, "A Methodology for Classifying the Means and Forces of Warfare," *Voennaya mysl',* Feb. 1993, pp. 53–60.

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Table 1
Means of "Radiated Destruction"

Casualty and Damage Effect (Destruction)	Means of Destruction (Weapons)	Nature of Casualty and Damage Effect on Targets
Acoustic	•Infrasonic weapons •Acoustic generators •Explosions generating (forming) acoustic energy •Means of acoustic (sonar) suppression	•Functional and structural disturbances in living organisms and demoralization or death of people •Suppression of operation or disabling of acoustic equipment, diversion from targets of weapons guided by acoustic (sonar) means •Destruction of earth's ozonosphere
Electromagnetic	•Laser and radio-frequency weapons •Nuclear weapons (electromagnetic pulse) •Means of electromagnetic suppression	•Destruction of cells of living organisms •Charring, partial fusion, or vaporization of surface of objects •Structural changes of equipment materials •Suppression of operation or disabling of electronics and of electrical and optical devices •Effect on minds, behavior, and reproductive function of humans
Radiation	•Particle-beam weapons •Nuclear weapons (ionizing) •Elementary particle accelerators •Nuclear power plants •Radiological weapons •Radioactive substances	•Ionization, structural changes (destruction), other disturbances of physical and chemical processes in organisms, military equipment materials, structures, and environment •Radiation sickness •Genetic changes in populations

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tegic) and reconnaissance-fire (operational and tactical) complexes consist of a triad of 1) highly effective ground-, air-, and space-based reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) systems; 2) deep-strike systems; and 3) intelligent command-and-control systems that ensure the delivery of strikes in *real time.* The same is true, in Russian theory, of *maskirovka* (cover, concealment, and deception). Its means and techniques contribute to protection against destruction and ECM, to increased survivability, and to preservation of

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the combat effectiveness of forces. In the sixth generation of warfare, *maskirovka* will outgrow its role as combat support and become a round-the-clock duty of personnel, whether in peace or wartime.

Russian Views of Space-Based Systems

Like its Soviet predecessor, the Russian military argues that outer space must be viewed as a potential theater of military actions.

The Persian Gulf operation demonstrated the importance of space systems for communications, navigation, reconnaissance, and missile launch warning. At the same time, the nature of threats from space is being revised in connection with the appearance in a number of developing countries of the capability of inserting objects into space for support purposes.[4] Russian military spokesmen have repeatedly warned that the militarization of outer space requires responsive measures. It is presently impossible, they argue, to ignore the shift of warfare into space, or the American drive toward supremacy in space. According to Russian military scientists, by the year 2000, the United States will be able to deploy orbital groupings capable of the following: effectively combatting strategic missiles in flight and, if necessary, sealing off outer space; seizing the most important spheres of near-earth space; and delivering strikes from space with precision weapons or new-generation mass-destruction weapons against ground, sea, and airborne targets in order to deter enemy attacks and reinforce operations of U.S. and allied forces.[5] But according to the Russians, their own scientists and economy are capable of creating corresponding systems and countersystems. A need has matured for Russia to have its own space forces to oppose the enemy, to create ABM systems, and to conduct space surveillance. It is necessary, they argue, to prepare for space warfare.[6]

In the Russian view, the forms of military operations in near-earth space will soon include the following: operations to destroy strategic nuclear (or conventional) weapons in flight; operations to destroy or prevent deployment of enemy satellites; operations to defeat orbital and ground space groupings and to seize and hold strategically (operationally) important spheres of near-earth space; operations to suppress radio-technical equipment of orbital and ground groupings of space units; and strikes delivered from outer space by "supernew weapons of mass destruction capable of paralyzing command and control of a state or coalition of states and groupings of its (their) armed forces for a

[4] For example, see Captain First Rank V.M. Golitsin, "Foreign Military Doctrines," *Voennaya mysl'*, July 1992, Special Edition, pp. 14–20.

[5] For example, see Colonel-General V. Ya. Abolins, "Certain Problems of Preparing the Country and the Russian Armed Forces to Repel Aggression," *Voennaya mysl'*, July 1992, Special Edition, pp. 84–92.

[6] For example, see General-Major M.A. Borchev, "On the CIS Military Organization," *Voennaya mysl'*, March 1993, pp. 2–10.

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certain period of time, or attaining a mass effect on the country's population without destroying installations and the environment."[7]

The increased power, accuracy, and swiftness of strikes against enemy forces, as well as the struggle for superiority in the air-space above ocean and sea areas, will be typical of military operations at sea. All-weather space reconnaissance and other kinds of space support can detect the heading and speed of weapons, surface ships, and submarines at any time of day and provide precision weapons systems with data for essentially real-time engagement. The importance of maneuver and concealment increases under these conditions, and submarines are forced to operate at a great depth. In the future, strikes against naval targets also will be accomplished from space.

Theory of Combat Systems

Like their Soviet predecessors, Russian experts see integration as critical—comprehensive integration into unified systems, at the level of divisions and armies, of reconnaissance equipment, weapons, ECM equipment, and equipment for the command and control of forces and weapons. The essence of this integration is to ensure the continuous, coordinated collection and processing of information, and to communicate data instantaneously to EW units. Under such conditions, warfare represents a process wherein complex, open, developing, dynamic operational-tactical structures—combat systems—exert a mutual effect on each other. Distinguishing features of the combat system concept include the following:

> It is an integral formation based on a grouping of army or navy forces; reconnaissance, target designation, and EW equipment; an automated command-and-control system; and other support systems. It is created by organizing coordination among them, and it is capable of changing its structure and function depending on situation conditions. (The synergy of coordinated systems is said to exceed the sum of the combat potentials of individual systems.)
>
> The goal of creating combat systems under conditions of implementing a defensive doctrine is to prevent damage inflicted by the enemy on force groupings and installations on friendly territory and on the territory of allied countries, force the enemy to give up aggressive plans, and, if necessary, disrupt the functioning of his combat system.

[7] Ibid.

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> The combat system is hierarchic; each of its components is a complex system performing a particular mission, while it represents a component (subsystem) of an even more complex combat system (supersystem). The combat system is controllable with respect to the supersystem and controlling with respect to its subsystems.[8]

Reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire complexes are an example of the simplest combat systems on a tactical scale. Their capabilities have substantially expanded, owing to the integration of weapons, reconnaissance equipment, and automated control systems. In the opinion of "foreign specialists," integrated attack systems make it possible to destroy a considerable portion of enemy targets even before making contact with the enemy and before committing friendly forces.

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Cardinal changes should be expected in the nature of warfare after combat systems of an operational and strategic scale appear on opposing sides. According to "foreign press reports," basic efforts of the U.S. and NATO military leadership are specifically directed at this. The Russians believe that by the year 2000, an operational system will be able to issue data on an overall number of targets (3,500–4,000 targets for 1,200 strike aircraft) at the level of European theaters of military action in one minute. They are also considering a procedure for centralized decision making for engagement of targets by a large number of offensive weapons in short time periods. They confirm the advisability of creating a unified, integrated, combined-arms system in which not only reconnaissance equipment, weapons, and EW equipment but also tactical command-and-control equipment would interface.

A systems-oriented, balanced armed forces development aimed at creating combat systems capable of opposing future enemy systems is a critical parameter of Russian military development at the present time. As a result, the Russian military argues for radical change in its "arms development" concept. Heretofore, Soviet doctrine decreed that creation of means—tanks, aircraft, submarines, surface ships, radar systems—was the primary object of research, design, testing, and evaluation on the assumption that each new model would

[8] For example, see Captain First Rank E. Shevelev et al., "A Scientific Discipline—Combat Systems Theory," *Tekhnika i vooruzhenie,* Jan.–Feb. 1992, pp. 16–17, 32.

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be more sophisticated than previous ones. Such an approach was called "ascending, straight-line arms development." In the sixth generation, the *goal,* not the means, must be the driving force behind research, development, testing, and evaluation; and scarce resources must go to whatever military branch or laboratory promises to develop technology relevant to the goal identified.

The first step on the path to a systems-oriented, balanced development of the Russian armed forces is to ensure that any request to develop a new weapon justify itself in terms of a combat system designed specifically to oppose projected enemy systems. Such a revolution in military research-and-development would clearly increase the effectiveness of the Russian military-industrial complex, but it would require a wholesale political assault on the vested interests of entrenched ministries, departments, design bureaus, and plants used to regular budgets and ascending, straight-line development of military technology. A systems-oriented approach, after all, precludes programs that do not meet modern demands, and would radically alter the method of evaluating priorities in military development. Any distribution of expenditures among branches of the armed forces would be justified only if it produced corresponding combat systems. For example, it would be inadvisable to construct the most sophisticated ship if it could not be employed in today's complex naval operations.

Electronic-Fire Operation

Like their Soviet predecessors, Russian military scientists view Desert Storm as the paradigm of future strategy, operational art, and tactics. Desert Storm is said to represent one of those rare "turning points" in military affairs that stand at the juncture of two epochs. It has ended the era of multi-million-man armies and begun the era of high-tech wars fought in the air, space, and airwaves. The revolutionary nature of Desert Storm lies in its having generated such new forms of combat action as electronic-fire engagement, remote-controlled battle, air-assault raids, deep mobile operations, and (on the Iraqi side) ecological warfare. The electronic-fire engagement played a special role in Desert Storm as the aggregate of massive and lengthy aerospace, missile, naval, and electronic strikes. It was the principal content of the operation and predetermined its successful outcome. In this case, the novelty lay in the fact that electronic countermeasures acted as a special weapon that was equivalent to fire strikes in effectiveness.

First, Desert Storm was characterized by the significant duration of the electronic-fire phase (thirty-eight days), which surpassed the ground operations phase (four days) by many times. Secondly, a large amount of the latest EW equipment, airborne early-warning and control aircraft, and radar systems for aerial reconnaissance of ground targets and strike delivery control took part in the engagement. The employment of EW equipment previously unknown to the enemy ensured surprise. Thirdly, all the most important enemy targets were continuously subjected to electronic-fire pressure to the full depth of the operational theatre, permitting the allies to disrupt enemy command-and-control

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and communications systems simultaneously at all command levels. Fourthly, electronic and fire strikes were precisely coordinated by objective, place, and time, thus reinforcing each other. Lastly, the intensity of the air strikes (in some phases up to two thousand to three thousand sorties per day) had no precedent in any previous war.

The result of these five factors was that the Iraqis lost almost all combat effectiveness even before the beginning of the ground war, permitting the allies' armored formations to complete the enemy's defeat without encountering organized resistance. The Russians conclude that one of the characteristic features of the new warfare is that its objectives can be achieved under certain conditions even without ground troops invading enemy territory—by conducting an electronic-fire engagement alone. That confirms the previous conclusion that large masses of ground troops will not be required in the future.

Admiral Pirumov argues that the effectiveness of information systems has led developed countries to acknowledge the dominant role of the "electronic-fire" concept of waging war.[9] In force structure and equipment, this concept manifests itself not in competing for numerical superiority in motorized rifle or tank formations, but in using industrial and technological advantages to create high-precision sea- and aerospace-based weapons and global command-and-control systems that facilitate "surprise first and subsequent massed radioelectronic and fire strikes that decide the outcome of the war without the invasion of ground forces." Pirumov argues further that war's main objective is shifting away from seizure of the enemy's territory toward 1) "neutralizing his political or military-economic potential—eliminating a 'competitor,'" and 2) "ensuring the victor's supremacy in the political arena or in raw materials and sales markets." What makes this shift possible is the electronic-fire operation, beginning with a surprise air attack. Pirumov concludes by arguing that Russia's scarce defense resources must be deployed to enhance not only the fire component of combat but especially the information component.

Countering the MTR

According to General Staff analyses, a classification of possible measures for protecting the armed forces against the new technologies of the MTR consists of the following:

> Active warfare: destruction of platforms, command-and-control equipment, and weapons elements by SAM complexes (systems); electronic and electro-optical suppression of weapons systems by EW equipment.

[9] Rear-Admiral V.S. Pirumov, "Two Aspects of Parity and Defense Sufficiency," *Voennaya mysl'*, Mar. 1993, pp. 26–34.

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> Passive protection: reduction of one's own radar or optical signature, and of emitted signals; use of diversionary means; mobility, armoring.
>
> Systems protection: creation of integrated air defense systems realizing the integration of air defense and EW assets; creation of alert radar field at high, medium, and low altitudes; support of information communications with reconnaissance systems of other branches of the armed forces.[10]

In addition, Russian military experts have suggested specific counters to the Tomahawk missile. The arming of NATO surface vessels with Tomahawk cruise missiles able to strike at coastal facilities from long range has posed a critical problem—keeping the enemy ships from approaching friendly coastlines to the missile-launch line. That can be solved by a new operational anti-ship missile system with a range comparable to that of the Tomahawk. Such systems, placed on mobile launchers and maneuvering freely along the coast, should be able to hit surface targets on the approaches to missile-launch lines. And they, in combination with other shore-based missile systems and artillery, will be the foundation of a highly effective system for action against naval targets, making it possible to increase return fire to the extent that enemy vessels approach the coast.

Russian military scientists have also examined the following specific counters to a variety of systems.

> Against reconnaissance-strike complexes: fighters against airborne elements (reconnaissance and communications relay aircraft); front air operation against ground elements.
>
> Against stealth: detection—radar, acoustic, laser sensors (multi-positional and multi-frequency radars; over-the-horizon radars; holographic radars; air- and space-based radars, EM, infrared systems, etc.; solid radar field); destruction (SAMs and fighter aircraft—S-300s, BUK SAMs and MiG-31s, SU-27s, and follow-ons).
>
> Against non-traditional weapons: detection and destruction of facilities, strikes by ground- and air-based radiotechnical systems; jam communications and guidance systems; troop and equipment protection—fortifications, aerosols, etc.

[10] Mary C. FitzGerald, "The Impact of the Military-Technical Revolution on Russian Military Affairs: Vols. 1 and 2," Hudson Institute Report #HI-4209, Aug. 20, 1993.

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Against EW systems: affect software—for example, computer viruses; strikes with beam, super-high-frequency, and, especially, electromagnetic pulse weapons; electronic protection and *maskirovka.*

Against RSTA systems: advanced anti-radar missiles, advanced anti-radar drones.

Against command-and-control systems: perturbations of environment (tectonic); system failures (non-lethal weapons); nuclear weapons; advanced conventional munitions; computer viruses.[11]

Defensive Fire-Strike Operation

In late 1992, Russian military scientists began to describe the new "defensive fire-strike operation" designed to counter the new technologies of the MTR. They noted that by analyzing the development of the armed forces of leading world states and the practice of deploying them in military conflicts, it is possible to forecast variants of the beginning of armed conflict in a future war. The aggressor probably will begin military operations with an offensive air operation aimed at the victim's aviation, air defense, communication, and infrastructure.[12] Subsequently, the enemy command will strive to achieve war objectives either by offensive operations by groupings of ground troops with wide use of landing and raiding forces, or without the use of ground groupings, limiting itself to presenting ultimatums with the threat of limited (regional) use of nuclear weapons.

Translating Gulf war scenarios to the Central European theater, the Russians fear that NATO may, by the late 1990s, obtain a unique opportunity to achieve the principal goals of war through fire effect without combat by major ground formations.

It therefore behooves the Russian military to devise means of surviving and repelling the first and subsequent strikes of enemy precision weapons and aircraft. But the insufficient number of airfields for aircraft dispersal and the insufficient number of reinforced concrete shelters for aircraft will complicate the Russian front commander's efforts to defend his installations and command and control. The solution to this problem lies in carrying out the following measures.

First, redeploy a large portion of strike aircraft from Western regions into the interior of the country even in peacetime. That will permit making them unreachable by enemy tactical aircraft and cruise missiles and thereby

[11] FitzGerald, "Military-Technical Revolution."

[12] Colonel A.M. Fufayev, "The Problem of Fire Destruction of the Enemy in the First Defensive Operation," *Voennaya mysl',* Dec. 1992, pp. 8–15.

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will sharply improve survivability. Secondly, leave fighter, ground attack, and army aviation in the border zone, dispersing it by using freed-up airfields equipped with reliable shelters and aircraft mock-ups. Gulf war experience demonstrates that thousands of mock-ups made from synthetic materials coated with metallized paint and supplied with thermal emitters represented dummy targets on Iraqi territory against which coalition aircraft delivered repeated strikes. Thirdly, disrupt the enemy's tactical air command-and-control (navigation) systems by jamming or destroying the NATO E-3A AWACS radar early-warning and control aircraft.

Operations of attack aviation will have to be concentrated on uncovering and delivering strikes against ground elements of the enemy's tactical air command-and-control (navigation) system, which may be deployed in advance (several days ahead) near Russian borders. Their destruction will hamper enemy strike aircraft in approaching targets, which will substantially reduce the effectiveness of their operations. In addition, in areas where centers of front operational stability are located, it is desirable to distort the radar (television, thermal, and so on) map of the terrain by making returns of objects similar to the natural background, concealing reference points, and changing the configuration of bodies of water, river channels, and so forth.

Clearly, air defense and EW personnel and equipment will play a critical role in repelling a first massive strike. But, instead of distributing them evenly throughout the defense zone, it is advisable to use them to cover centers of front operational stability, strengthening air defense specifically in those areas against which the enemy will strive to deliver strikes by precision weapons and tactical aviation. The air defense and EW grouping must destroy a considerable portion of enemy air weapons and disrupt the air offensive.

Finally, Russian forces must take aggressive action from the outset of an engagement against targets of vital importance to the enemy, including command posts, ground command-and-control centers, reconnaissance and air defense system elements, as well as various jammers. It makes sense to include among vitally important targets those that feed the enemy's information pipeline since, in sixth-generation warfare, the side with the most information can seize the initiative. In sum, the coming air-space battle will be a furious "information-fire engagement" sufficient to decide the issue long before ground groupings even make immediate contact.

Resort to Nuclear Weapons

In 1982, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev announced the Soviet "no-first-use" pledge with regard to nuclear weapons. This pledge reflected above all the Soviet Union's confidence that it had achieved conventional superiority over the West. In late 1991, however, the military began to question the utility of such a pledge—and now Russia's official military doctrine has repudiated it. The new stance stems logically from their loss of quantitative superiority in conventional arms, from the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

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and, especially, from the Russians' lag in the MTR as epitomized by Desert Storm.

In December 1991, *Krasnaya zvezda* noted that, owing to Russia's no-first-use pledge, an aggressor would be able by conventional weapon strikes to upset the functioning of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, or so reduce their effectiveness that the result would be tantamount to that of a nuclear strike. Smart weapons, therefore, have rendered the old nuclear threshold meaningless.[13] Five months later, a draft of Russia's new military doctrine was published in *Military Thought*.[14] In light of prior attacks on the no-first-use pledge, one of its new provisions was extremely noteworthy. The document stated that *conventional* strikes on Russia's nuclear or other "dangerous" targets will be viewed as an escalation to weapons of mass destruction—which implied that such strikes will elicit a *nuclear* response. The official military doctrine approved by Yeltsin and his Security Council in November 1993 confirms this provision.

According to Vice-Admiral R. Golosov, the United States has achieved significant success in creating conventionally armed high-precision weapons, especially air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The high effectiveness of these weapons, making it possible selectively to hit small targets, was tested in Iraq. Since the United States could use these weapons to attack Russia's strategic nuclear forces, retaliatory actions using multiple warhead ICBMs are said to be Russia's sole means of inflicting adequate damage on the aggressor. Obviously, Golosov concludes, the START treaty should declare that strikes against strategic nuclear forces by conventional weapons must trigger the use of nuclear weapons by Russia.[15]

Russian military scientists insist that the new conventional weapons (above all, those of the United States) have disturbed the military-strategic equilibrium by threatening to deprive Russia of assured retaliation in the event of war. Such vulnerability, in turn, threatens Russia with nuclear blackmail, hence her rejection of the obligation of no-first use of nuclear weapons.[16]

Besides threatening a nuclear response to conventional strikes on nuclear and ecologically dangerous targets, Russian military figures have warned that tactical nuclear weapons could be used against the multi-million-man armies of such countries as China. Prominent military scientists have also begun to discuss "limited and strategic" nuclear strikes against aspiring members of the nuclear club: Iraq, North Korea, South Africa, etc. Space-based mini-nukes, earth-penetrating munitions, and other so-called clean third-generation nuclear weapons are said to be prime candidates for striking hardened underground nuclear facilities in such a scenario.

[13] Colonel A. Klimenko, "The CIS: Does It Need a Common Military Doctrine?" *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 26, 1991.

[14] "The Fundamentals of Russia's Military Doctrine," *Voennaya mysl'*, May 1992, Special Edition, pp. 3–9.

[15] Vice-Admiral R. Golosov, "Disarm, But Sensibly . . . ." *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1993.

[16] Colonel V.F. Grinko and Lieutenant Colonel S.I. Kokhan, "Deterrence Concepts and Strategic Stability under Current Conditions," *Voennaya mysl'*, Apr. 1993, pp. 14–21.

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Whither the Military-Industrial Complex?

According to Russian military experts, the Russian military-industrial complex currently operates at a level of 80 percent of the old Soviet military-industrial complex: 85 percent of Soviet production facilities; 90 percent of the Soviet research-and-development potential; 50 percent of Russia's industrial production; and 25 percent of the Russian population.

Military and civilian spokesmen alike argue the need for slashing procurement in order to increase expenditures on research and development.

According to Deputy Defense Minister A. Kokoshin, in May 1992,[17] the defense complex is Russia's main resource for maintaining a high ranking in the world economy. Thus, it would be wrong to view the defense industry merely as a source for armaments and military hardware. Such scientific and technical talent is concentrated there that it could become a most important component of the emerging market economy. But for that to happen, the defense sector will have to break out of its familiar, isolated world.

Russia's defense industry, he argues, is perhaps the main national resource for competitiveness in the area of industrial products (particularly scientific-intensive products) and services. That applies to numerous types of space equipment (especially missile construction), the aviation industry, ship-building, production of high-quality steels and composite materials, diverse types of laser equipment, computer software, and quantum electronics.

In a December 1992 interview,[18] Kokoshin stressed that Russia can procure additional funds for equipment and R&D by exporting weapons and combat equipment, and that the defense sector forms the "locomotive" of Russia's national industrial policy. He recommended starting with about thirty "companies" born of the military-industrial complex and evolving into high-tech producers for military and civilian needs. The locomotive enterprises—particularly from the aviation and space sectors—will then have a multiplier effect on the recovering Russian economy.

The current civil-military consensus on Russia's military-technical policy is clearly reflected in a consensus on priorities for the defense budget. Military and civilian spokesmen alike argue the need for slashing procurement in order to increase expenditures on R&D. The demand for increased R&D at the expense

[17] "Deputy Defense Minister on Long-Term Security," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter FBIS, *CEur*), June 1, 1992, pp. 27–29.

[18] "Deputy Minister Assesses Defense, Nuclear Policies," in FBIS, *CEur*, Dec. 3, 1992, p. 13, from Interfax, Dec. 3, 1992.

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of procurement has been reflected in both the 1992 and 1993 Russian defense budgets. In 1992, the defense budget represented a 71 percent cut in procurement as compared to a 16 percent cut in R&D—an amount said to be equal to the R&D resources belonging to other republics of the former Soviet Union. Throughout the year, additional funds were repeatedly allocated to prop up sagging defense enterprises. According to official statements, the 1992 budget constituted 5.2 percent of the Russian GNP. The 1993 budget of over six trillion rubles represented a 10 percent increase in the defense order, a 2 percent cut in R&D, and 16 percent of the Russian federal budget. Expenditures on R&D will remain constant through 1995, with a 4 percent annual increase beginning in 1996.

Proceeding from existing realities in the country's economic and sociopolitical life, the Defense Ministry has defined the main avenues for improving military-technical policy. They include the further development of the system of targeted-program planning of orders for the development and supply of arms and military equipment; the transfer of all defense budget appropriations to the Defense Ministry; the transition to a competitive contract system for R&D and procurement; the maximum possible conservation of the production, scientific, and intellectual potentials of enterprises, scientific research institutes, and design bureaus of the defense sectors of industry under conditions of conversion and reduced expenditures on defense; the removal from production of all models of arms and military equipment that are obsolete and do not meet modern requirements; and the exclusion from serial production of models that have not been completely worked out and have not been adopted.[19]

The clause in the new defense law prohibiting defense expenditures without Defense Ministry authorization is said to be critical. Although previously the military-industrial complex could dictate requirements for one piece of hardware or another, confronting the military with a *fait accompli* and obtaining the necessary funds, this practice is now ruled out—which will undoubtedly produce a saving in funds since all defense expenditure is concentrated in one pair of hands.[20] In addition, all profits from arms sales are channeled directly to the Russian Defense Ministry. According to military spokesmen, these funds are targeted for R&D efforts.

In July 1992, the Russian government also adopted a law prohibiting foreigners from visiting several regions and cities in the Russian Federation.[21] The list comprises sixteen regions and reads like a litany of the "closed cities" of the former Soviet VPK: part of the Kamchatka Peninsula; the city of Komsomolskna-Amure; the island of Russkiy in the Maritime Region; several areas in the Moscow, Leningrad, Orenburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Kaliningrad, Volgograd, Astrakhan, and Krasnoyarsk regions; Mordovia, and several other regions.

[19] "Need for New Weapons Acquisition Policy," in Joint Publications Research Service, *Military Affairs,* Feb. 3, 1993, p. 16, from *Rossiyskie vesti,* Jan. 29, 1993, p. 2.

[20] "Provisions of New Defense Law Explained," FBIS, *CEur,* Nov. 2, 1992, pp. 43–44, from "Defense: Roots and Crowns," *Rossiyskie vesti,* Oct. 29, 1992, p. 2.

[21] "Several Regions Closed to Foreign Visitors," FBIS, *CEur,* July 10, 1992, p. 33, from Moscow ITAR-TASS, July 9, 1992.

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In August 1992, both President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet closed all regions of the country involved in developing, producing, storing, or using weapons of mass destruction; processing radioactive materials; and accommodating military or other facilities that require a special security regime. The law specifies procedures for the creation or abolition of such territories, for redrawing their borders and determining the budgets, administrative agencies, and social guarantees for their residents.[22] The decrees represent an attempt to stem the "brain drain" and channel limited resources into high-priority R&D programs.

Russian experts, such as Colonel-General V. Miruk, have stressed that the course and outcome of combat operations largely are determined by the capabilities of arms and military equipment with which forces are equipped. Aerospace defense arms must ensure effective combat against low-altitude cruise missiles, operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles, and targets manufactured with small-reflecting-surface technology. Along with upgrading the weaponry of SAM troops and fighter aviation, automated command-and-control systems, and air defense information assets, the problem of creating effective reconnaissance equipment and new EW assets has advanced to the category of priority problems. Considering the limitations on defense appropriations for the next few years, that means creating new models of arms and military equipment and conducting preparatory measures that support a high degree of readiness to launch their serial production. *But serial production itself and deliveries to troops should begin only with the appearance of a direct military threat.*[23]

In a December 1992 interview, Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin thus noted that the Russian military is trying to change the entire cycle between fundamental research and the final product. One of the main objectives of Russian military-technical policy is to form a "scientific-technical reserve" in the sphere of "critical technologies," to include dual-purpose technologies.[24] This scientific-technical reserve is equivalent to the Western concept of "hovering," which permits defense industries to leap over a generation of weaponry by focusing on the development of prototypes and avoiding costly serial production. In other words, the R&D establishment fully develops a new technology or system concept without proceeding to the next stage of acquisition until the situation warrants. Thus, the May 1992 draft of Russia's new military doctrine called for 1) reducing procurement of arms and equipment in serial production, and 2) maintaining R&D and production capacities to ensure the development and "rapid surge production" of emerging combat technologies.

In June 1993, Defense Minister Grachev announced that the Russian Defense Ministry now has "prototype development plans for all types of

[22] "Decree Enacting Law on Closed Areas," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Russia,* Sept. 24, 1992, p. 33, from *Rossiyskaya gazeta,* Aug. 26, 1992, p. 6.

[23] For example, see Colonel-General V. Miruk, "National Air-Space Defense: Fundamentals of Its Organization under New Military-Political Conditions," *Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony,* Sept. 1992, pp. 3–7.

[24] A.A. Kokoshin, "Contradictions in the Formation and Paths of Development of Russian Military-Technical Policy," *Voennaya mysl',* Feb. 1993, pp. 2–9.

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armaments."[25] As Kokoshin has noted, "We are also planning . . . the establishment of a scientific and technical capability that would permit us to achieve *a qualitative leap* and to expand mass production of the most modern equipment at a time when we are a little richer [emphasis added]."[26]

New R&D Priorities

In a December 1992 interview, Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin stressed the critical importance for the future of the results of the research and development effort. Kokoshin has noted that because Russia attaches exceptionally great importance to technological innovations and a search for new ways to create highly effective weapons, a Directorate for Planning Orders for Advanced R&D of New Technologies is being formed within the Directorate of the Chief of Armaments.[27]

The priority in the area of "critical technologies" will play an important role in forming the Ministry of Defense's military-technical policy. The Military-Technical Program for the Most Important Technologies developed by the Russian Ministry of Defense was used for the first time in working out the R&D plan for 1992. The basic goals of this program are to develop designs that when implemented permit raising the qualitative level of arms and military equipment and *creating preconditions* for both the appearance of advanced weapons and assurance of the possibility of using these technologies in the non-defense sphere.

Kokoshin notes that Russia has already developed ten fundamental R&D programs that constitute its "critical defense technologies program": microelectronics; optico-electronics; "artificial intelligence" systems; EW systems; near-real-time navigational systems; aerodynamic systems; hydrodynamic systems; computer, radar, nuclear technologies; new types of explosives, fuel, gunpowder; production of engines and electrical energy.

All that indicates that, despite their economic malaise, the Russians are fixated on competing militarily in the future as they have done in the past, and doing so in a far more focused, efficient fashion.[28]

Russia's New Military Doctrine

On November 2, 1993, President Yeltsin and his Security Council finally approved Russia's first official military doctrine. Like the May 1992 draft doctrine,

[25] "Defense Minister Grachev Interviewed," FBIS, *CEur,* June 9, 1993, pp. 43–47, from *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* June 8, 1993, pp. 1, 5.

[26] Interview with A.A. Kokoshin, "First Deputy Defense Minister Interviewed," FBIS, *CEur,* Apr. 19, 1993, pp. 51–52, from Moscow Television, Apr. 17, 1993.

[27] Kokoshin, "Contradictions."

[28] Y. Mamchur, "If We Preserve the Defense Complex, We Will Protect Russia," *Krasnaya zvezda,* Nov. 3, 1992.

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the official document stresses Russia's need to acquire those cutting-edge military technologies most promising for the conduct of *both local and large-scale wars*.

For example, the new doctrine calls for the following:

> the priority allocation of appropriations for the most promising scientific and technological defense developments to ensure Russia's security and develop its economy;
>
> fundamental and applied research and experimental design developments that ensure Russia's ability to react effectively to emerging military threats and military-technical breakthroughs;
>
> the development and production of highly efficient C^3I, strategic warning, EW, and precision non-nuclear weapons systems, as well as systems for their information support;
>
> the application of the latest scientific and technical achievements for developing new generations of weapons, and the maximum use of mathematical models for assessing their combat efficiency before starting serial production.[29]

The new doctrine demands that Russia continue to field world-class weaponry in advance of competitors and maintain a mass mobilization capability in both personnel and industrial terms. To these ends, priority must go to the military in the allocation of financial and other resources. Defense conversion should be carried out "rationally," and it is clear from the context that this means as little as possible. The consequences of a move to a market economy are mentioned only insofar as it is necessary to minimize their effects on defense R&D and production.

Russia's official doctrine also declares the final demise of Gorbachev's "defensive doctrine," which was enunciated in 1987 and triggered the CFE reductions in Europe. The Russian armed forces will henceforth prepare for "both defensive and offensive operations *with a massive use of existing and future weapons irrespective of how the war starts and is conducted* [emphasis added]."[30]

The role of emerging military technologies is also reflected in the new doctrine's repudiation of the nuclear no-first-use pledge. At first glance, the dropping of the pledge could simply reflect the Russian military's recognition that its current situation is identical to that of the United States and NATO in the mid-1970s. Deprived of conventional superiority, it will be compelled to

[29] "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," *Voennaya mysl'*, Nov. 1993, Special Edition, pp. 3–23.

[30] Ibid., p. 18.

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cross the nuclear threshold first. As already noted, however, Russian military planners have articulated at least three worst-case scenarios for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. But the acquisition of emerging technologies will allow Russia to cope with these scenarios *without* resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.

Russia's official doctrine also declares the final demise of Gorbachev's "defensive doctrine."

Perhaps the most disturbing new mission for the Russian armed forces is that which involves the use of these forces in the near abroad. In 1992, the draft military doctrine announced that Russian forces would be used to protect Russian citizens and persons "ethnically and culturally" identified with Russia in the near abroad. The official doctrine now legally entitles the Russian armed forces to be based abroad whenever Russian and CIS interests require such a presence. These forces may be purely Russian or part of joint CIS groupings. Sources of danger or threat include the suppression of the "rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of Russian citizens in foreign states"; attacks on Russian military facilities in foreign states; armed provocations and incursions over Russia's borders or those of her allies; and preparations of military groups to move into the territory of Russia or its allies. Taken together, these dangers or threats give any number of excuses for intervention in the near abroad or, potentially, in such countries as Turkey, Iran, or Afghanistan.

Defense Minister Grachev and others have explained further that Russia must be prepared to participate in the following types of wars:

> Local: wars that originate from economic, territorial, religious, ethnic, etc., contradictions within the republics of the former USSR (for example, hot spots in the republics of the former USSR). According to Russia's official doctrine, "local" conflicts and wars will be waged with the entire available arsenal of weapons—"from light small arms to state-of-the-art arms and military hardware, including high-precision weapons systems."
>
> Regional: wars that originate from contiguous states that have large armies (for example, China and the Islamic countries).
>
> Large-scale/global: wars that originate from countries that possess strategic nuclear and/or non-nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of Russia. The United States and NATO are, in effect, warned not to provoke a return to the confrontation of the cold war. This would result from: upsetting strategic

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> stability; the qualitative and quantitative buildup of armaments; interference in the internal affairs of Russia; expansion of NATO; and forward basing of NATO forces in former Warsaw Pact states or other republics of the former Soviet Union.

Russian military experts also single out certain countries said to present a threat of warfare that crosses the aforementioned categories: Turkey; Algeria, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan (the so-called Muslim factor); Japan, South Korea, China.

But the complexion of Russia's political leadership—and Russia's success in achieving the MTR—will ultimately determine whether Russia becomes involved in "local," "regional," and "large-scale" wars. According to its experts, Russia currently ranks second to the United States in the emerging technologies, with Japan and possibly China close behind.

Conclusion

Despite political gridlock and economic chaos, the Russian General Staff continues its foresighted planning. For the short term, they are devising sophisticated technical and operational counters to the new technologies demonstrated in Desert Storm. For the long term, they have focused most of their limited resources on creating an infrastructure that ensures "rapid surge production" of new military technologies as the situation warrants—a dramatic shift away from the quantitative paradigm of the past toward the new, qualitative, "technological deterrence" of the future. For the transitional period, they have resurrected the concept of limited nuclear war, if only to deter potential enemies during their time of troubles. What comes through clearly is the strong civil-military consensus reflecting a continuing, *disproportionate* emphasis on military power as the basis for Russia's status in the international arena, and a deep determination not to stand aside while other countries forge the military-technological revolution that will usher in the "sixth generation" of warfare.

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Correspondence

Rethink the Nuclear Threat

To the Editor:

The call by John Powers and Joseph Muckerman in the Winter 1994 issue to "Rethink the Nuclear Threat" (pp. 99–107) is timely and useful. . . .

In a few areas, however, Powers and Muckerman present ideas that are either beyond our capability, counter-productive, or unnecessary. . . .

The idea that we can transform Russia. The authors argue that the United States should "spend whatever is necessary and reasonable to help assure the success of the Russian experiment with new forms of economic and political institutions." Unfortunately, what is "necessary" is almost certainly not "reasonable". . . . Sound policy will not be facilitated by overestimating our relatively limited influence on internal Russian affairs nor by underestimating the difficulty of targeting aid to accomplish internal restructuring. A far better approach is to concentrate on aid directly relevant to reducing the nuclear threat, such as nuclear weapons and dismantlement assistance under the Nunn-Lugar legislation. . . .

The implicit idea of "managing" proliferation. The suggestion that the United States "provide emerging nuclear weapons states with the technical assistance they need to better control their own weapons" sounds simple and wise. Unfortunately, it is neither. First, such assistance . . . could be construed as a violation of U.S. obligations under Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. . . . More generally, provision of this assistance requires *de facto* acceptance of proliferation . . . [and reduces] our ability to prevent other states from following in the path we ourselves have legitimized.

Reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence of emerging nuclear powers. There is no question that we must be able to deter nuclear powers and that the threat of devastating retaliation is an indispensable component of such deterrence. But retaliation need not and should not be nuclear. U.S. conventional capabilities are more than sufficient to inflict devastating retaliation on any emerging nuclear-weapon state. . . .

Special preparations to recover from a nuclear attack on the United States. While the emergence of new nuclear states would represent a major threat to . . . international stability, the direct threat to the United States is likely to be modest. A small attack would leave most of the nation unaffected and capable of organizing relief and reconstruction. Upgrading U.S. abilities to respond to

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disasters, as the authors recommend, should be justified on its own merits, not as a hedge against nuclear attack.

These disagreements should not obscure the soundness of most of the recommendations Powers and Muckerman offer. Some are already being implemented. . . .

The most important step of all, however, is simplest to advocate and the hardest to implement: to think seriously about nuclear weapons as an integral part of the future international security environment. It would be nice to think that the end of the cold war has made historical footnotes of nuclear weapons, but as Powers and Muckerman so convincingly demonstrate, that just isn't so. A world in which we did not have to think about these awesome weapons would be more comfortable, but it would not be our world. The authors have done all Americans a significant service by reminding us of that fact.

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Distinguished Fellow
Center for Naval Analyses
Alexandria, Virginia

To the Editor:

Bravo to *Orbis* and the authors Powers and Muckerman for taking on an issue about which much hand wringing occurs, but little productive thought. This is a good start to a dialog that should gain substance and resolve as April 1995 approaches and the NPT Conference is held to consider its future. We in the United States need to heighten our awareness of issues and the threat that is out there in the rapidly dissolving "international system" of the past.

Having agreed with the authors that dangers exist, I must take exception to their assertion that proliferation has only slowed in one case, South Africa. Over the last several months, some positive signs have been recorded: the North Korean agreement to IAEA inspection in February 1994; the agreements with the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan for the resolution of the nuclear warhead problem; the agreements by Argentina, Chile, and Brazil that resolved their remaining problems over the commercialization of nuclear energy to make the Treaty of Tlatelolco a reality in 1994; the agreement between the United States and Russia to stop targeting nuclear missiles against each other; and Argentina's positive nod toward the NPT. . . .

Of considerable concern is the situation with our long-standing partner in the world of nuclear terror, the Soviet Union. . . . Recently, the Russian military announced a revision in its own nuclear weapons employment policy, stating that it could no longer adhere to a "no first use" policy, but may have to resort to the use of nuclear weapons when confronting the defense of Russia in the context of a declining military establishment.

It is this strategic and budget-driven abandonment of both Russia's and America's conventional military capabilities that may present both nations with unacceptable dilemmas in the future in attempting to deal with proliferation

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worldwide. Another arrow must be added to the Powers and Muckerman quiver of policy options. That is an option of reinvigorated regional non-proliferation regimes to deal with the basic security causes of the quest for nuclear weapons. Such a regime could be established in Northeast Asia to address the needs of both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—South *and* North.

To date, the international community has not been interested in providing the necessary security environment to replace the loss of China and the Soviet Union as socialist guarantors for Pyongyang. There is a need for the rapid development of a Northeast Asian community that can handle the issue of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and do so in a way which meets the security needs of all participants. One such concept calls for the creation of a Limited Non-Nuclear Zone for Northeast Asia centered on a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. . . .

While the specifics of the zone . . . would need to be resolved by international dialog reflecting the security needs of all the states in Northeast Asia, its heart would be the removal of nuclear weapons from a zone within a 1,200- to 1,300-mile radius placed in the center of the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula and verified by a multinational force consisting of trained professionals from all the nations involved. The verification force would become . . . a working security community [that] . . . would help the area gain the stability needed to attain the regional economic development levels envisaged in such concepts as the Tumen River Project. Until the political and security viability of such schemes can be enhanced by regional security arrangements, necessary private capital inflow will be insufficient.

Any such concept requires the active and continued involvement of the United States, but calls also for creative leadership by the nations in the region themselves. Japan, for example, with a newly elected non-LDP government searching for a new and positive role for its security community, could finally bridge the unproductive security debates that have existed between Right and Left since Japan regained her independence after WWII. South Korea could find an inspired mission to provide the environment so that even North Korea could assume an active role in creating a regional security community. Russia, long interested in such multilateralism in Asia, would be expected to become an enthusiastic participant disposing of many of its East Asia-based nuclear weapons for early credit in START II. China, while less than an eager suitor, may find additional assurances that Japan, Taiwan, and the two Koreas would be verifiably free of nuclear weapons, would be worth the inconvenience of necessary weapons relocation from the zone. Mongolia would find such a zone useful for its continued economic development, and Taiwan, likewise, would rest easier with several of its potential rivals pledging a new non-nuclear future for most of East Asia. Could not this effort to reduce the nuclear residue of the cold war in Asia be the beginning of a cooperative security regime and a new framework of peace for Asia?

A program where all the nations of the region work shoulder-to-shoulder to build a security community that establishes the basis for regional prosperity

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and peace is as timely as it is right. Thus, while I applaud the authors and *Orbis* for starting this dialog, I hope the concepts of arms control, especially nuclear free zones where they might do some good, and a viable and extended NPT regime will be added to the debate.

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[N.B. Professor Endicott's hope begins to be fulfilled in the current issue of Orbis. *See the cluster of essays on regional approaches to non-proliferation.—eds.]*

Swallowing Serbian Aggression

To the Editor:

For more than fifty years, scholars have differentiated Western nationalism from Eastern nationalism. From Carlton J.H. Hayes to I. Greenfeld, civic nationalism has been associated with pluralist democracy and ethnic nationalism with homogenizing styles of thinking. In "Serbia Chooses Aggression" (Winter 1994, pp. 59–66), Nicholas J. Miller attempts to extend that dichotomy to Serbian (ethnic) and Croatian (civic) nationalism. Miller uses the term "collective nationalism" to describe the Serbian style of thinking, which he sees as inconsistent with pluralism. He contrasts this eastern style with what he calls the "creative solutions" offered by Croatian "constitutional nationalism."

One may doubt that the nationalism of Croatia's current government is particularly creative or that the nationalism prevalent in Croatia today differs greatly from that in Serbia. Robert Hayden has shown, for example, that Croatian constitutional nationalism alienates the minorities in that country. But the kinds of counterattacks that Miller's article surely will generate will get us nowhere. What I propose instead is to ask what the implications are if Miller is correct, which I believe he is[:] . . . every Serbian party has a nationalist program. In the December campaign, for example, the allegedly democratic opposition Depos [Democratic Movement of Serbia] demanded that Serbia, Montenegro, Vardar Macedonia (now part of Bulgaria), the Serb Krajinas, and all of Bosnia-Herzegovina except Western Herzegovina be united in one state. Miller correctly points out that views of this sort have penetrated deeply into Serbian political culture.

Because of the pervasiveness of this kind of nationalism among Serbs, Miller argues that the United Nations's blockade will never achieve its main purpose, which is to remove Milosevic in favor of leaders more willing to achieve peace. But in my view, the purpose of the blockade is no longer to remove Milosevic, if it ever was. In fact, at this point, the West probably does not want to remove Milosevic from power because he is the only leader who

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has the authority to force a settlement on the Serbs, especially the Serbs outside of Serbia proper.

Unfortunately, after a short military occupation, the West has only one realistic option in Serbia, and that is to work with Milosevic. Paradoxically, however, the major concessions that will be necessary to bring peace in Bosnia will probably not be made by Serbia but rather by the West. Serbs may eventually have to make relatively minor territorial concessions, but the West will have to swallow a much larger frog: the fait accompli of Serbian ethnic cleansing. . . .

Whatever the course of what I think may be the end game in Bosnia, I expect that some sort of peace will be worked out by the end of 1994. For this to happen, the negotiations, which have proven so fruitless in the past and seem so hopeless in the present, must not be abandoned. When the parties are ready, they need to have a venue in which they can make their agreement. The outcome may be victory for the aggressors (Serbia and Croatia) or an unexpected stalemate achieved by the victims (Bosnia), but in either case, the West will end up accepting Serbian aggression. . . .

Stability in the Balkans is impossible without a stable Serbia. There are some aspects of the Serbian situation that are outside of Western control, primarily the problems of Kosovo and Sandzak. Given the successes of ethnonationalism, it is only a matter of time until the Albanians seek a way out from under Serbian domination. But a vindictive peace against Serbia, which would be justified in terms of the intransigence and brutality of the deeply felt ethnic nationalism that Miller identifies, would be almost as erroneous a policy as the vindictive peace imposed on Germany after World War I. The horrible lesson of Bosnia is that ethnic cleansing and collective nationalism have worked in the narrow-minded and exclusivist terms the nationalists set for themselves. Their success can not provide the basis for long-term stability in a world in which interdependence is increasing. That stability will come only when the Western alliance finds a way to encourage a more pluralistic viewpoint in Serbia. We are doing our best to treat a none-too-democratic Romania in a way that will encourage pluralist democracy there, and when peace comes to Bosnia, we need to do the same with Serbia. That is not something we would choose in a costless world, but we have little choice but to hold our noses and press forward. The only other option is all-out war. Who knows? Maybe that is what we will choose. But I doubt it.

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Review Essays

Introduction

For many years, an *Orbis* trademark has been its idiosyncratic review section. Instead of publishing standard reviews, *Orbis* subjected a great number of volumes to small notices, which we called "squibs." Both among readers and reviewers, views on the desirability of the squib method were split. Some have found squibs convenient both because they were brief and because the sections composed a handy list of new publications. Others thought the squibs too brief for some purposes and too long for others, and the section of little use in alerting readers to those volumes the editors believed to be truly important.

Those who liked squibs have had the run of the roost for years; now it's the turn of those who prefer a different approach. With this issue, we are moving to longer reviews of fewer but, we trust, the most significant books. Sometimes reviews will scrutinize clusters of books on related topics, sometimes an individual volume.

We cannot promise to review everything of importance in the field, but we can promise that every review published will be worth the time and effort we—and you—invest in it. A wag once claimed that more people read book reviews than books. On the off chance that this is true, we hope that our new format will raise the quality of this vicarious reading even at the cost of reducing the economy afforded by squibs.

We will continue to rely on an august group of regular reviewers—contributing editors, we call them—to cover various geographical and functional areas of world politics. At present, this distinguished group includes: Bruce D. Berkowitz (military/strategic studies); Paul Bracken (Northeast Asia); Patrick Clawson (international economics); Mark Falcoff (Latin America); Lewis H. Gann (sub-Saharan Africa); Ross H. Munro (East and Southeast Asia); Michael Radu (post–cold war European geopolitics); Harvey Sicherman (Western and Central Europe); and Vladimir Tismaneanu (postcommunist societies). Yours truly, but not so august, covers the Middle East.

Some major areas, including world politics and U.S. foreign policy, we have left unassigned so that we may secure reviewers we believe specially suited to the emerging literature. We will invite guest reviewers in other areas, too, as the spirit moves us.

Be aware, finally, that *Orbis* does not accept unsolicited book reviews (it simply "isn't done"). We do, however, encourage correspondence regarding

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reviews that appear, even from authors of books that are reviewed. Tell us what you think . . . and if the language is printable, and otherwise edifying, we may very well print it.

Adam Garfinkle
Book Review Editor

Money Talks, Ideas Walk
by Patrick Clawson

Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy. By Judith Goldstein. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993. 268 pp. $39.95; $13.95, paper.)

Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy during the Interwar Years. By Beth Simmons. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994. 303 pp. $39.50.)

We appear to be living in an age in which the foreign policy of the United States is more a matter of buying and selling this and that than safeguarding and advancing the national interest as more broadly and traditionally conceived. The present incumbent in the White House emphasizes economic renewal at home as the best guarantee of true American security, and in the actual pursuit of foreign affairs seems to summon enthusiasm for study or action primarily when U.S. techno-wonders are to be hawked. Now that Mr. Clinton has traded the battle fleet for the costermonger's wagon, what, if anything, does the academy have to say to us about such a state of affairs concerning the affairs of state? Surprisingly, quite a lot.

This may seem a whimsical conclusion at first blush. After all, contemporary debates among experts on international economic policy descend into the mind-numbing minutiae of econometric models: How many jobs will NAFTA create or destroy? How much will the U.S. trade deficit with Japan shrink if the dollar trades at 100 yen instead of 120? How much are Japan's imports reduced by administrative regulations? Economists strain to answer such questions with an air of scientific accuracy in order to bolster their authority, even though science is not exactly what they're up to. To be sure, economists surge forward defending their myriad models, each purporting to show definitive results, but each model coincides parsimoniously with the political inclinations of the statistician.

Therefore, statistical studies do not provide a fully satisfactory method to decide among alternative international economic policies, or to probe the contemporary link between economic goals and political ambition. But the two books reviewed here veritably do. Judith Goldstein's *Ideas, Interests, and*

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American Trade Policy and Beth Simmons's *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy during the Interwar Years* are not strictly economic analyses. Rather, they are excursions in economic history. Both authors are honest historians, each one far enough removed from present confabulations to examine the past on its own terms. Neither seems particularly interested in making points about contemporary debates; they are rather more disposed to expend energy to show that economic history can illuminate the way forward. Ironically, this lack of interest in contemporary matters is probably the best guarantee of contemporary utility, partly because it is only by stepping back that one appreciates economics as one of the human sciences, having far more in common with sociology and cultural anthropology than the current crop of macroeconomists would have us believe.

Goldstein's choice of venue is the history of the choice between free trade and various forms of protectionism. Her thesis is that, even in this most material of materialist domains, trade policy is determined by ideas as well as by interests. She disputes the conventional argument that the nineteenth-century American debate between protectionists and free-traders reflected sectional interests, with the industrial northeast wanting to shelter its infant industries and the agricultural south wanting cheap manufactured goods.

Ideas alone do not determine policy. Economists came to a broad consensus in favor of free trade decades before public policy changed direction.

Her key historical example is the protectionist policy of the Republican Party from the Civil War through the Depression. The Republicans originally adopted protectionism in the belief that it served the interests of free labor, their core constituency of the period. By the 1890s, protectionism clearly worked against America's narrow and immediate material interest: as the world's major manufacturing nation, the United States could have used freer trade to expand its sales abroad without worrying overly much that foreign competition would displace workers at home. Goldstein argues that while protectionism was not the optimal policy for this period, it did not interfere much with domesticially based American growth and, therefore, politicians were not forced to think through the consequences of their traditional stance. When economic problems grew acute during the Depression, the first impulse of beseiged politicians was to reinforce their long-time policy stance—that is, to reinforce protectionism—rather than to consider whether a new set of policies was appropriate. In short, the qualities inherent in the structure of ideas, with all their arational cognitive coping mechanisms, far better explain what actually occurred than do changes in the balance of forces among various material interests.

But ideas alone do not determine policy. Goldstein demonstrates that economists came to a broad consensus in favor of free trade decades before public policy changed in that direction. She argues that economic theories were

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long unable to influence public policy because they were too abstract and because economists commanded little respect. The eventual change in policy came from a marrying of the pro-free trade intellectual position with the practical needs of politicians: Franklin Roosevelt's desire to expand the powers of the presidency made him eager to gain authority to negotiate reciprocal agreements lowering tariffs, and this in turn launched the process of trade liberalization.

In her short discussion of contemporary policy, Goldstein argues that U.S. trade policy is determined by a deep commitment to free trade rather than by any empirical evidence that free trade continues to be advantageous. That seems an overstatement. To be sure, the case for free trade is not as self-evident to many Americans as it once was: economists have no good explanation for the low growth rates of the last twenty years, and it is attractive to blame the stagnant wages of the unskilled on the growth in international trade. But, free trade continues to offer many benefits, some of which go beyond classical arguments over comparative advantage. For example, free trade encourages technological innovation and is thus a major factor in generating economic growth.

Beth Simmons examines a related set of issues about international economic policy, namely, why countries maintained or abandoned the gold standard during the 1919–1939 period. The usual argument here is that the decision was based on straightforward national material interest: those who thought they could benefit from beggar-thy-neighbor policies left the gold standard to engage in competitive devaluations, in which each country tried to make its products cheaper relative to those from other countries. She shows that, in fact, the major determinant of who devalued and who defended the currency was not objective economic interest but rather the character of the political party in power. In 1931 Britain, 1933 America, and 1936 France, left-wing governments were determined to stimulate output, and they believed the best way to do that would be to devalue the currency and simultaneously begin to lower tariffs. In 1934–36 Belgium and 1924–27 France, on the other hand, right-wing governments were more interested in preventing inflation and preserving national power. They thought the best way to accomplish these aims was to defend the currency's value and simultaneously raise tariffs.

Simmons goes to great length, with moderate success, to show that domestic political considerations swamped economic conditions and structural constraints as major factors in determining whether a country left the gold standard or not. Her thesis is that governments could weather currency crises without devaluation, but they could not withstand an erosion of domestic political support for a strong currency. She argues that, in addition to the conservative or liberal bent of the government, the most important element in the decision to devalue were political institutions rather than technical economic factors: devaluations occurred more quickly where the central banks were less independent and the trade union movement more powerful.

Simmons includes considerable statistical analysis to prove her thesis, but this package is not particularly helpful in advancing her case. Her models are too simple to provide convincing statistical evidence, yet even those simple

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models require such a lengthy presentation as to drive the reader's attention away from the basic historical account. She is also overly concerned about the relationship between her work and political science theory, which seems trivial compared to the powerful lessons she has to teach about actual public policy dynamics.

The main lesson to learn from these historical accounts is that governments adopt economic policies that fit the ideas of the time and the needs of the politicians, not necessarily those that match the economic interests of the nation. Another, perhaps more charitable, way of stating the same point is to say that politicians support policies that the temper of the times thinks will advance the broader interests of the nation. If national leaders know or suspect that those policies will harm material prosperity, they may feel—and justifiably so—that other goals (such as the preservation of stability, as represented by the continued rule of their party) are more important. If they don't know, then they are as much victims of intellectual fashion as the wayward theorists who promote that fashion.

Goldberg's and Simmons's accounts of what has determined international economic policy in the past should be required reading for Clinton administration economists who think that policy ought to be decided on the basis of what works, that is, on empirical analysis of what policy serves best. In point of fact, policy has been and will continue to be influenced by the general intellectual framework and by the overall political tenor of the times much more than by the econometric model that produces the best statistical fit in a theoretical world devoid of ambition and vision.

Rising Sun in a Stormy Sky
by David Gross

Postwar Japan as History. Edited by Andrew Gordon. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 496 pp. $17.00, paper.)

Japan: Beyond the End of History. By David Williams. (London: Routledge, 1994. 238 pp. $25.00, paper.)

What Is Japan?: Contradictions and Transformations. By Taichi Sakaiya. (New York: Kodansha International, 1993. 312 pp. $25.00.)

Atarashi Nihon no tame ni (To build a new Japan). By Taichi Sakaiya and Hiroshi Kato. (Tokyo: Kodansha Press, 1993. 254 pp. $14.50.)

David Gross, associate scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, resides in Tokyo where he works for a major Japanese electronics firm.

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Manzokuka shakai no hoteishiki: Ranki wo toku! (The satisfactory society: An answer to today's confusion!). By Taichi Sakaiya. (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Press, 1994. 313 pp. $14.50.)

In the past three years, Japan has been shaken by a series of unexpected changes that has finally brought to a close a stunning period of economic expansion and political stability. The April political crisis, occasioned by the sudden resignation of Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, was the most recent reminder that the current period of political unrest and overall drift will not pass by Japan as quickly as many had hoped. In Japan, before April, confidence emanating from the promises of the new coalition government gave way to confusion; afterwards, this confusion seemed to develop into deep pessimism and concern about national leadership.

Policy makers and analysts around the world, however, have felt a sense of private relief that Japan's accumulation of economic and political power has finally run up against constraints typical of those experienced by other advanced industrial economies. But, if those grappling with the implications of Japan's postwar rise to economic superpower status thought that the Japan of the 1980s was a chronic policy challenge, the mid-1990s and beyond will serve as a rude awakening. In retrospect, the task of dealing with a vibrant and prosperous Japan will pale in comparison to that of confronting a vexatious and stagnant one.

Japan's uncertain future flows from political as well as economic problems. The uncomfortably long pause in Japan's economic expansion is troubling but, as with any other such pause, perhaps temporary. But the political system, which has shown itself to be largely incapable of dealing with the complexities of an interdependent world economy and a post–cold war security environment, is far less likely to be self-correcting. And there are fears that, ultimately, Japan's economic slowdown is not a function of business cycle perturbations but is rather a broader systemic crisis. Much recent literature, including that written by Japanese, points to widespread structural economic inefficiencies, systemic corruption, and the detachment and intransigence of the bureaucrats who really run the country.

As a result of such observations and fears, old arguments on Japan's capacity to change, often referred to as outdated, are returning to the fore in public forums and literature. One argument, espoused earliest by the pioneering Japan scholar and eminent anthropologist Ruth Benedict (*The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,* 1946), is that the sociological underpinnings of the Japanese political character allow for unfettered commitment to a certain system and set of ideas, followed by a radical shift to another system once tactical adaptation to a new environment cannot be transformed into systemic flexibility. Stated differently, self-correcting, midway changes in the political system and the ideas that support it are difficult, if not impossible, to bring about. Needless to say, other observers are not resigned to such seemingly deterministic theories about change. But, clearly, old debates have been revived and transformed by Japan's new precariousness.

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Stakes have been raised compared to days past, too: the peace and prosperity of all Asia is at issue. Japan has steadily lost the good favor and patience of its most critical allies, including the United States. Further, Japan seems perched on the edge of a vast transformation that it is doing everything it can to avoid. It would be the height of folly if U.S. policy, in a spasm of narrow and myopic economic nationalism, pushed the Japanese from their perch in the wrong direction. Yet, that is not beyond possibility.

If that happens, it won't be the fault of the academy. The literature is adapting to new circumstances faster than statesmen and bureaucrats. It is, of course, a truism that statesmen routinely ignore scholarship; while this sometimes may be justifiable, recent literature can offer considerable guidance to policy makers and thus should be taken seriously.

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Two new books in particular, *Postwar Japan as History,* a collection of essays edited by Duke University professor Andrew Gordon, and *Japan: Beyond the End of History,* by *Japan Times* editorialist David Williams, are worth the attention of busy policy makers. Both concentrate on the historical evolution of postwar Japan in order to explain the larger context of Japan's economic power. This approach usefully complements that of the many exhaustive and exhausting studies of Japan's institutional peculiarities that dominate scholarship in this field. These two volumes are supported, in turn, by three relatively new works by social critic Taichi Sakiaya. As a whole, this set of recent literature on Japan aptly counsels us to consider synoptically Japan's development as a modern nation, and therein offers us a clear view of the forces working against meaningful reform.

What Is the Real Japan?

Both *Postwar Japan as History* and *Japan: Beyond the End of History* take up the debate on the "real Japan." On the one side are those who stress change, who see Japan as an evolving advanced industrial society with vexing but ultimately assimilable differences. On the other are those who stress continuity, arguing that Japan is an incorrigible nationalist polity supported by a society with immutably particularistic tendencies. Whether the editors and

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authors intended it or not, the evidence for continuity is more compelling than that for change. One can only consider such judgments, one way or the other, by stepping back far enough from current preoccupations. It is the merit of both *Postwar Japan as History* and *Japan: Beyond the End of History* that they accomplish this perspective.

The first surprise of the historical approach is the observation that Japan, though seen as having undergone dramatic change in recent years, is in fact long overdue for basic systemic reform. In this view, Japan is not changing too quickly to insure stability, but too slowly. Japan's major political and economic institutions are traceable to key events and decisions made during and directly after American occupation of Japan following World War II and, in contrast to other states whose political and economic systems have undergone either great upheaval or substantial revision since the 1950s, Japan is in many ways still experiencing "postwar" history.

Several essays in *Postwar Japan as History* expand on the theme that Japan's institutions remained virtually unchanged from those that emerged from the tumultuous yet authentic "postwar era" (1945–1955). Disheartening essays by Carol Gluck and J. Victor Koschmann show that the consolidation of pro-U.S. bureaucratic power and the widening of the national conservative center actually involved a silencing of true democrats and anti-establishment historians. These "liberal democrats" strove to prevent nationalist bureaucrats from stamping out political discourse on Japan's future and an honest discussion of its destructive past. The postwar Japanese polity, several authors argue, provided "autonomy within a stable order" but sacrificed political idealism and, to a large degree, meaningful political participation by most Japanese. Notions of democracy that had surfaced after the occupation were scuttled and replaced with "collectivist and consensual values" that persist today.

In other words, nearly forty years of rule since 1955 by a static, if moderately accommodative, conservative hegemony muted real political pluralism for the sake of economic growth. This new political establishment focused on national economic restoration, a separate peace from early cold war regional conflicts, and avoided genuine democratization.[1] But even in the economic sphere, it retained an elitist, non-democratic character. The emphasis on economic expansion as the overriding national goal gave rise to the emergence of a "management culture," a pervasive and manipulative middle-class ideology through which the Japanese people accepted meager increases in the standard of living in exchange for the overall stability deemed to inhere in constant increases in national wealth and industrial power.

Japan's views on the bilateral relationship with the United States, too, have been equally constrained by the persistence of postwar images and institutions. These views, in turn, have revolved around the placement, or more

[1] See, also, Kenneth Pyle, *The Japanese Question* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1992), which examines the formation of this conservative establishment in the period directly following the American occupation of Japan.

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precisely, subordination, of Japan in a global system dominated by the United States. John Dower and Bruce Cummings argue persuasively that the environmental givens of U.S. global leadership—a guarantee of security in Asia, steady commitment to free trade, and a willingness to allow crucial institutional aspects of the Japanese war economy to be carried over from Imperial Japan—in turn provided the conditions for the formation of the essentially illiberal political hegemony described above.[2]

The authors of *Postwar Japan as History* do point to certain elements of change within an otherwise pessimistic analysis. Within Japan's rigid political configuration, there are thin reeds of pluralism, open political expression, and debate at the heart of important questions of national direction. Sheldon Garon and Mike Mochizuki track political deals struck between interest groups and the conservative establishment that cleverly accommodated political objectives other than economic growth. These "social contracts" were, however, almost always consistent with the overall goals of the conservative leadership and thus served to "blunt oppositional thrusts against the state." Laura Hein discerns division within mainstream views of economic expansion and analyzes the implications of sporadic student revolts and popular demonstrations against the state. Editor Andrew Gordon examines hard-fought trade-offs between labor and management that also seem to portend change, and Marylin Ivy, Charles Horioka, and James White focus on emblematic social changes, such as consumerism and the spread of ideological conservatism in Japan. But, despite this view of change, the more powerful voices in the book remain those who point up Japan's unexposed problems and hidden weaknesses.

Not surprisingly, most authors in *Postwar Japan as History* are ambivalent about Japan's capacity for real internal reform. Part of the reason is that they see modern Japan as having become an imprisoned ally of the United States. The "outer limits" of the development of the postwar system—extending from economy to politics to culture—flowed from the American-dominated environment, as many of the authors of *Postwar Japan as History* cogently argue.

The belief that the special characteristics of Japan's domestic political and economic system were essentially products of an American-designed environment is not universal. Yes, argue other scholars, a unique set of historical circumstances mainly fashioned by the United States stimulated economic expansion and political stability in postwar Japan. But the real Japan was always elsewhere, deeper down, ineffable but indominable. Thus, argues one school, a distinctly Japanese way of organizing society also worked to promote rapid economic growth with a political economy sharply divergent from the West. And yet another school also sees economic development as drawing from enduring Japanese cultural attributes, but as having resulted in a "good modernity" compatible with the West. This literature ranges widely from exposition of the

[2] For a closer look at the illiberal character of Japan's democracy, see Peter Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy* (Tokyo: Japan Library Press, 1994).

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"capitalist development state" made famous by Chalmers Johnson, to the polar opposite symbolized in Ezra Vogel's argument that Japan successfully transformed itself into a modern state while avoiding problems that plagued Western nations.[3]

The gap in these understandings of Japan is unusually wide. A pessimistic school of thought exemplified by Johnson and many of the authors in *Postwar Japan as History* implies that the greatest discontinuity in Japanese history since the Meiji Restoration was defeat in World War II, and American occupation produced foreign-influenced institutions that collectively represent Japan's greatest problem today, stasis. A more optimistic school believes, despite Japan's accident-prone early twentieth-century history, that the continuity of Japanese culture provides the key source to its versatility and success.

A bizarre mixture of these two perspectives is to be found in David Williams's *Japan: Beyond the End of History.* On the one hand, Williams agrees with Johnson and others that contemporary Japanese institutions better reflect Japanese culture than American implantation, seeing more stasis than change. But on the other, he is excessively laudatory about Japan's achievements and is surprisingly optimistic about its future.

Williams argues that Japan's modernization is fundamentally different from the Anglo-American model and that our methodological tools for analyzing Japan are therefore inappropriate. The Japanese system justifies a whole new category of Western political science, he believes, and he asserts that Japan's political and economic system will not converge with the West in a way that would confirm the universal viability of the liberal capitalist state as defined by Francis Fukuyama.[4] Nevertheless, he allows that Japan is a "nationalist polity becoming a more liberal one," even if it has a long way to go.

This assertion of Japanese particularism, or exceptionalism, is, of course, nothing new. By now it may even be fairly overworked. Fortunately, however, Williams's conclusions are prefaced by an insightful review of the historical roots of Japan's postwar public policy. Williams describes postwar Japan as a nationalist polity rooted in a philosophical tradition more like that of Otto von Bismarck and Friedrich List than that of John Locke and Adam Smith. The failure of Western policy makers to see beyond Japan's formal constitutional structure to grasp this reality has resulted in countless ill-fated initiatives aimed at trying to make Japan more like the West, such as promoting economic liberalization and structural change. Echoing Johnson and von Wolferen, Williams argues that the West's conceptions of public policy and political economy do not apply to the role of the Japanese state in promoting economic development and in managing social norms.

[3] Chalmers Johnson's seminal work, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), spawned a series of books on the "capitalist development state" ranging from Karl van Wolferen's *The Enigma of Japanese Power* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), which largely supports Johnson's thesis, to Kent Calder's *Strategic Capitalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), which modifies it. Ezra Vogel's work, especially *Japan as Number One* (New York: Harper, 1979), has been followed by less successful attempts to praise Japan's unique economic and political system. See Daniel Burstein, *Turning the Tables: A Machiavellian Strategy for Dealing with Japan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993).

[4] See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest,* Summer 1989, pp. 3–18.

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Williams also stresses the cultural roots of deferring key national decisions to bureaucrats. Looking back to the Meiji Restoration, Williams tracks a "tradition of official discretion" in which bureaucrats are seen as reliable and competent wielders of national power. Such assumptions have made the Japanese a remarkably governable people, especially when matters of security were at issue. Liberal values and democratic tendencies are shallowly rooted compared to centrally planned industrialism and nationalism.

Williams then turns to the critical question: can Japan adapt systemically? Japan's capacity to change, he argues, inheres in the fact that national goals are implemented by a consensus formed among multiple authority centers of the government and the quasi-private sector. In the absence of any single source of overriding authority, institutional reform must satisfy the power structures and national priorities as they already exist. Under current circumstances, political rigidity originates from deep conflicts of interest among those trying to protect the status quo as a whole but rearrange its payoffs to benefit themselves.

That more than anything else explains the immobilism of Japanese public policy. It cannot be reformed from the outside, and is not capable of responding to bold external pressures or threats. In other words, Japan's problems are the result of Japanese sources—an eminently sensible observation. But that does not make them any easier to deal with or any less problematic for U.S.-Japanese relations.

Williams's keen understanding of the modern Japanese state sours a bit, however, when he describes Japan's "thinking nationalism" as an alternative to free market liberalism. Despite his own recognition of some of the problems Japan has fallen into, he applauds Japan's supposed early recognition of the primacy of economics in world affairs and the commitment of the nation's best resources to economic and technological development. Williams comes close to presenting the Japanese model as the only systemic alternative to the free-market model that the struggling countries of Eastern Europe can gainfully emulate.

How can this be? For Williams, apparently, Japan's problems are more or less accidental. He doesn't say so, but rather seems to assume that the current gridlock over fighting for the spoils of the status quo will resolve itself. Thus, Williams fails utterly to consider whether there are any inherent weaknesses in Japan's "thinking nationalism": system-threatening economic inefficiencies, immeasurable losses of personal freedom, and the destructive trial-and-error process Japan underwent to finally reach modernity. Williams's thesis verges on the patronizing when he praises the "extraordinary intellectual conquest in Japan's variant of modernity"—this in the face of his own discussion on the intellectual banality of bureaucratic power and the dangers of strong nationalist ideologies.

Reformist Appeals for a New Japan

The sociological imagination counsels that outsiders are often better able to discover truths about societies than those living within—a version of

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the "can't see the forest for the trees" aphorism that is present in virtually every culture in one form or another. True enough, but Japan may be a special case. It is hard to think of another modern nation in which the insularizing power of language and racial image is stronger, making it especially hard for outsiders to penetrate the cultural essence.

So it is fortunate that for every insight provided recently by non-Japanese observers we have available a series of reality checks from a cadre of Japanese social critics who have reacted fervently to the myopic policies undertaken by Japan's elite bureaucrats and conservative politicians. Perhaps the most significant of these is the gadfly of Japan's public forums and the press, Taichi Sakaiya, a former MITI bureaucrat and, today, an influential social critic.

Sakaiya's works are predictably free of Western bias on the one hand or fawning and fashionable cultural relativism on the other. And compared to other social commentators and analysts in Japan, Sakaiya's clear and powerful prose strikes a welcome, if discordant tone. His is a near-heroic act; whether Japan's political and business leaders will listen to him remains to be seen.

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Sakaiya argues, most centrally, that the same bureaucrat-led establishment that masterminded Japan's economic success has today stunted the standard of living, undermined the political legitimacy of elected officials, and excessively micromanaged an economy now suffering from oversupply, overcompetition, and stultifying inefficiencies. Excorciating bureaucrats for pursuing the narrow interests of their organizations at the expense of the long-term interests of Japan, Sakaiya and a few selected others have propelled a wave of "bureaucrat-bashing" in the Japanese media and public forums.[5]

In his searing attack on the powerful government ministries, Sakaiya concludes that bureaucratic control of the pre- and post-World War II governments was unimpeded by real public debate over Japan's national direction. Bureaucratic domination of the political system has succeeded in standardizing all facets of life aimed at expediting mass production and promoting private-sector dependence on regulatory agencies. This same bureaucratic establishment is also culpable for creating an "industrial monoculture" that has protected large suppliers at the expense of consumer freedom, and irritated Japan's closest

[5] In addition to Sakaiya, reformist Ministry of Health and Welfare official Dr. Masao Miyamoto has published a two-book series highly critical of the bureaucracy. The titles of these books are *Zainichi Nihonjin* (Japanese Japan-basher) (Tokyo, 1993) and *Oyakusho no okite* (The rites of the bureaucracy) (Tokyo, 1993). *Nikkei Business* recently printed a critical special report on the power of the Finance Ministry, which was preceded by a briefer article in *Business Week*, Mar. 7, 1994.

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allies around the world by promoting the cheap export of vast industrial surpluses.

In creating a society optimal for privately owned but publicly managed industrial giants, the bureaucrats have extended their control far beyond the economy. Each ministry has sought to expand its purview resulting in top-down management of national education programs; restrictions on information flow, media, and cultural expression; the centralized direction of regional development; and an insufficient assignment of resources to the foreign policy apparatus. Absorbed in these vast regulatory spheres, Japan's bureaucrats have strangled areas of the economy not related to mass-production—such as services—and shifted the economic losses to the overworked, undercompensated Japanese people. According to Sakaiya, the collective severity of these various spill-over effects today threatens Japan, body and soul.

Take the political system. With their tentacles on the media, the bureaucracies distort the views of elected officials and inflate their personal faults to undermine their legitimacy in the public eye. The ministries dominate the legislative process, writing most of the bills proposed on the Diet floor. Most important, government spending and taxation, and thus the assignment of policy priorities for the entire country, are firmly in the hands of the Ministry of Finance. Its reform therefore becomes the *sine qua non* for any real reformist government, but even the highest elected officials have little influence over the Finance Ministry, and the typical parliamentarian none at all.

Former senior bureaucrats also dominate political party ranks and display untrammeled commitment to the welfare of their former ministries well after they have officially left them. Elected politicians fear bureaucratic power and seek the ministries' political support. Political stability, argues Sakaiya, has been achieved at an excessively high cost.

How likely is real reform? As Sakaiya sees it, the current political apparatus pits self-proclaimed "peace conservatives" in the coalition government against still-powerful Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) operatives with their hands on the reins of the reform bandwagon. That is both good and bad. It is good because, as Sakaiya admits, Japan's bureaucracy-led economic success and the resourcefulness of its economic elites in moulding Japan's institutions for economic growth cannot be denied. But he doubts the long-term economic and political sustainability of the Japanese system now that the bureaucrats have outlived their usefulness. Broad reform may be impossible: the very organization and operational discipline of the ministries shuns the sort of thinking and policies that could lead to major systemic changes. He bases this view on history.

Looking back at strong Japanese and German bureaucracies at different points in modern history, Sakaiya finds that a period of stagnation and drift often follows the achievement of the state's initial developmental goals. In pre-World War II Japan, when the bureaucracy accomplished its ambitious economic goals and grew larger and more powerful, it lost touch with major changes in other countries and became isolated. Sakaiya's fear is that Japan will repeat this pattern of bureaucratic power accumulation, stagnation, and

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drift, leading to international isolation and erosion of the trust of Japan's allies. Indeed, because Japan lacks an overarching national policy function needed to overcome the ministries' power and parochial interests, its future may well depend on whether a new politics can escape the mangles of bureaucratism.

Sakaiya and his colleagues are no clattering legion of devoted reformists who can prompt major institutional changes in the political economy.

Sakaiya enjoys far greater prominence in the popular forums of Japanese media and in the West than he does in Japan's ruling circles—for now. He and his few colleagues are no clattering legion of devoted reformists who can prompt major institutional changes in the political economy. Some outspoken businessmen who harbor similar criticisms as Sakaiya, such as Fuji-Xerox chairman Yotaro Kobayashi, have often been branded as "half-American" despite their high status in industry and the media. But their influence is growing in rough proportion to the perceived seriousness of Japan's problems. While most Japanese still do not consider the bureaucrats as the main source of Japan's economic and political troubles, there is a growing awareness of the economic consequences of overregulation and an ossified political system. Hosokawa and the reform movement he has come to symbolize have, despite limitations in political power, exposed the excesses of bureaucratic management of the economy and corruption among politicians. Given the concern of influential businessmen about prolonged economic malaise, and other social critics worried about Japan's drift and international isolation, the reform movement may regain momentum even after Hosokawa's tenure. Such events would boost Sakaiya's influence and draw greater attention to his works.

Whether they do or not, Sakaiya's works ought not to be overlooked by American policy makers. Confronting an economy sapped by bureaucratic controls and jolted capriciously by a corrupt political system, outspoken Japanese social critics and realist historians provide a window on what will become an increasingly embattled yet still-critical partner of the United States.

Further, this new understanding of Japan is gaining momentum in the Japanese media and in business circles. U.S. policy makers must follow this new wave of anti-bureaucracy commentary if only to gauge the severity of Japan's internal problems and the possibilities for meaningful reform. As the Japanese debate widens to include issues such as the efficacy of industrial policy, policy makers there will be weighing anew the true costs of Japan's present political economy. This is a conversation of the utmost importance to the United States.

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Does America Matter?

In the 1980s, a group of Japanologists who were unfairly branded "bashers"—a group with whom David Williams is aligned—broke the academic fixation on Japan as a typical market economy, accusing free market economists of methodological dogmatism and historical ignorance. But by overlooking or denying evidence of the great costs of Japan's bureaucratic-style capitalism—such as that which Sakaiya provides us—these analysts developed an intellectual dogmatism of their own. This dogmatism has extended to a rejection of signs that Japan's economy is suffering from bureaucratic intervention and rhetorical attacks against those who provide empirical evidence of inefficiencies and structural problems.[6]

In making use of existing literature on Japan, therefore, American policy makers should beware the obfuscations of academic sparring contests. But they need do more than that. They must acknowledge the peculiarities of the Japanese system but without glorifying them or believing them impervious to influence. Indeed, with the nascent but seemingly unfettered emergence of an American diplomacy based strongly on economic criteria, such an awareness must form the core of Americans' understanding of Japan.

But beyond reading and thinking, is there anything American policy makers can do? Perhaps there is.

Nearly four years have passed since the collapse of the cold war order and the downturn of Japan's economy, yet Japan's leaders have not yet faced the changes of a new era. Meanwhile, as the external environment changed so dramatically, the bureaucrats, by doing nothing new, have completed their self-transformation, in Sakaiya's words, from "effective promoters" to "barriers of change." For a while, anti-bureaucracy agitation dovetailed with the stated goals of the Hosokawa administration. That is now in doubt, too. Clearly, then, as Sakaiya and others point out, the bureaucracy will not be tamed short of the transfer of real authority to elected politicians who are supported and directed by a more aware, politically active citizenry. That won't happen by itself, except if it is triggered by a major crisis that demonstrates to the wider public that the bureaucracy is incapable of providing comprehensive economic and physical security. If this occurs, a lot will be up for grabs and outside influence might, for a time, become crucial. The United States might have to save Japan in order to save the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Therefore, aside from reading and thinking, a little planning for what seems an extreme, but hardly impossible, contingency is in order.

More likely than a systemic crisis, however, is a protracted stalemate between entrenched bureaucratic interests and an organization of political interest around reformist politicians. That struggle will delay economic revival and lead to growing frustration with the hardening claims of the outside world.

[6] See, for example, Eamonn Fingleton, "Tokyo: Fine, Thank You," *The Atlantic,* May 1993, pp. 24, 35–39. See, also, Karl Zinsmeister, "Japans's MITI Mouse," *Policy Review,* Spring 1993, pp. 28–35, which shows both sides of the debate on the depth of Japan's economic problems.

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Such a climate will probably intensify as profound structural problems lurking below the recession-battered economy surface.

If this occurs, Japanese trade policy will become a political football in a domestic fight of ghastly proportions. Depending on the fate of reformists, Japanese policy could grow increasingly intractable. Outside pressure, if it is not aware of internal Japanese dynamics, could end up making things worse. Therefore, in reference to affecting change within Japan's political system, American policy makers should dedicate themselves to a determination, at the least, to do no harm.

American "managed trade" practices will have little long-term impact on market access to Japan. An unyielding U.S. trade diplomacy will only reinforce Japan's feelings of victimization and economic vulnerability, which play into the hands of centralized bureaucratic power.

Instead, amid a long period of instability and probable political impotence (Sakaiya's forecast is ten years), the United States must craft a new Japan strategy as well as a greater Asia policy. As to the former, we must be guided by the realization that significant reform in Japan will probably not occur without the shock of a major crisis, and that the Japanese bureaucracy will not otherwise relinquish its massive power for the good of the nation. In such an environment, American "managed trade" practices will have little long-term impact on market access to Japan and, worse, an unyielding U.S. trade diplomacy will only reinforce Japan's feelings of victimization and economic vulnerability, which unerringly play into the hands of centralized bureaucratic power.

A more effective U.S. approach would target the bureaucracy itself. First, policies aimed at shifting the political balance in favor of the anti-bureaucrats will in the long run serve American interests. As all the authors reviewed here agree, Japan's international environment over the past forty years *has* helped determine its economic fortune, political behavior, and domestic development. By shaping a new environment, the United States can stimulate policies that will normalize Japan's relations with the world and bring it out of the 1950s and into the post–cold war world.

One important aspect of such a policy would be the American-sponsored recrafting of the 1960 U.S.-Japan security pact. Such a recrafting could gradually expand Japan's decision-making role in foreign affairs; increase pressure for market liberalization coupled with new guarantees for basic resources ranging from rice to oil; bring selective punishment of those adversarial trade and protective practices under the *direct* purview of bureaucracy (that is, government procurement); and increase the mandate of elected political leaders by promoting Japan's stature in world organizations.

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As for Asian policy more generally, the beginning of wisdom is that foreign economic policy is not the same as foreign policy. Forging a comprehensive U.S. relationship with China will of necessity bring into being a circumstance in which Japanese decisions must take into account wider interests. Such a policy would have an economic dimension, but not only an economic dimension. Nor need such a policy be adversarial. The United States will continue to have more in common with Japan than with China, and friendship does not mean either patronage or perfect accord. Indeed, U.S. policies may be required to arouse the requisite Japanese pragmatism necessary to promote meaningful change so that Japan can continue to be a friend to America many decades into the future. As a catalyst for such change, only the United States can restructure the bilateral relationship and finally end Japan's postwar era.

Shocked Russians, Chagrined Economists
by James L. Hecht

RUSSIA 2010 and What It Means for the World. By Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson. (New York: Random House, 1993. 300 pp. $23.00.)

Adam Smith Goes to Moscow: A Dialogue on Radical Reform. By Walter Adams and James W. Brock. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. 156 pp. $19.95.)

Changing the Economic System in Russia. Edited by Anders Aslund and Richard Layard. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 237 pp. $39.95.)

The future of Russia's economy will have a profound effect on international events. One indication of its importance to American interests is that during the 1992 U.S. presidential election, George Bush, Bill Clinton, and Ross Perot all supported providing aid to assist Russia in the transition from a command socialist economy to a market economy.

Recognizing the importance of Russian reform is where agreement ends. At the political level, there is disagreement about how much the West, and particularly the United States, should make Russian reform its own business. Even old colleagues seem to differ here. Richard Nixon championed giving large-scale economic aid; Henry Kissinger believes we should focus our attention on Russian foreign policy behavior rather than its presumed domestic sources.

On the economic level, very wide differences of opinion exist both in the West and in Russia as to how the transition should be made. At the heart

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of the debate has been whether changes should be introduced gradually or whether the economy should be completely restructured immediately—"shock therapy." Not surprisingly, the debate has been affected by the ambiguous and contentious record of Russian reform over the last two years.

In the West, shock therapists led by Jeffrey Sachs, a brilliant and charismatic Harvard economist, have convinced those that count that their method is best. The U.S. government, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank all support rapid reform, such as completely freeing prices and ending subsidies to unprofitable businesses. Most young Russian economists schooled in the West agree. When Yegor Gaidar, the leader of Russia's shock therapists, was appointed prime minister by Boris Yeltsin in 1991, it appeared that a working consensus had arisen between external donors and internal managers. Expectations were high on both sides of the ocean.

But the Russian people prefer more gradual change. A little over a year after he was appointed, Gaidar was forced to resign as a result of public dissatisfaction with the economy. In 1993, Gaidar returned as a deputy prime minister, and many in the West believed that his policies would be supported in the December 1993 election. But Gaidar's party, Russia's Choice, despite being well financed and supported by the state-controlled television, received only 12 percent of the vote.

Although most well-known Western economists support shock therapy, probably a majority of economists specializing in the former Soviet Union do not. Nor do American and European business executives with extensive experience in the former Soviet Union support shock therapy. Three new books help explain the great debate over Russian economic reform, and two of them do it particularly well.

Adam Smith Goes to Moscow consists of a hypothetical dialogue between an American advisor advocating shock therapy and a skeptical East European prime minister. It is authored by Walter Adams, an economist and past president of Michigan State University, and James W. Brock, a business school professor. Written with wit and style, it addresses the wisdom of shock therapy by faithfully attempting to present both sides of the question.

As it proceeds, *Adam Smith Goes to Moscow* provides a triptych of the many complex issues involved in converting a socialist command economy to a functioning market economy. Marketization (that is, freeing prices), the monopoly dilemma, privatization, and stabilization are each covered in a separate chapter. That works well for beginners, but the usefulness of the book for those more familiar with the terrain is limited by the authors' own lack of knowledge about Russia and a naïveté about how economies really succeed. For example, it is easy to share the enthusiasm for Russian privatization expressed in the book by the hypothetical American advisor—and that seems to reflect the authors' enthusiasms, as well—but the sad fact is that Russians lack the managerial

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skills for privatization alone to make a large difference.[1] Even in Eastern Europe, research has found that the only companies that improved their performance after privatization were those with dominant Western partners who compensated for managers never before exposed to the best business practices. And East European states that were under communism for only forty years have a more robust market culture than Russia.

RUSSIA 2010, by Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, makes up for what *Adam Smith Goes to Moscow* lacks in providing detail about Russia and acumen about the political environment of economic reform. Every person concerned with Russia should read it. Yergin, whose last book won a Pulitzer Prize, is a world-class policy analyst; Gustafson is a highly respected expert on the former Soviet Union.

Since rapid reform would result in millions of people being unemployed (tens of millions, most likely), it is hardly surprising that the Russian people are reluctant to take the plunge.

RUSSIA 2010 is organized around a small set of alternative development scenarios, a tactic widely used by strategic planners. What is happening in Russia today is termed "Muddling Down"—a deterioration of the society and the economy. Among the major scenarios that might follow are "Two-Headed Eagle," a reassertion of power by the central government, or "Time of Troubles," a family of scenarios involving varying degrees of decentralization and chaos. But another possibility is "Chudo," the Russian word for "miracle," which holds steady progress toward a market economy, greatly increased investment (Russian and foreign), and consistently high rates of economic growth.

Yergin and Gustafson clearly do not believe in shock therapy; not even one of their many minor scenarios includes extended discussion of it. There is but brief mention of Gaidar's attempt at shock therapy along with the curt but accurate observation that "the legal and institutional bases for a market did not exist" (p. 35).

This observation, which has been painfully experienced by nearly every Western executive trying to do business in the former Soviet Union, summarizes why members of the business community have been so negative about shock therapy. Even if all of the immediate objectives of shock therapy were put into motion, almost all of the problems that have limited foreign and domestic investment would remain. These problems include the inadequacy of laws defining and protecting private property and tax policies that discourage investment by their volatility and confiscatory nature.

[1] See Kevin McDonald, "Why Privatization Is Not Enough," *Harvard Business Review,* May–June 1993, pp. 49–59; and James L. Hecht, *Rubles and Dollars* (New York: Harper Business, 1991).

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Even more basically, Yergin and Gustafson help us understand the social obstacles to economic reform. For example, the workplace plays a much larger role in the lives of most Russians than it does in Western countries. Russian enterprises usually supply their workers with housing, access to special food supplies, recreational areas, and vacation houses. In addition, one's job determines social identity. Since rapid reform would result in millions of people being unemployed (tens of millions, most likely), it is hardly surprising that the Russian people are reluctant to take the plunge.

Despite its dismissal of shock therapy, *Russia 2010* recognizes the true intent and accomplishment of radical reformers like Gaidar. They decapitated the command economy with stunning effect, and made a return to the old order impossible. Because of this impossibility, Yergin and Gustafson predict that by 2010, if not before, Russia will have a functioning market system, albeit one distinctively Russian in its particulars.

For all these considerable merits, *Russia 2010* is not the true masterpiece it might have been. There are questionable assertions; let's take the discussion of agriculture as a case in point.

Based on their belief that much of Russia's soil has been badly damaged, the authors indicate "there will be no strong agricultural revival in Russia by 2010" (p. 112). But U.S. Department of Agriculture experts report that Russia's major farm areas had such excellent soil that, despite deterioration, Russia still has some of the best farmland in the world. Yergin and Gustafson are correct when they say that in 2010, Russian farmers will not match the efficiency of the West, but matching highly efficient Western agriculture is not necessary for Russia to cease being a net importer of agricultural products. A much higher percentage of the workforce in Russia is engaged in agriculture than in the West, and this number could even rise for two reasons: massive decreases in industrial employment and acute urban pollution. Also, Yergin and Gustafson do not factor in the gradual application of Western know-how, privatization, and changes in market infrastructure that could lead to substantial gains from increased productivity and decreased spoilage.

Another case in point may concern crime and corruption. Yergin and Gustafson, like many others, predict that organized crime and corruption will become deeply entrenched and that a criminal "shadow economy" will persist. But as Yergin and Gustafson themselves make clear, the mafias are having a devastating effect on the economy. Consequently, drastic measures may be taken to bring crime under control.

Changing the Economic System in Russia, edited by Anders Aslund and Richard Layard, is a book typically academic in tone that will appeal to a smaller audience than *RUSSIA 2010.* But it is both insightful and particularly useful for those Westerners thinking about doing business in Russia. Its main novelty is that it is written by many of the key players, Russian and Western, and the superb editing has rendered their knowledge into smooth and eminently clear prose.

Western business executives interested in Russia will find "Privatization with Foreign Participation" by Boris Fedorov, a former deputy prime minister, of special interest. Fedorov recognizes that foreign investment is an excellent

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way to acquire the capital investments, technical know-how, and management skills necessary for privatization to succeed, but that foreign investors must deal with the hurdle created by legitimate Russian fears that foreigners will be allowed to acquire assets too cheaply and that Russians often tend to overvalue property. By warning Western businessmen to expect delays, disruptions, and dissimulations, he wisely counsels patience.

Of similar if more abstract value, Sergei Vasiliev, economic counsellor at the Centre for Economic Reform, explains how Russian culture works against economic reform. He discusses without cant or exaggeration such topics as the communal spirit (as opposed to individualism), contempt for commerce as an occupation, and a dislike of the prosperous. He observes, too, that power has been more important than law in Russia, which helps explain today's sorry state of property rights. That also explains why bribes are still considered by many as justified perquisites from pursuing private economic interests.

A chapter co-authored by Anatoly Chubais, the deputy prime minister in charge of privatization, is of special interest because it outlines the ambitious program now in the process of implementation. What stands forth from Chubais's presentation is both the blending of Western concepts with Russian realities and Chubais's sense of basic fairness—for example, that local and foreign investors should be subject to similar conditions.

Speaking of Western concepts, the chapter by Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton deals with "Remaining Steps to a Market-Based Monetary System." Lipton, like Sachs, has been an American adviser to the Russian government, and here the two discuss how the ruble can be made into a stable, convertible currency. More than that, the argument illustrates the intellectual powers that have made Sachs the undisputed leader of that group of economists advocating rapid Russian economic reform.

The advisability of shock therapy is also discussed by Anders Aslund, one of the book's editors, in a perceptive chapter titled "The Gradual Nature of Economic Change in Russia." Aslund, a highly respected Swedish economist who has specialized in the former Soviet Union for many years and who has been one of the most influential foreign advisors to the Russian government, argues that the economic problems that have arisen in Russia have been caused by excessive gradualism. His chapter contends that, in fact, shock therapy has never been tried. Special interest groups, often aided by corruption, produced exception after exception to price liberalization; export policy was guided by bribery and corruption; and subsidies never ceased. Aslund is right that the shock therapy he has advocated has never been tried, but it does not follow that it would work if it were tried. The institutional infrastructure for a market economy must be built first, and that takes time.

Moreover, economic factors must be combined with human factors. Shock therapists have done a disservice, not because what they propose is incorrect, but because it is premature. The Russian economy is like a sick person who will die without major surgery. The operation must be performed, no doubt, but it is often wise and proper medical practice to postpone the operation

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until the patient is "stabilized" and has sufficient strength, physically and psychologically, to survive. Russia, too, needs to be "stabilized" before surgery.

Moreover, to achieve eventual economic benefits from reform, Russians must pay a high initial price. Doing so exacts political capital, and there isn't very much of that to go around these days. In the meantime, there are ways to strengthen the Russian economy that do not carry the liabilities of shock therapy. Western pressures, rather than pushing Russia to emphasize macroeconomic reforms, should be directed at effective actions against crime and corruption, legal protection of property, and a stable tax regime conducive to business investment and export trade.

Western pressures, rather than pushing Russia to emphasize macroeconomic reforms, should be directed at effective actions against crime and corruption, legal protection of property, and a stable tax regime conducive to business investment and export of products.

Beyond that, it would be well if the international community stopped trying to buy help for Russia on the sly and on the cheap. For all the talk about foreign aid to help Russia make the transition, little has been done, and much of that has been pathetically self-serving. The U.S. role has been particularly disappointing.

Most U.S. "humanitarian aid," for example, has consisted of sending Russia excess U.S. agricultural products. The hundreds of millions of dollars of food aid, much of which was not "given" but financed, probably has not saved a single Russian life, and this at a time when large numbers of Russians are dying needlessly owing to an acute lack of medical supplies. Technical assistance to Russia, again, much discussed and lauded, has in practice been primarily a U.S. government welfare program to a few American companies—more often than not based on cronyism instead of merit. In this regard, Fedorov makes wry note of "the legions of Western consultants who are roaming around, consuming technical assistance and other funds, only to produce mountains of worthless paper" (p. 118).

Those charged with reforming Russia's economy have few precedents to guide them as they attempt to accomplish in a few years what took place in most countries over several centuries. The fact that these three worthwhile books on economic reform in Russia were published in 1993 is a small miracle; Russia only became a separate country at the end of 1991, and major economic reform in the region did not become a possibility until only a year earlier. And the fact that two of them, *RUSSIA 2010* and *Changing the Economic System in Russia,* are of superior quality raises hopes that, to paraphrase Winston Churchill on the Americans, the right thing in the end will be done . . . after all of the other possibilities are exhausted.

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The Legacy of Perestroika

by Vladimir Tismaneanu

The Fate of Marxism in Russia. By Alexander Yakovlev. Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993. 250 pp. $29.95.)

The Morphology of Russian Mentality: A Philosophical Inquiry into Conservatism and Pragmatism. By Vladimir Zviglyanich. (Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993. 318 pp. $79.95.)

The period of perestroika is commonly thought of in the West, if not also in Russia, as a brief but intense period of transition between Soviet totalitarianism and the yawning uncertainties of contemporary Russia. But calling a historical phenomenon a transition period is tantamount to relegating it to obscurity. That is a shame, for it is in the hinges of history, so to speak, that the anatomy of social change often reveals itself. Happily, then, two recent books on perestroika by authors who live within the storm—Aleksandr Yakovlev and Vladimir Zviglyanich—afford a chance to revisit this most portentous time. Fortuitously, too, the brilliance of one illuminates the exasperations of the other.

Yakovlev was one of the main architects of the political and economic project that led to the disbandment of the bureaucratic despotism called the Soviet Union. To the Soviet and post-Soviet "conservatives" (reactionaries, demagogues, and Stalinist-fascist rabble-rousers), his name is anathema. For example, in his memoirs, orthodox Leninist and former Politburo member Yegor Ligachev thundered against Yakovlev's allegedly perfidious role in influencing Gorbachev, hijacking what he referred to as the "healthy perestroika" and using it for malevolent, tenebrous purposes. Indeed, for the Russian nationalists and communists, Yakovlev (even more than Mikhail Gorbachev and former foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze) is responsible for all the disasters that have befallen their country: loss of imperial power, moral disarray, psychological chaos, military decay, economic bankruptcy, and the criminalization of society to boot.

Moreover, Yakovlev's unrepentant counteroffensive against the conservatives, and his continued prominent public presence as head of Russian Television, make him a central figure in ongoing political conflicts. Unlike Gorbachev, whose "has-been" status is undebated, Yakovlev still matters. What he writes therefore matters, too.

His recently published book, *The Fate of Marxism in Russia,* could have shed light on the real motivations of those involved in the great reforms, their illusions, hopes, disappointments, and failures. After all, the Gorbachev-Yakovlev

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philosophy represented what turned out to be the last gasp of Marxist revisionism, the ultimate if impossible endeavor to reconcile individual liberty with bureaucratic collectivism. Besieged from all directions, distrusted by genuine liberals, and despised by Soviet conservatives, this approach was doomed to fail, but reliving failure from the perspective of a true believer would have been revealing. Yakovlev's detailed defense of his choices as well as his response to his arch enemies would have been interesting. No less instructive would have been an analysis of the dynamics of de-Stalinization provided by the man who chaired the Politburo's commission charged with examining the crimes of the Stalinist era.

Although he never confesses the main illusions of perestroika—Yakovlev finally understands the futility of any political approach that covets monopolistic forms of authority.

Alas, we are disappointed, perhaps *because* Yakovlev is still in the public eye. Yakovlev offers the Western reader only a collection of essays on the destiny of Marxism in Russia. (Perhaps this match of subject and audience is partly a function of the fact that only in the West does anyone care anymore about theoretical Marxism.) Worse, Yakovlev's thesis is simple beyond expectation: Marxism was an alien theory imported to Russia and used by the Bolsheviks to achieve supremacy. For anybody familiar with the contributions of such authors as Isaiah Berlin, George Lichtheim, Isaac Deutscher, Richard Pipes, Robert C. Tucker, and Leszek Kolakowski, Yakovlev's musings sound despairingly trite and unoriginal. There is little analysis and much generalization about Leninism and Stalinism as offsprings of Marxism.

Yakovlev also fails to connect the mentality and practice of Bolshevism to the Russian political tradition. After all, it was not simply a theory that disfigured Russia; Russia also disfigured a theory that, intrinsically, was as liable to lead to Eduard Bernstein's Social Democratic reformist gradualism[1] and the Menshevik rejection of apocalyptical violence as it was to lead to the Gulag. Because Yakovlev ignores the historical fit between Marxism and Russian culture, he cannot settle the accounts he wishes to settle. Coming to terms with the past, highlighting the sources of radical evil as it occurred in the Stalinist years, requires historical exploration, self-questioning, intellectual courage, and ethical alertness. We have none of that here.

If there is anything of real importance in this book, it is on the order of the psycho-political. Although he never confesses the main illusions of perestroika—the belief in an "enlightened Bolshevism" and the self-appointed

[1] Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) was a German Social Democrat who advocated an evolutionary, incremental transition to socialism. His book *Evolutionary Socialism,* first published in German in 1899, influenced Western Social Democracy.

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redemptive role for the party intelligentsia—Yakovlev finally understands the futility of any political approach that covets monopolistic forms of authority:

> Since perestroika started out inside the Party, it could only announce itself as an initiative aimed at strengthening socialism and the Party, as an effort to bring about a more accurate understanding of Marxism-Leninism, and as a struggle to cement the socialist and communist nature of society. We had tried to destroy the Church in the name of a genuine religion and a genuine Jesus, only vaguely aware of the fact that our religion was false and our Jesus an imposter (p. 229).

Nicely said, to be sure, but what does this metaphor of the prodigal socialist really mean? Whom does Yakovlev speak for? Party intellectuals? The group within the apparatus (including the KGB) that brought first Yuri Andropov and then Gorbachev to power? And who is Jesus in this analogy? If not Marx then Lenin, but surely it was in the logic of Leninism to eliminate any vestige of pluralism and establish a system inherently hostile to true legality.

Despite its pretensions, then, Yakovlev has not written a theoretical treatise but a polemic case against a political doctrine responsible for countless atrocities and abominations. His approach is not a reckoning with the past, either, so much as an exercise in contemporary partisanship. The book repudiates the paradigm of intolerance and orthodoxy that continues to inspire "neo-Bolsheviks" today. Yakovlev's prime motivations spring from current political collisions in Russia, and these are motivations of survival, not scholarship.

Nor may the motives be said to flow from a detached historical serenity. Yakovlev's critique of this petrified ritualistic galaxy of dead symbols echoes Václav Havel's anatomy of the ideological mirage as proposed in his classic essay on the power of the powerless.[2] But Havel never participated in the ideological self-reproduction of the system, never prepared the ground for the punishment of dissidents, and never had to break with an existing "church." Is Yakovlev, a man who served as the supervisor of Soviet "ideological purity" for so many years, really entitled to excoriate it?

The reality of perestroika was not the intellectually based structural reform of institutions imagined by Yakovlev, but rather, as Ukrainian political philosopher Vladimir Zviglyanich asserts, the carnival-like cathartic ritual that allowed the dissipation of the monological (ideological) form of discourse. In others words, perestroika was not in essence a technocratic management enterprise that fell short, but a general social-psychological emancipation that swept away the old order. Zviglyanich's dense but thoughtful book advances this highly provocative interpretation of Gorbachevism, and convincingly so.

Using a conceptual framework developed by literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin—but one which also hauntingly recalls the Russian anarchists' indictment of the Bolshevik seizure of power—Zviglyanich calls attention to the striking parallel between the closed culture of the medieval world (in the times of

[2] See Václav Havel et al., *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe* (Armonk, N.J.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), pp. 23–96.

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François Rabelais) and the strictly controlled mental world of Homo Sovieticus. Once the pretense of "scientific" Marxian omniscience was challenged (especially through laughter, satire, pamphlet, comedy, carnival) the door was opened for the rise of a culture of tolerance and individualism. According to Zviglyanich, perestroika was a spontaneous resurrection of the sense of joy and freedom that frozen ideology had tried to annihilate with its enforced "revolutionary" asceticism.[3] In Bakhtin's vision, absolutism (monologue) is transcended thanks to carnival (irony, mockery, laughter), and freedom becomes possible in the form of dialogical communication.

Zviglyanich believes perestroika was a spontaneous resurrection of the sense of joy and freedom that frozen ideology had tried to annihilate with its enforced "revolutionary" asceticism.

Of course, the complete destruction of all the old taboos and the transvaluation of all Bolshevik "values" was not at all what Gorbachev (or Yakovlev) had in mind. But the carnival gathered its own momentum and the ideological "priests" had either to embark on apostasy (like Yakovlev) or leave the scene (like Ligachev). Zviglyanich sums up this development in a fine paragraph:

> The paradigm advocating the universal freedom of man is put forward by the democratic and liberal forces. The mixture of both ways was the mode of action Gorbachev used before his resignation in December 1991 and constitutes the essence of perestroika. According to Bakhtin's method of classification, Gorbachev was the typically grotesque figure of a carnival Bolshevik who desires to renovate socialism with the help of a market economy, thus attempting to combine the uncombinable (p. 170).

Thanks to Zviglyanich's rich and provocative analysis of which, alas, we can detail no more here—we get a glimpse of what is still the matter with Yakovlev. Ironically, Yakovlev's conceptual and philosophical assumptions remain dominated by precisely the doctrine he now so strongly rejects. His anti-Marxist statements notwithstanding, he still advocates some vague species of "ethical socialism" that would allow Russia to pursue its own "third way." As for the current predicament of his country and the onslaught on its fragile democratic institutions and values, Yakovlev has little to say except to lament the "lumpenization" of post-Soviet society.

[3] All real social revolutions, and attempts at them, have their carnival and even comedic side. See, for example, S. R. Turkle, "Symbol and Festival in the French Student Uprising," in Sally Falk Moore and Barbara Meyerhoff, eds., *Symbol and Politics in Communal Ideology: Cases in Question* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975).

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Maybe because the carnival is not over yet, and because he is so directly involved in it, Yakovlev could not write the fascinating political memoir he owes his contemporaries. If and when he does, he would benefit more than most from reading Zviglyanich's engrossing, truly innovative interpretation of Bolshevism, Stalinism, perestroika, and so many other adventures of the Russian mind.

Post-Soviet Withdrawal Symptoms
by Michael Radu

Russia and the New States of Eurasia: the Politics of Upheaval. By Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 437 pp. $19.95, paper.)

Conflicts in and around Russia: Nation-Building in Difficult Times. By Victor A. Kremenyuk. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994. 176 pp. $49.95.)

Russian Security after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow. Edited by Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. Miller. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's with the Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994. 150 pp. $14.00, paper.)

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was both the beginning of a new geopolitical reality and—less frequently remarked—the end of the last European colonial empire. This latter fact helps to explain much of the confusion surrounding the successor states of the USSR.

While the end of the British, French, and Portuguese empires was subsumed into the ongoing and larger reality of the cold war, the end of the Soviet empire was also the termination of that struggle. Thus, the former republics of the Soviet Union, Russia included, must face up to two revolutions simultaneously: the loss of a "war" and the breakup of an empire.

This difficult exercise has global implications, and they are fast upon us. For the time being, these implications are chiefly focused on Russia's activities in its "near abroad"—former Soviet republics other than Russia—and how those activities relate to domestic political turmoil inside Russia. Naturally, these are subjects of great interest and importance for the West as well as for the peoples of the former Soviet Union.

As we study and debate such issues, we would do well to work on three tasks: mastering basic information that heretofore seemed marginal; paying attention to assessments by Russians and others in the area concerning their

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own predicaments; developing patience, in particular the patience to resist conclusions about matters still in flux. The three books under review here clearly help in accomplishing these tasks.

Before one can comprehend the politics and policies of the former Soviet Union, one must understand well the differences between the Soviet empire and other modern European colonial empires. Dawisha and Parrott's *Russia and the New States of Eurasia* provides much elucidation in this regard.

First, they point out that the Soviet empire's claim to legitimacy rested on two pillars, one explicit, the other unstated or denied. The explicit pillar was Marxist-Leninist internationalism; the pillar unstated or denied was Russian chauvinism. By contrast, French and British colonialism rested on pragmatic geopolitical, military, or economic interests, notwithstanding vague proclamations of "the white man's burden" and "the civilizing mission." Then, too, as Dawisha and Parrott correctly note, the formation of the modern Russian nation did not precede the process of czarist colonial expansion but instead coincided with it. This experience was virtually the reverse of the French, British, and Portuguese experiences, and the result is that Russian national consciousness does not separate easily from the notion of territorial expansionism and empire.

Dawisha and Parrott also observe that the modern West European empires were propelled by advances in science and its military-technical applications, most obviously in navigation, transportation, and weaponry. As a consequence, these empires were based on economically vibrant homelands and were global in reach. As a result, the geographical distances between the metropolitan power and its colonies were enormous, and so also, more often than not, were the cultural differences between the colonizers and the colonized. Indeed, this latter separation was often maintained as a matter of policy; few Frenchmen or Britons expected or wanted their non-European subjects to become like them.

Not so with the Russians. Their empire was continental; their methods of expansion traditional; and territorial distinctions between the metropolitan country and the colonies were blurred, as were cultural distinctions. For the most part, the Russians lived in the midst of their subject peoples and, as self-styled cultural superiors, expected their subjects to become culturally Russian. The result, nearly everywhere outside of European Russia, was the development of highly stratified cultures delineated principally by distinctions of power, language, religion, and economic roles.

A third difference between the Russian and West European empires concerns frontiers. While much is still made of the arbitrary borders drawn by Western powers, those borders did, at least on occasion, make some historic sense. And, sensible or not, most lasted long enough to acquire a modicum of legitimacy in the eyes of the inhabitants. Not so in the case of the Soviet Union, where Stalin purposefully redrew internal czarist boundaries to make sure that no unit would be ethnically homogeneous, economically self-sufficient, or even historically plausible.

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Thus, the borders between Belgian Congo (Zaire) and Portuguese Angola, British Nigeria and French Cameroon, British Kenya and German Tanganyika were decided on the basis of bureaucratic convenience and diplomatic or military realities. The borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Russia and Kazakhstan were drawn (and redrawn) primarily on the basis of a divide-and-conquer manipulation of ethnicity, with details decided by such factors as communist party cliques, tribal loyalties to the regime, or simply the whim of a dictator.

Not all the successor states of the USSR are equal, either in the nature or in the intensity of their national identity.

After treating differences between Russian colonialization patterns and those of the West European empires, Dawisha and Parrott turn their attention to differences within the former Soviet Union. Not all the successor states of the USSR are equal, either in the nature or in the intensity of their national identity. Belarus, the most likely candidate to be reincorporated into a new Russian empire, has at best a vague sense of nationhood. Indeed, at the end of 1992, 80 percent of Belarusians polled thought that the end of the USSR was a "great misfortune." Ukraine's identity problem is regional; the closer to Russia a given population lives, the weaker the sense of separate Ukrainian nationhood.

The two extremes, however, are the Baltic states and Central Asia: the former with a recent history of independent statehood and a strong sense of national identity, the latter with neither. Dawisha and Parrott explain well the predicament of the Balts in general and of the Estonians and Latvians in particular. These are small nations who consider themselves culturally Western and thus superior to the Russians, and they are economically the most advanced provinces of the former USSR. But, at the same time, both nations are in danger of cultural extinction because Moscow settled Russians and Russian-speakers in their territory, deliberately and massively. Today, ethnic Latvians make up barely half of their country's population, ethnic Estonians only some 60 percent, and both are trying to limit the rights of their Russian settler populations, which they perceive, with more justification than the authors allow, as arrogantly disloyal, economically backward, and culturally unassimilable. The fact that in the December 1993 Russian elections, Russians in Latvia and Estonia voted overwhelmingly for the communist and ultranationalist parties (much more so than voters in the Russian Federation) has only stiffened the Balts' mistrust and fears.

In Central Asia, on the other hand, modern statehood and nationhood—even the phoney Soviet version—is a recent development, still in the process of definition. Sunni Islam and shared Turkic dialects have generally played an important unifying role in the region, outweighing distinctions of clan, tribe, and vague historical traditions. (The Farsi-speaking and more urban Tajiks are the exception—and they are the only Central Asian people with a tradition of

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statehood.) In Central Asia, therefore, we see a pattern closer to that of the Western colonial situation: a distinction between imperial and colonial peoples (Slav versus non-Slav), reinforced by distinctions of race (European versus Asian), religion (Orthodoxy versus Islam), economics (urban versus rural, skilled versus unskilled), and education (literate versus largely illiterate).

Furthermore, recently developed national consciousness in Central Asia tends to be simultaneously insecure and aggressive; hence, the general Central Asian wariness of implicit Uzbek claims to regional hegemony based on numerical superiority and dubious interpretations of medieval history. (Uzbek nationalists often mention that certain of their cities—Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khiva—had a history of statehood; what they don't mention is that those cities were, historically and culturally, Tajik centers.) As Central Asian nationalisms develop, the region's economic woes are tending to drive them toward parochialism and even chauvinism. Thus, perhaps more than anywhere else in the former Soviet Union, the borders drawn by and inherited from Moscow may be called into question, and under circumstances where only Russia can effectively police the consequences.

What is valuable in these offerings by Russian analysts is not directly in what they say, but in what they reveal about basic attitudes and assumptions.

All these factors suggest that post-Soviet politics, borders, and stability are in flux, and nowhere is this more the case than in Russia itself. As its former colonies are unlike former Western colonies, so post-imperial Russia is unlike other former home-countries. One obvious reason is the suddenness of imperial collapse: whereas Britain and France divested themselves of empire over decades and had the time to formulate adaptative responses, Russia did not. And whereas British decolonization was the result of a deliberate policy of withdrawal, Russian decolonization was haphazard, the result of uncontrollable events rather than policy decisions.

As a consequence, the very concept of Russia's post-imperial national interest was until recently hotly debated. Victor Kremenyuk and the Russian authors included in the Johnson and Miller volumes help explain the internal Russian debate and prefigure its outcome, increasingly clear since 1992 and obvious after the December 1993 elections.

Most of what is valuable in these offerings by Russian analysts is not directly in what they say, but in what they reveal about basic attitudes and assumptions. We may also be usefully reminded by this literature that, Marxism-Leninism or not, we and the Russians do not approach such subjects with the same mental grammars.

Kremenyuk's central task is to define the parameters of debate on Russia's national interest at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse. It was a

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confused moment, true, and the confusion in Kremenyuk's account may reflect that. On the other hand, this veteran of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada may have had obfuscation in mind. In any event, Kremenyuk distinguishes between a "quasi-imperial" definition of Moscow's international position and an "isolationist" one. The former, personified by former foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze among others, argued for an active international diplomacy in line with Moscow's position as a great power and its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. At the other extreme, we are told, were the isolationists who were interested primarily in recasting relations with the former Soviet republics in a way that would maximally benefit Russia.

Arbatov mildly expresses what Kremenyuk implies and what Lukin muscularly claims: Russia has a right to limit the exercise of sovereignty by its former colonies if Moscow perceives their policies to be hostile to Russian interests.

In between these extremes are the views championed by people like Vladimir Lukin. Lukin, formerly the Russian ambassador to the United States and today the chairman of the Duma's Foreign Relations Committee, is probably Russia's most influential and articulate foreign affairs spokesman. He sees relations with the near abroad as a priority because of the large number of Russians living there. The key point, however softened it may be, is that Lukin thinks good relations with the former colonies are conditioned on the latter's inclination to "respect" the Russian minority's rights (as defined, presumably, by Moscow) and, most ominously, by Russia's "right to expect them not to conduct hostile policies or encourage unfriendly policies of other countries on their territories" (p. 72).

This view of Russia's foreign policy priorities, an opinion Kremenyuk clearly shares, is also expressed by Alexei Arbatov in *Russian Security after the Cold War*, a volume useful for Arbatov's essay and little else.[1] Arbatov's essay stands out largely because it is representative of articulate opinion among up-and-coming Russian foreign-policy makers.

For Arbatov, Moscow's maximum goal in the near abroad should be "economic integration and close political cooperation" with at least some of the former Soviet republics, while the minimum *vital* goal is good-neighborly

[1] Six of the seven "views from Moscow" deal with issues of narrow importance, such as military industrial conversion (Andrei Kokoshin, Russian deputy defense minister), the Russian military in general (Yevgeni Shaposhnikov, former commander of CIS Joint Armed Forces, and V.N. Lobov, former chief of the General Staff of the USSR); or with general overviews of specific issues (Sergei Rogov on relations with the United States, Dmitri Rurikov on the origins of the Russian Federation's foreign policy establishment). Former Russian Parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov's musings on the CIS are outdated and of minimal historic significance.

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relations and the "prevention of a coalition of republics hostile to Russia, supported by major foreign powers."

Thus, Arbatov mildly expresses what Kremenyuk implies and what Lukin muscularly claims: Russia has a right to limit the exercise of sovereignty by its former colonies if Moscow perceives their policies to be hostile to Russian interests. All three authors also include in their definition of hostility any alliance with "other major countries," at least in the cases of the Baltics and the Ukraine.

Arbatov is even more specific and his views more alarming. Russia can make border changes in its favor should some—undefined—"genocide" against minorities take place in the near abroad. Even more disturbing, Arbatov says Russia could invoke these same rights if an ex-Soviet republic elected to change its borders by joining another state. This amounts to a claim that Russia retains de facto imperial control despite its vastly changed political circumstances.

Arbatov's views are particularly important in part because of who he is. Son of Gyorgy Arbatov, the omnipresent Soviet spokesman on relations with the United States from the Brezhnev to the Gorbachev eras, the younger Arbatov is perhaps the perfect example of the intelligent, articulate, and successful scions of the former *nomenklatura*.[2] He is part of the group of intellectuals who described themselves, with some justification, as Soviet "liberals" during the 1980s, working against—they unfailingly told us—the "hawks" in the military establishment and in the older echelons of the Communist Party.

In other words, Arbatov and Kremenyuk are about the best we can expect when it comes to those who are about to shape Russian foreign policy, and even they seem to share a Solzhenitsyn-like definition of Russia's minimum "vital" geopolitical and cultural space. Arbatov allows that residents of Moldova and Azerbaijan may move toward their kith and kin across the borders, and Central Asia may become part of "the South Asian region," but he draws the line at the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus; they are fated to enjoy "deep economic integration and close political cooperation" with Moscow. In this, Arbatov typifies virtually all Russians who think about such issues and whose views matter: these regions are of vital domestic and foreign policy interest to Russia.

As it turns out, both Kremenyuk and the contributors to the Johnson and Miller volume have accurately forecast not only the parameters but also the proximate outcome of the foreign policy debate in postcommunist Russia. Basic Russian objectives, shared by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Boris Yeltsin alike, include claims to a "natural" Russian veto over the foreign policy alignment of all former Soviet republics, including the Baltics. None is to be allowed to join NATO, for instance, or to ask for or receive non-Russian foreign military aid. The rights of Russian minorities everywhere in the near abroad, as Moscow chooses to define those rights, not only justify but legitimize Russian interference; and some former Soviet republics—particularly Ukraine, Belarus, and

[2] Victor Kremenyuk was also a staff member of Gyorgy Arbatov's Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada.

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Kazakhstan—are seen by Russian policy makers as forever a natural area of Russian influence.

In sum, Dawisha and Parrott have provided a concise, clear, well-written and well-timed volume that will help with the first task mentioned at the outset: getting the basics straight. As for the second task—understanding how the Russians see their own post-imperial priorities—the Kremenyuk and the Johnson and Miller volumes give us much of what we need there. Alas, none of the books under review help us much in judging the future, but in that regard we must not be too harsh; prophecy is obviously a demanding craft or there would be more successful prophets. Are current Russian elite attitudes reflective of the psychological scars of a sudden loss of international prestige that, in due course, the Russians will get used to bearing? Or do these attitudes reflect the deeper evolution of Russian nationalism and promise to be with us for a long time? We don't know, but—in different ways—all three volumes reviewed here lean to the latter possibility. If that turns out to be the case, developing a pragmatic American partnership with Russia is going to be a trying endeavor.

War: Taking It from the Top
by Bruce D. Berkowitz

A History of Warfare. By John Keegan. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994. 432 pp. $27.50.)

John Keegan is probably the best-known and most-read military historian today, and for good reason. His books provide a level of detail and a depth of explanation that allow the ordinary reader to appreciate not only why war is so horrible, but also why one side wins and the other loses.

Keegan first gained attention with *The Face of Battle* (Viking, 1976) a comparison of ground combat from medieval times to modern. More successes followed, including *The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare* (Viking, 1989), which accomplished the same analytical task for naval warfare, and *The Mask of Command* (Viking, 1987), a fascinating comparison of the military-leadership styles employed by Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses Grant, and Adolf Hitler. Those readers lacking professional involvement with military affairs particularly appreciated Keegan's masterful ability to dissect complex events and, most of all, his clear and engaging style.

Many of these readers will be disappointed by Keegan's latest effort, *A History of Warfare,* which is also his most ambitious book to date. Not that it's a bad book. On the contrary, it achieves its main goal, which is to offer explanations both of how warfare has evolved and how it has shaped the

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development of society. The problem is two-fold: that the explanation is partly unoriginal, partly unfulfilled; and that *A History of Warfare* lacks the appealing story-telling style for which the author is justly famous.

Keegan argues that war required societies to develop armies. "The history of the world is largely a history of warfare, because the states within which we live came into existence largely through conquest, civil strife, or struggles for independence" (p. 386). Armies in turn provided an important organizing structure for the society. Indeed, Keegan believes the very development of towns, which first necessitated civic organization, was driven by the construction of fortifications and the need to train and control military units. This is not a new idea, but Keegan illustrates it well, and then goes further. He contends also that the flexibility of a society's military structure frequently determined that society's ability to adapt and survive over the long term. And one of the most important aspects of this flexibility, Keegan notes, was the military's eventual willingness to relinquish social and political control.

The Eastern tradition has proven to be more successful not only for war (witness Vietnam) but possibly also for economic production (witness the Pacific Rim).

More prosaically, Keegan observes that the capability of a society's military has often been critical to the society's survival—societies whose armies could not cut it were eventually displaced from their land and became either extinct or marginal. Thus, Keegan urges the oft-proposed thesis, taken perhaps to its most exalted level by John U. Nef some forty years ago,[1] that the development of technology, from iron-forging to computers, has commonly been driven by a military application (spears and artillery, in the two cases mentioned).

Eventually, Keegan's cross-national, cross-millennium study of war and society settles into a broad comparison between Eastern and Western military cultures. He argues that Western military culture "played for keeps"—its objective was to defeat the enemy and then crush it in a direct confrontation. When combined with better technology—firepower, transportation, delivery systems, and so forth—this Western "fight to the finish" resulted in the horrors of Gettysburg, Verdun, Stalingrad, Dresden, and Hiroshima. In contrast, the Eastern military tradition was to feint, dodge, and concede short-term losses in order to achieve long-term victory.

Because the West was first to harness the technology and the organizational know-how of the Industrial Revolution, it was initially more successful than the East, Keegan says. In the long run, however, the Eastern tradition has

[1] John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950).

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proven to be more successful as a strategy and organizing concept, not only for war (witness Vietnam) but possibly also for economic production (witness the Pacific rim).

On a broader level still, Keegan examines various answers to the question of why war occurs at all, considering each of the traditional explanations in turn: psychological and anthropological roots; economic need and geographic opportunity; ethnicity and culture; and ideology. As a result of his inquiry, Keegan concludes that—although warfare has been a driving force behind the development of civilization so far—it is not innate to human nature. Quite the contrary, Keegan says, agreeing with John Mueller's assertion that war between advanced industrial countries is becoming obsolete. He cites Mueller to the effect that modern civilizations have learned through experience not to escalate to warfare even when they are on the losing end of economic and political transactions.

In sum, *A History of Warfare* is not a typical Keegan book in either content or style. But it is not merely a lack of familiarity that evokes unease. To begin with, Keegan's sweep is so broad that one suspects his basic premise is overdrawn. Although Keegan makes an excellent case for the importance of warfare and military preparations in shaping various societies, he does not adequately test his assertion against competing arguments: the importance of environmental factors, the nature of pre-urban economic organization, or even the transmission of disease. Consequently, the reader cannot determine just how important military factors were in a given case of social evolution over time.

But, above all, there is style: Keegan's past books have hooked readers with illuminating concrete details gleaned from viewing warfare at every conceivable level of organization. By describing seemingly trivial factors—such as the cost of transportation, the technology of preserving food, or the technical details of sailing ships and missiles—Keegan's previous works have brought alive the real sinews of war in its essential social organization. By contrast, *A History of Warfare* tends to view events from the top only, describing peoples and nations, trends and patterns, but with much less emphasis on the affairs and interactions of individuals. The result is a more abstract and, in this instance at least, a less satisfying work. Not a bad piece of work, to be sure, but one that makes the reader eager for Keegan's next effort—which, with any luck, will be written in the author's more familiar manner.

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